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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the nature of understanding 
in multi-racial social work practice (MRP), and in 
particular with the philosophy of anti-racist social work. 
After a review of the past and present literature on MRP 
which charts the development of anti-racism and black 
perspectives in social work, it is concluded that new 
approaches are needed to take account of the importance of 
racism conceived as a linguistic resource. A consideration 
of the wider literature on race and racism leads on to an 
exploration of hermeneutic philosophy as a general guide 
to the analysis of problems of communication and 
understanding in social work. The work of Gadamer and 
Derrida is reviewed in some detail, in the context of 
wider developments in the philosophy of language and in 
literary criticism and textual analysis. It is argued that 
analysis of social work texts can offer new insights into 
the problems of formulating guidelines for anti-racist 
practice. Two exemplary analyses are presented: the first 
of Dominelli 's text Anti-Racist Social Work and the second 
of Ahmad's Black Perspectives in Social Work. Finally, it 
1S suggested that this analysis demonstrates the utility, 
and complementarity, of Gadamerian and Derridean 
perspectives in this effort - and that we must recognise 
that the positions we adopt on the best way forward are 
necessarily provisional, just as the commonly understood 
meanings of key terms in the debate about race and social 
work remain provisional. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with questions of understanding 
in social work, and in particular looks at how these are 
addressed 1n the context of multi-racial social work 
practice. My interest in this area was sparked during a 
period as a field social worker in an inner-city London 
borough, where a largely white staff of social workers and 
managers/administrators worked with a racially mixed 
client group. In the first instance, I had thought to set 
up a study which would look at the treatment of comparable 
groups of black and white users of social services, as 
they passed through the social services system from 
initial referral or presentation to allocation. The object 
of the study was to examine the similarities and 
differences between the 'career' patterns of white and 
black clients in order to clarify the processes whereby 
some individuals assumed or were inducted into the role of 
client, and to see if similar processes operated with 
respect to white and black users. 
However, discussion of this proposal within the 
department, together with the reading I was doing on the 
subject of social work across racial, ethnic or cultural 
boundaries,1 led me to reconsider the priority of this 
project. The personal discussions I had with both white 
and black colleagues made it clear that the whole area of 
communication and inquiry between white and black is 
potentially fraught with difficulty - and the scope for 
misunderstanding and communication breakdown, in turn, is 
immense. So before a study of the kind I had envisaged 
would be possible (both practically and politically), 
other issues needed to be addressed. 
The kinds of questions that now presented themselves had 
taken a different, more philosophical turn: how is 
understanding between individuals from different racial, 
ethnic or cultural backgrounds possible, and (if it is) 
what is the nature of the understanding that can be 
achieved? How is the dimension of race conceptualised and 
treated and, arising from this, what understanding of 
racism informs social work practice? If racism plays a 
role in structuring the encounter between client and 
worker, and between worker and worker, then how (if at 
all) 1S it dealt with and challenged? Is 'anti-racism' -
however this term may be defined - an appropriate or 
effective response? The social work literature suggested 
some answers to these questions, but left a number of 
issues unresolved. Indeed, the abiding impression from a 
study of a range of texts was that social work had not yet 
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satisfactorily got to grips with multi-racial practice. I 
therefore began to look for new ways to interpret and 
supplement this literature, and thus initiated the line of 
inquiry that has resulted in this thesis. 
My starting point is an area of concern that has been much 
remarked upon, but remains problematic: namely, what is -
or should be the nature of social work practice, 
education and training in relation to ethnic minorities 
(workers, students or clients)? The 'what is' part of the 
question can be dealt with briefly. From the available 
literature, an argument can be constructed which says that 
social work in its present form is widely considered to be 
inadequate at best, and positively damaging at worst, to 
black people. The 'ought' dimension - that is, what ought 
social work to do or be like in relation to black people -
has remained controversial. The debate about social work's 
involvement with ethnic minorities has at times been 
heated and has, in some cases, inhibited white workers who 
fear that 'incorrect' action or speech however 
well-intentioned may lead to them being accused of 
racism. Better then to remain silent. Even if we are not 
sure exactly what the current orthodoxy on 'anti-racist' 
practice entails or what its effects should be, it is 
better (that is, safer) not to make too much noise about 
it. But such inhibition is, in the end, unsatisfactory and 
this thesis marks the working out of my attempt to engage 
with the complexities of the race and social work debate 
by focussing attention on the philosophical bases of 
anti-racism. 
That there 1S a problem in social work's relations and 
involvement with ethnic minorities has been noted by a 
range of bodies from the Association of Directors of 
Social Services (ADSSjCRE, 1978) to the Central Council 
for Education and Training in Social Work (CCETSW, 1991), 
as well as by client groups, individual practitioners and 
academics. The first chapter examines a range of these 
accounts of multi-racial practice. Acknowledgement of 
racism as a key factor in the debate about multi-racial 
practice 1S a feature of the more recent literature 
discussed 1n chapter two. The texts that I suggest 
represent the 'state of the art' in social work thinking 
and theorising argue for two interconnected positions 
based on 'anti-racism' and the incorporation of 'black 
perspectives' into all aspects of social work education, 
training and practice. With the development of these 
positions, social work thinking moves into a new phase and 
becomes more self-analytical and self-critical. But 
neither the 'anti-racist' approach nor the adoption of 
'black perspectives' are entirely straightforward, and I 
discuss the problems associated with each of these 
positions in the course of the second chapter. 
3 
I conclude that chapter by suggesting that it might be 
helpful to look outside social work for a way of 
re-conceptualising, and hence thinking of ways to 
intervene practically in, multi-racial practice. This 
conclusion is based on a rethinking of the terms of what I 
refer to as the 'race and social work' debate, using a 
framework drawn from and discussed in parallel with 
Harding's account (1986) of the trends ln feminist 
critiques of science. 
In chapter three, the concept of racism is taken up 
explicitly and examined from a range of perspectives to 
chart a shift from 'race' to 'racism'. I look at the 
history and range of ideas about race and how these have 
been organised in racist discourses. Next, I discuss the 
cognitive dimensions of racism, and follow that with a 
consideration of the political dimensions, including the 
construction of what has become known as the 'new racism' 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s. I also consider the way 
racism is reproduced through the operation of prejudiced 
communication structures and strategies, and suggest that 
an understanding of racism which ignores its linguistic 
dimension would be inadequate to explain its power and 
persistence. I arrive at a position where racism is 
presented as a cultural or linguistic 'resource', 
operating at the level of common sense - largely implicit, 
unthought, and untheorised, relying on its everydayness to 
maintain a purchase on a range of discourses many of which 
inform or structure the discourse of social work itself. 
The Vlew proposed above, that racism operates as a 
linguistic resource, has philosophical as well as 
methodological implications for the race and social work 
debate; these are worked through in the remainder of the 
thesis. To take the philosophical first: the linguistic 
turn directs the focus of the study onto the ways in which 
language operates, and understanding or meaning are 
generated. I take this, in general terms, to be the 
province of the branch of philosophy known as 
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is concerned specifically with 
problems of textual interpretation which, I suggest, suits 
it to a study of social work an activity that is 
irreducibly dependent on reading and writing, on the 
production and reception of text. 
Chapters four and five are devoted to an extended 
exploration of what could be characterised as two 'wings' 
of hermeneutics - the hermeneutics of tradition associated 
with Gadamer, and the more radical deconstructive approach 
associated with Derrida with a view to establishing 
whether these approaches could contribute to an 
understanding of social work with ethnic minorities. The 
Gadamerian hermenutics of tradition fits well with much 
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that is accepted as valuable ln current social work 
practice, particularly practice based on the 
'client-centred' models, and it offers a constructive way 
of conceptual ising the interaction between worker and 
client and between colleagues. 
However, I also suggest that there are limitations to this 
approach, namely that it can result in acquiescence in the 
status quo which, from the viewpoint of this thesis, is 
taken to be largely beneficial to the white majority at 
the expense of black and other ethnic minorities. The more 
radical process of deconstruction, though, offers no such 
opportunity for opting in favour of the status quo, since 
it involves the critic or reader in a rigorous analysis of 
the conceptual structures that support given (dominant) 
discourses and texts. Chapter five, therefore, presents an 
account of deconstruction, which considers it both in 
relation to the limitations attributed to Gadamerian 
hermeneutics, and in terms of its specfic contribution to 
the race and social work debate. 
In chapter six, methodological concerns are addressed. The 
practical or 'strategic' implications of the linguistic 
resource position are discussed in relation to an area of 
study that foregrounds reading and the study of text 
generally literary criticism. Different approaches to 
reading are considered, each one drawing on a particular 
conception of 'the text' and the location and determinacy 
of meaning. I suggest that the methodological concomitant 
of the philosophical position elaborated in the preceding 
two chapters is a form of reading that locates meaning 
neither in the text nor the reader; indeed, it is a form 
of reading that abandons altogether the search for 'the' 
meaning, and focusses instead on the multiplicity of 
meanings and the processes of their production. 
Two further chapters engage more directly with the 
hermeneutic approaches previously discussed and offer 
extended readings of two social work texts, one of which 
defines itself explicitly as 'anti-racist', the other as 
avowedly from a 'black perspective'. By analysing both the 
content of these books and the process of reading them, I 
return directly to the earlier concerns of the thesis, and 
consider the usefulness of a hermeneutic approach for an 
understanding of social work across racial, cultural or 
ethnic boundaries. I conclude by suggesting that 
hermeneutics does indeed have much to offer social work, 
but that it cannot provide a once-and-for-all answer to 
the problems of understanding and meaning. The search for 
such an answer is misconceived, being based on a 
misconstruction both of the nature of racism and, beyond 
that, of language itself. Hermeneutics does not tell us 
how to do social work in the 'right' way, but rather 
offers a way of thinking about, and opening up, the 
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conceptual frameworks within which we find ourselves. Only 
by recognising that our existing answers are always 
provisional can we hope to improve them. 
6 
INTRODUCTION 
NOTES 
1. It is clear, even at this early stage, that questions 
of terminology are going to be important. I use the terms 
'black' and 'ethnic minority' more or less 
interchangeably, for example, and it is not the case that 
all ethnic minorities in this country are necessarily 
'black'. However, I would justify the use of these 
different terms to refer to visible minority groups in 
Vlew of the process, discussed in more detail in chapter 
three, by which the discourse of 'race' has given way to 
one based on the idea of ethnic or cultural difference. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
SOCIAL WORK AND RACE 
1.1 Introduction. 
"The social worker wishing to understand and work with 
ethnic minority clients is presented with aspects of human 
experience beyond the usual range of casework theory or 
general social work training .... In short, perceptions 
grounded ln a different experience and a different 
reality" (Ely and Denney, 1987:69). 
How are we to conceptualise social work with ethnic 
minority clients? If work with ethnic minority clients 
takes the social worker "beyond the usual range of 
casework theory" , in what new or a 1 ternat i ve theoret i ca 1 
framework can the worker base her practice? If present 
casework theory is not up to the task, is the answer a new 
form of casework or some other theoretical orientation 
entirely? How can the social worker, apparently now both 
inadequately trained and theoretically adrift, make any 
sense of a "different experience and a different reality"? 
What kind of understanding does the above quotation assume 
was possible hitherto if worker and client were from the 
ethnic majority? 
The kinds of questions posed above set out the general 
concerns of this thesis: how do - and how might - social 
workers work across racial, cultural or ethnic boundaries? 
More precisely, as later discussion makes clear, my focus 
throughout is on language and text, on ways of thinking 
about social work reading and writing. To start to look at 
how social work has addressed - or, broadly, failed to 
address - the 'race issue' to date, the first two chapters 
present a discussion of the social work literature. The 
section below charts the development of ideas about social 
work with ethnic minority indivduals and communities, and 
the changes in the understanding of the 'social work task' 
that have accompanied them. Then, in the next chapter, I 
look in more detail at the current state of the race and 
social work debate through a study of what I have called 
the 'state of the art' approaches that can be identified 
in the literature. 
Before proceeding further, however, I should draw 
attention to a problem of terminology: even a cursory 
glance through the literature shows that a number of 
different terms are used to refer to what social workers 
are doing when they are working with clients from minority 
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ethnic backgrounds. 'Multi-racial' or 'multi-cultural' 
practice appear; 'ethnic-sensitive' practice is endorsed 
by some, while both 'non-racist' and 'anti-racist' social 
work have their adherents. Each term has its own 
s~btleties and shades of meaning,1 but at this stage I 
wlll not try to tease out all these nuances. Rather, I 
will adopt one provisional 'working usage' to describe 
social work practice across racial, ethnic or cultural 
boundaries: multi-racial practice (MRP). 
1.2 Multi-racial practice: a review of the literature. 
The literature relating to multi-racial social work has 
been tackled by various authors intent on typologising or 
categorising the kinds of activity undertaken by 
practitioners working across ethnic, racial or cultural 
boundaries. Examples of three different kinds of texts are 
discussed here to see what light they shed on the somewhat 
shadowy entity of MRP. The first text I examine is an 
article by Jansari which offers a critical review of the 
social work literature relating to practice with ethnic 
minority clients, involving consideration of approximately 
seventy works (Jansari, 1980). The review draws attention 
to "the multifarious shortcomings of not only the 
literature, but also the practices and attitudes of 
practitioners that it purports to report" (Jansari, 
1980:29). Jansari's approach is thematic: he highlights 
the "largest common denominators" in the existing 
literature, and comments briefly on the views about social 
work practice and the client groups concerned in relation 
to each topic. While not claiming to be comprehensive, 
this review is wide-ranging, and provides an interesting 
snapshot of the state of MRP at the end of the 1970's. 
The second text (Devore and Schlesinger, 1981) takes 
existing social work practice as its starting point, 
identifying four predominant approaches or methods and 
then relating each one to what the authors term 
"ethnic-sensitive" practice. The third work to be examined 
is Ely and Denney's discussion of social work in a 
multi-racial society (Ely and Denney, 1987), in which the 
authors offer a historical account of developments in MRP, 
suggesting that it has gone through different stages, 
changing in parallel with government policy. They propose 
a typology based on five "perspectives", and analyse the 
positive and negative effects of each perspective both on 
social work practice and the client groups concerned. 
Jansari 's review identifies eight main topics or themes in 
the literature. The first is a "general" category which 
includes a number of texts written between 1945 and 
approximately 1960. Works in this group are characterised 
by the absence of reference to the specific or special 
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needs of ethnic minorities, and thus present little in the 
way of suggestions for an appropriate organisational 
res~onse from the welfare system. There is, in this 
perlod, what Jansari calls an "institutionalised lack of 
acknowledgement of the needs of the ethnic minorities" 
(Jansari, 1980: 17).2 
This period of non-acknowledgement of the ethnic minority 
populations in this country was succeeded by what, for 
many 'immigrants', may have been an unwelcome burst of 
interest from the social work system. Having become aware 
of the presence of new ethnic minority communities, social 
work thinking took several steps: the existence of 
coloured immigrants with special needs was acknowledged; 
'special needs' quickly became translated into personal 
problems or inadequacies of immigrant clients; and from 
there, it was but a short step to the formulation that 
Jansari identifies as the second main idea in the social 
work literature: "Colour = problem". As he notes, 
"Whenever there has been some acknowledgement of the 
existence of ethnic minorities and their special needs, 
authors have wasted no time in labelling these as 
problems. Social work literature abounds with examples of 
the equation, COLOUR = PROBLEM, and the trend continues" 
(ibid:18). 
Some authors were clearly more aware of the dangers 
inherent in this approach, and could see the risk of 
reinforcing prejudiced or stereotyped views of coloured 
people as problems. Such writers suggested that a more 
fruitful approach could be the consideration of needs, as 
defined by the client groups themselves (ibid:17). This is 
a point that Jansari returns to when he considers the 
literature which specifically addresses the needs of 
ethnic minorities in relation to the social services. 
Concentration on the problems of ethnic minorities in turn 
generated an interest in the cultural patterns of such 
groups usually with the assumption (covert or overt) 
that these patterns were somehow deviant, causing or 
exacerbating the problems experienced by ethnic minority 
individuals in this country. Emphasis on the cultures of 
ethnic minority groups was reflected in the literature, 
forming the third topic in Jansari 's review. He highlights 
the problem of over-generalisation in cultural explanation 
and the misleading or inaccurate conclusions it produces 
(Jansari, 1980:18-21). In addition, he suggests that much 
of the work on understanding the cultures of the now 
urban-based ethnic minority groups was skewed by an 
over-reliance on explanations based on traditional rural 
practices. At the time of writing (late '70's), he notes 
that "Very few writers have made the effort of 
understanding the cultures of ethnic minorities in terms 
of 'British sub-cultures'. The coloured populations have 
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become part and parcel of the British society, adopting 
many values of the host society yet retaining their 
cultural identities" (Jansari, 1980:20). 
The fourth topic identified in the literature, culture 
conflict, can again be seen as a development of the 
prece~ing one: where ethnic minority culture is largely 
negat1~ely evaluated, in relation, it is supposed, to 
7ome . 1deal formulation of 'British culture' or 'society', 
1t 1S perhaps not surprising that the idea of culture 
conflict should prove attractive in explaining the 
'problems' of ethnic minority youth in adjusting to a 
British way of life. The inherent superiority of the 
latter, and the backward-looking nature of the parent 
culture are readily assumed in such accounts. 
An alternative, though perhaps not unconnected, response 
to the 'culture conflict' issue, which Jansari does not 
specifically mention, could be called the 'when in Rome' 
approach; that is, ethnic minority cultural practices are 
all well and good in their own habitat but should not be 
maintained 1n the new setting provided by settlement in 
this country. Such a view would put the onus on ethnic 
minority individuals to adopt majority group cultural 
practices and norms, and would explain subsequent 
difficulties among ethnic minority group members in terms 
of a failure to adapt or assimilate sufficiently. 
The emphasis on cultural explanations of both the above 
kinds to explain disaffection or other problems among 
ethnic minority youth deflected attention away from the 
behaviour of the host society, and its responses to the 
visible minority groups, a point not lost on the authors 
McCulloch and Kornrei ch who observe, " ... the pri mary 
difficulties they [i .e. black youth] face in contacts with 
social workers may no longer be difficulties arising from 
cultural differences,but rather difficulties associated 
with belonging to a minority groups [sic] within the 
society" (quoted by Jansari, 1980:22). Other writers who 
challenged the prevailing over-emphasis on cultural 
conflict include Catherine Ballard (1976), Ahmed (1978), 
and Roger Ballard (1979).3 
As his fifth category or topic, Jansari considers the 
"gulf of communication" (1980:23). In the social work 
literature, this refers both to the basic problem of 
communication between an indigenous social worker and, for 
example, an Asian client who may speak little or no 
English, and also to the somewhat different problem of 
establishing a more general communication between the 
professional and the client. "Communication here is not 
necessarily just a matter of language ... for what is 
often at issue 1S the totality of cultural differences" 
(Ballard, quoted by Jansari, 1980:23). Jansari deals only 
1 1 
ve~y briefly with this topic which, in a sense, forms the 
maln concern of this thesis, and to which I will therefore 
return. 
Jansari next considers the literature dealing with the 
needs of ethnic minorities in relation to the social 
ser~ices, a~ his sixth topic. He looks at the way three 
baslc questlons have been approached in the literature 
(1980:23ff): Are ethnic minorities making use of the 
social services? If they are not, then why not? And 
lastly, what are the needs of ethnic minorities? The bulk 
of research examined by Jansari indicated that ethnic 
minorities did not make good use of the statutory social 
services. Two main reasons are proposed for this: a lack 
of knowledge about existing services; and availability of 
alternative means of support. The literature surveyed 
failed to suggest a third possible explanation, namely 
that ethnic minorities found existing services either 
irrelevant or inappropriate, though it is worth noting 
that this suggestion has been given much greater 
promlnence ln more recent literature. 4 On the needs of 
ethnic minorities, Jansari reported little research, but 
it is an area that members of ethnic minority groups have 
become increasingly articulate about. The needs of ethnic 
minorities have been explored to some extent in the later 
literature which also records examples of direct action, 
in the form of specific projects, taken by such groups to 
meet identified need. s 
In contrast to the general lack of comment ln the 
literature on ethnic minority needs, Jansari observes that 
the "question of technique" his seventh topic - has 
received considerable attention. By "technique", he means 
the question of the methods to be adopted when working 
with ethnic minority clients. Should the methods employed 
be the same or different? Is casework an appropriate 
approach or is community work more suited to this client 
group? Should social service agencies attempt to involve 
ethnic minority individuals and groups in decisions about 
service provision and delivery? While these and other 
associated questions were debated in the literature of the 
1960's and 1970's, Jansari finds little evidence of 
unanimity in the suggested answers. Moreover, he notes 
that "authors who wrangle with the question WHAT should be 
done do not necessarily answer HOW it should be done" , , (1980:26), a situation that, I suggest, recurs ln more 
recent literature, too. 
The last topic Jansari discusses is "multi-racial social 
work" (ibid:28-29), under which heading he considers bo~h 
the place and role of ethnic minority students "n 
professional education, and the training offered to wh~te 
students and practitioners to equip them for work wlth 
ethnic minority clients. In both cases, he concludes from 
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the literature that not enough is being done to meet the 
needs of these different groups, thus inhibiting the 
development of truly multi-racial practice. 
Overall, Jansari's analysis of the existing literature 
suggests that at the time of writing, social work was not 
working for ethnic minority clients, and that shortcomings 
were evident at every level. However, his paper gives the 
social worker few clues as to ways of identifying 
successful multi-racial practice. His approach is simply 
to review, with some critical comment, the disparate 
literature addressing the question of social work with 
ethnic minority clients, and to draw attention to the 
limitations of both the existing literature and the 
practice it describes. He is clear that something needs to 
change in the way social welfare provision is organised 
and delivered, as the following statement demonstrates: 
"If Britain is to become a truly multi-racial society, 
fundamental changes are necessary both in the attitudes of 
the personnel and the provision of services in social 
serVlces departments" (Jansari, 1980:29). But he himself 
is not in the business of offering guidance for the 
development of appropriate initiatives and he finds no 
signposts ln the available literature to suggest the way 
forward. By 1980, to judge from Jansari, no-one actually 
knew what multi-racial practice looked like, or what it 
should look like if such a practice were to be developed, 
a point well made in the Association of Directors of 
Social Services/Commission for Racial Equality report of 
1978 (in Cheetham et al (eds.), 1981:15). 
Jansari makes no attempt to draw from the literature a 
historical or social context for his review. Themes are 
presented almost in the abstract, as if the kinds of ideas 
found in social work texts have no relation to the broader 
political and social framework within which both social 
work and its different client groups are operating. The 
'snapshot' effect of such a review is to dissociate social 
work analysis and practice from the dynamic of social 
forces; changes happen, Jansari demonstrates, but he does 
not explain them and, I would argue, could not 
satisfactorily explain them without drawing on the concept 
of raClsm. 
In the course of his article Jansari does not explicitly 
mention racism, reflecting, one assumes, the absence of 
the term in the texts under review. As he observes, vis a 
V7S the social work literature, "The general environment 
did not seem relevant at the time" (Jansari, 1980:18), a 
view he seems almost to endorse himself. He does hint at 
the implicit racism of many of the texts he draws on and 
the practice it describes, through his choice of 
quotations, but stops short of identifying it directly. 
The closest he gets is the somewhat cryptic remark, 
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"ethnic m,' nor,' t,' es h ave particular difficulties of 
prejudice ~nd ~is~rimination that are not shared by the 
cc:>ntrast [, .e. ,nd,genous] group" (Jansari, 1980:20), and 
h,s reference to the McCulloch and Kornreich's suggestion 
that the problems of black people are more to do with 
structural inequality than personal inadequacy (1980:27). 
The second text I examine here, Ethnic-Sensitive Social 
Work Practice (Devore and Schlesinger, 1981), takes a more 
overtly political stance in its analysis of social work 
practice with ethnic minority clients. Devore and 
Schlesinger are clearly aware of the impact of ethnicity 
and social class on the lives and opportunities of 
individuals, and coin the term "ethclass" to denote "the 
point at which social class and ethnic group membership 
intersect" (Devore and Schlesinger, 1981 :16). Social work 
intervention that fails to take full account of this 
dimension of both the client's and the worker's lives 
cannot be thought of as "ethnic-sensitive". 
Devore and Schlesinger outline the key characteristics of 
the four approaches they have found most frequently in a 
wide range of practice settings, these being the 
psychosocial approach, the problem-solving approach, the 
structural approach, and the systems approach. Each 
approach lS analysed to assess its suitability for, as 
well as its practical application to, ethnic-sensitive 
practice. The authors conclude that, while there is little 
inherent in the assumptions of these different approaches 
that makes them inimical to ethnic-sensitive practice, in 
fact "limited attention has been paid to modifying or 
generating procedures which heighten the practitioner's 
skill in working sensitively with people of various ethnic 
or class backgrounds" (Devore and Schlesinger, 1981:128). 
They therefore try to take practice one stage further on, 
by proposing a model for ethnic-sensitive practice which 
builds on "(1) social work values, (2) the conception of 
the ethnic reality and its relationship to the life cycle, 
(3) the layers of understanding, and (4) the view of 
social work as a problem-solving endeavor [sic]" (Devore 
and Schlesinger, 1981: 133). 
The use of "social work values" as one of the four planks 
of this model is interesting, as Devore and Schlesinger 
seem quite confident that basic social work values exist, 
and that they can be readily itemised: "The dignity of 
the individual, the right to self-determination, the need 
for an adequate standard of living, and satisfying, 
growth-enhancing relationships ... " (p128). The problem 
seems to be less to do with values, on which we are 
apparently agreed, and more to do with the application of 
the set they identify for us. Practice is further governed 
by the use of the four layers of understanding (discussed 
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ln great detail ln chapter three of their book).These can 
be summarised as follows: 
"1. A basic knowledge of human behavior [sic]; 
2. ~ ,self-awareness, including insight into one's own 
ethnlclty and an understanding of how this may influence 
professional practice; 
3. The impact of the ethnic reality upon the daily life of 
clients; 
4. The adaptation and modification of skills and 
techniques in response to the ethnic reality" (Devore and 
Schl esi nger, 1981: 78). 
Having set up their model and outlined the assumptions and 
principles that support it (ibid:133-134 and 156 
respectively), they then present an analysis of the 
typical intervention process. Working on the understanding 
that "[e]thnic-sensitive practice is first and foremost 
good social work practice" (ibid:162), they identify the 
basic skills that are relevant at each stage of the 
intervention and suggest guidelines for their adaptation 
to the ethnic reality. Their reliance on the idea of a 
shared definition of 'good social work practice' commits 
them to a relatively unproblematic view of the process of 
change towards more ethnic-sensitive service delivery and 
minimises the opposition any attempts at change meet, for 
example, in the form of entrenched racism. 
Ely and Denney's examination of social work in a 
multi-racial society (1987) promises great things for the 
worker in pursuit of help or guidance in this area. 
According to the description on the cover, Ely and Denney 
will provide "basic information for the development of 
anti-racist social work practice and agency policy". They 
have amassed a large amount of information - which they 
present, in highly condensed form, in the first part of 
the book about the lives and circumstances of black 
people in this country. Three chapters, approximately one 
third of the text, are devoted to 'scene setting', in the 
sense of locating black people as multiply disadvantaged 
members of a racially structured society. 
Ely and Denney acknowledge that black people in this 
country have a wide range of economic and cultural 
backgrounds and that, as they settle, they will diverge 
according to wealth, housing, and social/geographic 
mobility. Nonetheless, it is axiomatic to them that, in 
comparison with the white population, blacks are "in 
aggregate a disadvantaged group" (Ely and Denney, 
1987:68), and that this may, in turn, affect the way black 
clients perceive themselves - not just as individuals but 
"as members of a relatively disadvantaged community" 
(ibid:68). This, Ely and Denney suggest, may have 
implications for social work practice in that the black 
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client may distrust the worker and the agency, 
anticipating unfair treatment or unequal access to 
resources. They argue that the black client's suspicions 
maY,well be justified given the structural racism of white 
~oclet~ and therefore the tendency of white agencies, 
l~cludlng social services departments, to comparatively 
dlsadvantage black people, and the probability that white 
sta~f will share the perceptual framework of the majority 
soclety. 
Having thus 'situated' black people within British 
society, Ely and Denney then examine some of the social 
work literature dealing with MRP, using a typology which 
recapitulates and extends the one presented by Denney in 
an earlier article (Denney, 1983). In that instance, 
Denney identified four "dominant perspectives" in the 
literature: anthropological, now re-named cultural 
deficit; liberal pluralism; cultural pluralism; 
structuralism. To the above, Ely and Denney now add one 
further perspective, black professional. 
Each perspective is tied to a particular political 
ideology and has particular practice implications. 
Ely and Denney start from the position that the social 
worker involved in MRP is engaging with "aspects of human 
experience beyond the usual range of casework theory or 
general social work training ... perceptions grounded in a 
different experience and a different reality" (Ely and 
Denney,1987:69). They seem to assume that white social 
workers are a reasonably homogeneous bunch, holding the 
views that they ascribe to the majority of the white 
middle class, namely "a belief in the primacy of the 
two-parent nuclear family, and a general assumption of the 
desirability of self-reliance and self-realisation" (p69). 
It is not clear on what basis Ely and Denney make this 
generalisation. 
According to this first perspective, cultural deficit, the 
problems of black families derive from supposed weaknesses 
or deficiencies within their cultural patterns and 
practices though these, as critics of this approach 
argue, are measured against an idealised white 
middle-class norm. Differences between black and white 
family structures, for example, are deemed to make the 
former inherently more problematic, potentially 
pathological, and therefore more liable to need 
intervention from the statutory social services. The form 
of intervention associated with this approach is intensive 
casework, designed to assist the black person or family in 
assimilating ever more closely into white society. 
Cultural difference is acknowledged, but seen as a 
temporary phase. Thus, the goal of social work with black 
clients is clear: "instilling the values and norms of 
British society" (Denney, 1983:152). 
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Criticisms of the cultural deficit approach point to a 
number of shortcomings. First, it adopts an idealised view 
of society's norms and values which is then used as the 
y~rd~tick ~or judging black families. So authors operating 
wlthln thlS perspective are comparing unlike phenomena 
that is, white cultural ideals with the actual behaviou~ 
of some working-class black families. Taking Fitzherbert's 
(1967) text as an example, Ely and Denney argue that if 
the behaviour of the black client group had been compared 
instead with that of working-class whites then the 
contrast reported by Fitzherbert might not have been so 
stark, and the cultural differences might have assumed a 
lesser importance (Ely and Denney, 1987:74). 
Second, this view operates with a very limited Vlew of 
culture (see Denney, 1983:153). Third, there 1S an 
over-reliance on assumed cultural preferences which does 
not locate the actual practices of black families within 
their particular economic and social circumstances, and 
limited range of options. It is assumed, for example, that 
certain groups have a cultural preference for fostering, 
which accounts in part for the large numbers of black 
children in local authority care. But such 'explanations' 
fail to acknowledge the need of many black mothers to work 
outside the home in order to support their families, and 
the inadequacy of daycare provision for young children. 
And finally, this perspective focusses on the supposed 
personal failings of individuals, and gives insufficient 
consideration to the issues of racism and discrimination 
and their effects on black people. 
Denney (1983:155) locates the second perspective, liberal 
pl ural ism, in the "mood of consensus-based soci al harmony 
and optimism" prevailing at the end of the 1960's and 
beginning of the 1970's. Assimilation had given way to 
integration, which was seen as not only a desirable, but 
also an achievable, goal for Britain's black population. 
Roy Jenkins, the then Home Secretary, described 
integration as "equal opportunity accompanied by cultural 
diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance" (quoted in 
Denney, 1983:154). The assumption here was that 
intolerance toward racial minorities could be reduced 
through anti-discrimination legislation, and that in the 
developing atmosphere of mutual tolerance, equal 
opportunities would naturally follow. 
Cheetham's first major contribution to the MRP literature 
(1972) belongs within the liberal pluralist framework 
where society is seen as containing a number of elites, 
each influential in different spheres of social and 
political life. Power is diffused through society, and no 
one group has overall control. However, Cheetham herself 
is very aware that access to the various elites is not 
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avai~able uniformly to all groups within society and, 
partlcularly, that black people often meet discrimination 
that prevents or impedes them in gaining access to sources 
of power. Discrimination, then, is seen as a real factor 
in the lives of 'visible', that is, black, minority group 
members. Cheetham's response is a form of social work that 
comes down to conflict management between indigenous and 
'immigrant' groups. With individual families, the social 
worker can act as a 'bridge' or link between them and 
other outside agencies such as schools, and within the 
family can mediate between parents and their perhaps more 
'British' children. 
In Cheetham's analysis, blacks share some problems with 
poor whites, notably in the areas of housing and 
education, but they also face additional problems and 
stresses arising directly from their experlence of 
emigration. Cheetham sees a role for social work in 
helping immigrants to cope with the strains of migration, 
particularly homesickness and adjustment to the new 
society. She recognises the possibility of 'culture 
conflict' between social worker and immigrant client, but 
her case examples suggest a belief that, with time, 
productive relationships can be established, and that the 
worker can successfully mediate between the black family 
and public agencies, or the outside world more generally. 
Denney points to contradictions and difficulties ln 
Cheetham's pluralistic stance that are neither adequately 
explored nor resolved. For example, he suggests that 
Cheetham emphasises "the importance of the social worker's 
ability to translate the 'rules' of interaction, or put 
more simply help the parties involved to make sense of 
what is happening" (Denney, 1983:157), but as she does not 
explain the process by which this interpretation takes 
place "it would appear that the worker must rely on common 
sense ln attempting to negotiate reality and the rules 
that govern that reality with the client" (Denney, 
1983:157). This omission begs the question of relative 
power in the transaction between social worker and client: 
whose version of 'reality' finally prevails? An appeal to 
'common sense' is not unproblematic, as common sense is 
itself not a neutral concept; common to whom, one could 
ask? The power to make one's definition of reality stick 
is clearly not evenly distributed through society.6 
Cheetham acknowledges the issue of the distribution of 
power and, with it, of resources, and would see it as a 
valid social work task to link 'disadvantaged' people to 
appropriate resources and the systems that control their 
allocation. But she does not then proceed to a more 
thorough structural analysis of the place of the black 
person in British society. Without a clear expression of 
the structural factors which hinder racial minorities from 
18 
gaining access to limited resources, the 'problem' once 
again devolves onto the individual black person. 
I~tervention is focussed on the individual; social workers 
wlll use a, variety of methods to help black people use 
oth~r serVlces effectively, and obtain their full 
entltlement to available resources. Departmental practices 
and procedures for work with black clients are less 
central to Cheetham's analysis. 
Writers within the third tradition or perspective, 
cultural pluralism, again share a basically consensus 
oriented Vlew of society, while acknowledging that 
different ethnic groups are competing for power. "The 
importance of cultural differences and of ethnicity is 
stressed above all other factors, including perhaps race, 
and it is the business of the cultural pluralists to show 
how these many ethnicities serve as a support and a buffer 
against the injustices and misfortunes of a racially 
inequitable society" (Ely and Denney, 1987:84). Roger 
Ballard (1979) and Catherine Ballard (1979) emerge as 
champions of this particular approach. 
The main messages from the cultural pluralists seem to be 
that professional agencies should accept a degree of 
cultural relativity, so that each ethnic group is judged 
by its own standards, not those of an 'alien' group 
imposed from outside; and that culturally specific 
practices of ethnic minority groups which may seem 
confusing and even irrational to the outsider should be 
seen as part of a systematic totality. 
Two points arise for social work practitioners within this 
framework. Firstly, ethnic minority cultures should not be 
viewed as inherently pathological or aberrant, but rather 
as internally coherent, functional structures that can 
offer group members a unity and strength in the basically 
hostile environment of white British society. Secondly, 
and as a consequence of this more positive assessment, 
social workers should be under an obligation to learn 
about, and operate in sympathy with, the cultural 
practices of the ethnic minority groups they encounter. 
It is not clear how deep this understanding is expected to 
run. Ballard, for example, suggests that social work 
practitioners would become more effective agents in their 
dealings with ethnic minority clients, once armed with "a 
limited amount of relatively simple cultural information" 
(Ely and Denney, 1987:88) - this, presumably, to stop them 
treading on too many cultural 'toes' - and an awareness of 
the dangers of cultural imperialism. Quite how the social 
worker should adjudicate between conflicting claims of his 
or her 7 own and the client's social world is not 
explained. An awareness of the dangers of cultural 
imperialism may not be sufficient to counteract the basic 
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presumption 1n favour of the majority culture that 
reinforces the position and power of the social worker in 
relation to the client. Adopting a stance of cultural 
relati~ism. disguises the power relations between majority 
and m1~or1~y. cultures. Thus, within this perspective, 
there .1S m1n1mal consideration of the impact of racism on 
the ~1ves of ethnic minorities. Explanations of the 
negat1ve behaviour displayed by some whites are couched 
~ore 1n terms of "cultural hostility" than even 
1nadvertent racism, shifting the focus away from 
s~ruc~ural inequalities, and towards the malign, or simply 
m1sgu1ded, behaviour of individuals. 
The structuralist position is considered next. The broad 
term 'structuralist' covers a range of writings within a 
Marxist framework, which emphasise the class and racially 
structured nature of British (capitalist) society. Within 
this perspective, racism is analysed in the context of 
existing capitalist relations of production. 
"Structuralists locate the 'problem' in deficient material 
resources, in racist attitudes and practices within social 
work agencies, and in the current dominant ideologies of 
the state" (Ely and Denney, 1987:89). Dominelli 's work 
falls into the structuralist camp and is discussed by Ely 
and Denney, while Denney (1983) also refers to Husband's 
discussion of race in social work (in Brake and Bailey 
(eds.), 1980). I sketch in the outlines of Dominelli's 
(1979) arguments below, and present a fuller account of 
her later (1988) work in the next chapter where her 
prescriptions for 'anti-racist' social work are discussed. 
I will then return in greater detail to Dominelli 's work 
in chapter seven, where I present an analysis of this 
later text. 
Dominelli wants to demystify the social work relationship, 
by emphasising its material basis: social work here is 
about access to resources. She criticises the way casework 
personalises problems and pathologises individuals who 
are, as she sees it, victims of structural inequality and 
inadequate resources. Her reframing of social work 
practice commits the practitioner to action that shifts 
power and resources towards the ethnic minority 
communities. "Dominelli suggests that a non-racist social 
work practice would expose the racist ideology embedded in 
current practice and would reveal the structural role 
occupied both by ethnic minority clients and social 
workers working with them" (Ely and Denney, 1987:90). Her 
approach would lead to the development of "client-centr~d, 
community-based" provision, which would depend on uSlng 
ethnic minority groups' organisations, resources and 
expertise to build services to meet the expressed needs ~f 
these groups within their own communities. Further~ lt 
would entail an overhaul of agency employment practlces 
and all departmental procedures, leading to the 
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recruitment of more ethnic minority staff, and greater 
involvement of black community organisations. 
Clearly, traditional social work practice would need a 
thorough shakeup to bring it into line with the 
structuralist position. And it would seem that much of 
what has hitherto been valued by many workers - the 
ability to empathise, to establish 'caring relationships' 
with clients, in short, the features commonly associated 
with the client centred approaches8 - no longer has a 
place in this radically revised practice. Dominelli has 
debunked what she sees as the myth of the social work 
relationship and exposed it as merely another instance of 
the exercise of white power, with the client placed 
firmly, albeit benignly, in a position of dependency. But 
she does not say exactly what form of working relationship 
would emerge between social worker and client within the 
structuralist framework. Is the relationship to be purely 
instrumental, or must there still be a role for, and an 
understanding of, the personal interaction between 
individuals? 
A different concern is raised by Ely and Denney: if social 
work is about redistribution of resources, how is such 
re-allocation to be achieved in a situation of limited, 
and often now decreasing, provision? Who should give up 
their share of possibly hard-won resources in order to 
provide the increase required by presently disadvantaged 
black groups? 
The last perspective presented by Ely and Denney, the 
black professional, is associated particularly with the 
work of the Association of Black Social Workers and Allied 
Professionals (ABSWAP). The establishment of ABSWAP can be 
seen as a move by black professionals to start taking an 
active role in the formulation and articulation of 
policies and practices within the social welfare field, as 
these directly affect black and minority communities. 
Black people are no longer being 'enabled' by concerned 
whites but are taking the initiative and approaching 
social policy issues from a specifically 'black' point of 
view. White ideology and assumptions are not to be taken 
as givens, but are being radically re-assessed and placed 
alongside newly articulated and competing black ideologies 
and assumptions. 
As an example of this approach, Ely and Denney present 
ABSWAP's analysis of trans-racial fostering, and the 
Association's views of a more correct way of arranging 
substitute family care for black children. A view has 
emerged from within black communities that trans-racial 
fostering fails to equip black children adequately for 
dealing with the reality of living in a racist society. 
The argument against trans-racial placement contends that 
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a black child in care needs to develop a strong identity 
as a black person, and that this sense of identity can 
best be,nurtured in a loving black family where the child 
will dally see strategies for coping with the racism of 
white society. 
Trans-racial fostering has been a high profile and 
lastingly contentious issue, and the debates about it have 
been conducted with great energy not just within the 
profession but also in the wider public media. 9 As one of 
the aspects of practice that has been considered from a 
black perspective the key to which seems to be its 
emphasis on initiatives to challenge and reduce racism in 
social work trans-racial placement has been an issue 
around which some of the broader concerns about 
'cross-racial' social work have crystallised. Does 'white' 
social work have anything to offer black families, or is 
it approaching these families with the wrong questions, 
based on stereotyped and misleading information, producing 
faulty assessments of the 'problems' and therefore, 
necessarily, offering inappropriate and even damaging 
'solutions'? 
It lS not clear from Ely and Denney's brief discussion 
whether they see the black perspective as promoting a form 
of 'separate development', something on the lines of 
'different therefore equal' services running in parallel, 
or whether it is assumed that this newly articulated 
position is in some sense thought to be generally better -
with this black perspective pointing to possible 
improvements in existing white practice, as well as 
immediately benefitting black clients. That is, are the 
criticisms made by black workers and clients indicative of 
general failings in the welfare services, such that the 
kinds of remedies envisaged, initially in relation to 
black serVlce users, will lead to a broad improvement in 
services for all? Although such issues are not addressed 
by Ely and Denney in the two and a half pages they devote 
to consideration of the black professional perspective, 
they are fundamental to a general understanding of what lS 
considered 'good' practice for any/all client groups. 
Having outlined these five positions, Ely and Denney 
suggest that they differ along three main axes: the 
location of the 'problem'; treatment of the issue of 
power; and the extent to which social work is seen as free 
from or tainted with racism. Ely and Denney do not 
formally adjudicate between the different positions, but 
suggest that their perspectives follow a sequence that 
reflects developments in wider government and social 
policy and acknowledge~ th~ ef:e~ts of the coming of a~e 
of generations of ethnlc mlnorltles born and educated ln 
Britain. Each new approach has its roots in a particular 
historical, political and social configuration - which 
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would apparently leave the possibility of new 
circumstances encouraging or precipitating a further 
redefinition of both the 'problems' facing multi-racial 
social work, and their solution. 
What then, in Ely and Denney's own assessment, are the 
characteristics of MRP? As they do not explicitly set out 
their own position, an answer has to be pieced together 
from comments made through the book, particularly the 
section dealing with social work provision for ethnic 
minority client groups and its relevance and effectiveness 
for ethnic minority clients. MRP would, it seems, involve 
at least the following elements: social work and social 
workers must acknowledge the impact of racism on the lives 
of black people in British society. More staff from ethnic 
minorities should be employed within the social services 
system. Training for all staff involved in social welfare 
provision should pay more attention to ethnic minority 
issues (p154).1o Two-way communication should be promoted; 
that is, "there should be cooperation and communication 
with ethnic minority communities i.n making provision" 
(p155), and also Social Services Departments should be 
more open and transmit more information to the local 
population. 
Social workers should be able to recognise the strengths 
of the different practices of ethnic minority groups, for 
example in relation to differing parenting styles (p156). 
In connection with this, the social worker must be aware 
of her own social class experience and the difference 
between that and the experiences of many of her clients 
(p156). She also needs to be cautious of over-reliance on 
"cultural" explanations, ensuring that these do not 
disparage ethnic minority cultural preferences "and 
obscure the need for understanding class, race, financial 
and individual aspects of both nuclear and extended 
family" (p158). Finally, social workers should take 
account of the social and economic realities of the black 
client's position; at the simplest level, this means, for 
instance, arranging meetings at times that working adults 
can attend, even though this may be less convenient for 
the social worker. 
Ely and Denney (pp125ff) discuss a number of situations 
where power is being exercised - for example, when the 
social worker is acting as gate-keeper, limiting access to 
scarce resources, or is acting under statutory powers of 
investigation or intervention - to illustrate "some of the 
complex ways in which ordinary transactions of everyday 
social work can operate to discriminate against and 
disadvantage the black client even though there is no 
policy to do so" (p125). They therefore urge that in such 
situations, the objective for social work with ethnic 
minority clients at this stage in the development of MRP 
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should be "damage limitation". In the end, then, Ely and 
Denney are making a plea for each 'case' to receive 
individual assessment, which will include consideration of 
what, to borrow Devore and Schlesinger's expression 
(1981), could be called the client's "ethnic reality". 
Ely and Denney themselves seem to operate broadly within a 
structuralist framework, emphasising the multiple 
disadvantage suffered by the black communities in Britain, 
economic and social hardship exacerbated by the experience 
of personal and institutional racism, although they do not 
adopt the 'consciousness raising' approach favoured by 
Dominelli. Although at points in the book, Ely and Denney 
have appeared to endorse a very practical, 
resource-oriented form of social work, and have expressed 
pessimistic views about the possibility of 
"relationship-based work" (see p96 and p125), nonetheless 
they do still seem to think that it is desirable for 
social workers to attempt that form of activity 
characterised as "time-consuming, consensus-based 
discussion" (p97). They go on: "Hopefully, social workers 
in inner-city areas are still able to spend some of their 
time in this way Perhaps this is still the most 
personally rewarding and productive part of their work." 
(p97) 
So the suggestion remains that there is in social work 
something that involves establishing a relationship that 
goes beyond the simply instrumental involvement of A with 
B, in which A (who has power) acquires resources on behalf 
of B (who lacks equivalent power). However, the present 
level of analysis does little to illuminate the nature of 
that relationship, nor the kind of understanding between 
the participants on which it depends. 
In this chapter, I have charted the changes in approach in 
the social work literature to what I originally called 
multi-racial social work practice (MRP) - looking at the 
socio-political assumptions and implications of the 
different approaches outlined in texts that covered the 
range from Fitzherbert's West Indian Children in London 
(1967) to Social Work with Black Children and their 
Fami lies (Ahmed, Cheetham and Sma 11 (eds. ), 1986) and 
ABSWAP's (1983) analysis of trans-racial fostering. I 
concluded my examination of the literature with the belief 
that MRP had somehow 'escaped' from the existing attempts 
to pln it down and analyse it, despite Ely and Denney's 
promise (Ely and Denney, 1987) to tell the bemused social 
worker how to proceed. 
Devore and Schlesinger (1981) have started to re-examine 
social work with the object of adapting present practice 
in a more ethnically sensitive direction. But they seem to 
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stick at an attempt to reshape existing practice rather 
than moving beyond present definitions to a 
reconceptualisation of both the social work task and its 
execution. Ely and Denney provide an analysis of the 
change in the way MRP has been conceived and acted upon, 
but break off at the critical point in the story - ie what 
next? The book has the feel of an extended trailer for an 
inexplicably delayed main feature. Ely and Denney leave us 
at the stage in the development of practice where a "black 
perspective" is being defined, a process that has 
continued during the intervening five or six years since 
the publication of Social Work 1n a Multi-Racial 
Soci ety. 1 1 
My reading of the literature suggests a discernible shift 
across time in the way social work with ethnic minorities 
has been conceptualised and presented. As Jansari (1980) 
noted, the earliest position adopted by the social work 
establishment was "Colour = problem". Social work itself 
was not implicated as part of the 'problem'; this was held 
to reside solely with the 'coloured immigrants' who were 
having trouble adapting to life in Britain. Once the idea 
was accepted that ethnic minorities were the victims of 
structural inequalities endemic to British society, social 
work could have a role in making sure that the 
distribution of available resources was as equitable as 
possible, and also in arguing for the provision of more or 
'better' resources for all disadvantaged groups. Again, 
the focus was not on social work practice but on the 
position of ethnic minorities in the broader (structurally 
unequal) society. 
Even the emergence of the idea of racism as a causal 
factor in the disadvantage suffered by ethnic minorities 
did not immediately challenge social work to any great 
degree. If social work was distorted by racial bias then 
this could be overcome by training and the availability of 
culturally appropriate information. This seemed to be the 
position taken, albeit in slightly different ways, by both 
the "cultural pluralists" discussed earlier and by Devore 
and Schlesinger. The fundamental integrity of the social 
work enterprise was not threatened; although local 
examples of 'bad practice' could be found, these could be 
corrected if the tenets of 'good practice' were once again 
applied. So social workers could concentrate on 
eradicating 'bad practice' rather than start questioning 
the assumptions of the whole enterprise. 
But having introduced racism into the equation, there is 
scope for the relationship between social work and ethnic 
minorities to shift dramatically as demonstrated by the 
articulation of a range of black and/or anti-racist 
perspectives. And it is to these more recently formulated 
positions that I now turn. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
NOTES 
1 . See, for example, the comment on the use of 
"non-racism" and "anti-racism" by the Social Care Pracice 
Committee, 1988:25. 
2. The behaviour of welfare organisations noted here by 
Jansari is perhaps equivalent to what has elsewhere been 
called the 'colour-blind' approach; see, for example, the 
Introduction to Social Work with Black Children and their 
Fami lies (Ahmed, Cheetham amd Small (eds.), 1986). 
Colour-blindness can appear in either of two guises, 
paSSlve or active. In the passive form, the colour-blind 
individual claims not to notice the colour of the people 
with whom he is dealing; in the active form, colour 
differences are noted, but the individual tries to 'treat 
everyone the same'. 
3. These latter two essays appear in an anthology edited 
by V.S.Khan (1979), which includes a chapter by Weinreich 
reflecting the same concerns as those attributed to 
McCulloch and Kornreich. Weinreich looks at the 
development of ethnic identity in adolescents and suggests 
that the special psychological pressures faced by ethnic 
minority adolescents are different from those faced by 
their majority ethnic group peers. His study concludes 
that "[t]hese differences result from their position in 
the wider society and not, as it is often assumed, from 
problems inherent ln the minority populations." (Khan, 
1979:88) 
4. See 
(1988); 
(1988) ; 
(1979) . 
the following articles: Williams (1988); Jolley 
Ahmad (1988c); Sharma (1991); Ranger (1989); Scott 
Anon. (1988a); and also Draper (1978) and Jackson 
5. See, for example, Horn (1982); Dutt (1989); CRE (1980); 
the following are discussions of projects run by and for 
ethnic minority clients: Anon (1988b); Arnold (1982); Guru 
(1986); Hopkins (1987); Melville (1985); Sheik (1986); and 
Sondhi (1982). 
6. See CCCS, 1982:46-88. 
7. For expositional ease hereafter, 
forms randomly throughout the text. 
I vary the gender 
8. The client-centred approach is associated in particular 
with the work of Carl Rogers (discussed in Howe, 
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1987:98ff); other writers adopting their own variants of 
the client-centred approach include Egan (1975) and Wilkes (1981). 
9. The following glve an idea of the range of the debate: 
ABAFA (1977), Ellis (1979), Arnold (1982), Bagley and 
Young (1982), White (1983), Mennell (1986), Small (1986), 
Tubbs (1986), Dale (1987), Evans (1987), Longmore (1987), 
Burningham (1988), Arnold and James (1989), Chambers 
(1989), Hayes (1989), Tizard and Phoenix (1989), and Anon 
(1990). Most recently (July 1993), trans-racial placement 
was highlighted when a Norfolk couple were refused 
permission to adopt a mixed-race child. This case was 
well-publicised in the national press and other media. 
10. This simple statement glves no hint of the heated 
debate that surrounded the issue of race-relations 
training, once this kind of training went beyond the level 
of simply providing culturally relevant information about 
different ethnic minority groups, and the range of 
approaches proposed. See, for example, Katz (1978), 
Peppard (1980) , Newby (1982a) , Newby (1982b) , Jones 
(1983), Peppard (1983), Sivanandan (1985), Coombe and 
Little (eds.) (1986), Dummett (1986), Jervis (1986), 
Jervis (1987), Race Equality Policy Group (1987), and 
Al ibhai (1988). 
11. For example, Ahmad (1988), Ahmad (1990), CCETSW 
(1991), NCDP (1991), and Wilson (1991). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE STATE OF THE ART: ANTI- RACISM AND BLACK PERSPECTIVES 
IN THE SOCIAL WORK LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction. 
In the first chapter, I looked at the ways in which social 
work with ethnic minorities has been conceived. Jansari 
adopts a thematic approach while Ely and Denney present a 
broadly historical account of the changes that have been 
recorded in social work practice. Devore and Schlesinger 
take a different tack, identifying four approaches current 
in social work and analysing the potential of each one to 
bring about "ethnic-sensitive" practice. But, as I 
suggested then, these different analyses of practice 
suggest that, to date, social work has not responded 
adequately to the challenge of providing appropriate and 
effective services to ethnic minority groups. The 
implementation of the Children Act 1989 and its 
requirement, for the first time, on social workers to 
consider children's needs in relation to religion, racial 
origin and cultural and linguistic background focusses 
attention on social work involvement with black families 
and brings new urgency to the question of appropriate 
intervention in these cases. 
Social work, then, cannot stand still or rely on old ways 
of 'making do' in relation to work with ethnic minorities. 
As I suggested at the end of chapter one, new approaches 
are being formulated and among the recent contributions to 
the race and social work debate, two predominate: 
anti-racism and the incorporation of black perspectives 
into social work education, training and practice. In this 
chapter, I shall examine these two approaches in greater 
detail, starting with a discussion of the most challenging 
and uncompromising statement of the anti-racist position, 
Dominelli 's Anti-Racist Social Work. 
2.2 Anti-racism. 
If MRP is at present more of a hope than a reality, what 
are the options for practitioners struggling to develop 
ways of working that challenge the racial/racist status 
quo and allow for more equitable service provision? One 
answer could be that if MRP is not yet possible, then an 
aggressive form of anti-racism 1 may prepare the ground for 
its future development. 2 
The failure of white social work to tackle raClsm is 
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Domi nell i ~ s s~arti ng poi nt and the strength of her feel i ng 
that raC1sm 1S an evil that must be eradicated is present 
thro~ghout the book. She opens, in typically forthright 
fash1on, with the statement: "white social workers have 
not come to terms with the ethnically pluralistic nature 
of British society nor have they reflected this in their 
practice by making available services which cater for the 
specific needs and demands of ethnic minorities (ADSSjCRE, 
1979). Their failure to do so has made countering racism a 
most pressing issue in social work education, training and 
practice" (1988:1).3 She observes that white society has 
tried a range of approaches in its dealings with ethnic 
minority communities: assimilation, integration, 
multi-cultural ism and, finally, multi-racialism. But in 
her assessment, each of these approaches has been found 
wanting, and therefore something new is required: "Racial 
inequality has not disappeared because white people 
understand better the customs, traditions, and religious 
activities of ethnic minority groups" (p2). 
What Dominelli requires of social work is that it becomes 
a campaigning, outward-reaching activity, challenging 
raC1sm overtly and working positively to bring about 
personal and organisational change that will promote the 
reduction, and finally, the elimination of racism in 
British society. An appreciation of the multi-cultural 
richness of contemporary British society may be a 
necessary part of good social work, she argues, but it is 
not a sufficient condition for the establishment of 
anti-racist social work - and anti-racist social work is, 
for Dominelli, the way forward. 
She works within a structuralist perspective that 
emphasises the class- and racially-structured nature of 
British society. Racism is a structural fact in the 
context of existing (capitalist) relations of production; 
it is endemic in society and is manifested in different 
forms personal, cultural and institutional. Dominelli 
acknowledges that efforts have been made to counter 
raC1sm, but argues that they have so far proved 
insufficient to deal with the problem and in some cases 
have even proved damaging to the very groups whose 
position they were designed to improve (p1). She accepts 
that it is difficult for white people to know how to 
respond appropriately to the challenge of fighting raci~m 
as different 'orthodoxies' have come and gone. But th1S 
does not remove the white social worker's responsibility 
for engaging in the struggle: "we must tackle racism,at 
its core by combining change at the personal level w1th 
organisational change. Anti-racist approa~he~ to 
countering racism have attracted those of us w1shlng to 
transcend the limitations inherent in the other approaches 
open to white people" (p2-3). 
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So, what 1S racism? Dominelli provides this assessment: 
"British racism is about the construction of social 
relationships on the basis of an assumed inferiority of 
non-Anglo-Saxon ethnic minority groups and flowing from 
this, their exploitation and oppression. Racism lS 
apparent in the minutiae of everyday life as well as 
institutions and legislation and permeates every aspect of 
our personal and professional lives whether we are black 
or white, making confronting it difficult and complex" 
(p6).4 Racism, in her view then, suffuses and structures 
all our personal, social and professional relationships, 
but 1S so deeply embedded in the social fabric that its 
presence cannot always be consciously articulated. 
Her argument against racism is a moral, as well as a 
social/political one: racism deforms and demeans the 
perpetrators and beneficiaries of racist practices as well 
as those on the receiving end. Therefore, to become more 
fully human, generally 'better' people, there is no 
choice: we must take up the struggle and join the battle 
against raC1sm. For Dominelli, this moral imperative is 
clear, and cannot be avoided, particularly by those who 
would claim a serious involvement in a so-called caring 
profession like social work. A strategy for engaging with 
racism is therefore required. 
Dominelli addresses the macro level of organisational and 
social change where personal change is a necessary but not 
the most important component. However, she thereby 
obscures or diminishes the importance of the micro level -
the nature of the social work 'encounter'. After reading 
this book, the social worker will know which campaigns to 
engage with, what organisational changes should be 
pursued, even what kind of training or re-education she 
should seek. But a characteristic feature of social work, 
the direct interpersonal contact between social worker and 
client, has been left unexamined. What, as a social worker 
walking into an interview with a client, do you do after 
you have said hello? 
One answer would be that the social worker establishes an 
"egalitarian relationship" with the black client. But how? 
How does the social worker unilaterally offload power and 
disown her position of dominance? What would an equal or 
egalitarian relationship look like? What difference would 
it make to the form and content of the interaction between 
the parties? Dominelli stops short of defining a process 
for developing such relationships or even for 
identifying when one has been successful - and remains at 
the level of exhortation. Such relationships are 
necessary and we must engage in them. The ends are clear. 
The means for achieving them remain somewhat less SO.5 
Nonetheless Dominelli continues, "If white social workers 
start relating to black people on the basis of equality, 
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not only will they be transformed into better 
practitioners all round, but their agencies' policies and 
practices will be similarly affected" (p1S). This all 
sounds so straightforward it is hard to understand why MRP 
~as proved so elusive! To be fair, this is only the 
lntroduction, and Dominelli has the rest of the book to 
make her case in detail, but this kind of throwaway 
comment is not reassuring. 
The main text starts with a chapter aimed at unravelling 
the dynamics of racism in social work, and confronts the 
reader with a chapter heading reminiscent of a Chinese 
Communi st 'thought reform' slogan: "Raci sm permeates 
social work ideology and practice" (p21).6 Dominelli 
convincingly debunks the view that social work is in some 
mysterious way untouched by racism as social workers are 
themselves, as individuals, not terribly - or overtly -
racist in their behaviour and attitudes. Racism is not 
adequately explained as the irrational or prejudiced views 
of a few intolerant individuals. Prejudice is undoubtedly 
a component of individual raClsm, but the pernicious 
characteristic of racism is the way it pervades all 
aspects of personal and social life. It is "an integral 
feature of British society" (p21) and social work has not 
been inoculated against its effects. 
Having looked at the theoretical role and the practical 
manifestations of raClsm ln British society (pp22-29), 
Dominelli focusses on racism in social work practice: she 
argues that, especially during a period of decreasing 
resources, social work's caring function becomes eclipsed 
by its social control function, and power shifts from 
those demanding or requiring resources to those providing 
them (p26). Thus far, Dominelli 's position does not differ 
markedly from other broadly Left/Marxist or radical social 
work texts. 7 However, she takes her analysis a stage 
further and says that social work is caught in a trap 
between its professed aim of promoting people's welfare 
and at the same time "rationing resources among those 
'deserving' help" (p28). Racism, then, allows for the 
creation of a category of "undeserving" poor who can be 
systematically disenfranchised from welfare provisions. By 
failing to address the inherent racism of both the welfare 
system as presently operating and the wider society, 
social workers collude with the reduction of black 
people's access to welfare services despite their already 
apparent position as victims of structural inequality and 
inadequate resources. s 
She concludes, "White social workers working ln 
anti-racist ways have to consider racism in service 
delivery within a context in which the welfare state is 
being dismantled and restructured to exclude more and more 
people from receiving welfare provisions" (p31). This 
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con~l~sion places social work firmly and openly in the 
polltlcal arena, and challenges what Dominelli sees as the 
prev~i~ing self-definition of social work as broadly an 
apolltlcal activity. Anti-racist social work must confront 
~his misleading self-presentation and acknowledge the 
lnherently political dimensions of a situation dealing 
with the unequal distribution of, and access to, power and 
resources (p31-32). 
One factor militating against the adoption of a more 
overtly political stance - apart, that is, from the threat 
to the individual's continued employment by the 'local 
state' is "professi onal ism". Domi nell i offers her 
description of the prevailing professional mode, based on 
Compton and Galaway's premise that social workers largely 
have 'faith ln the system'. So Dominelli proceeds, "A 
professional social worker is not interested in 
challenging the social structures in which the social work 
task occurs and remains objectively neutral on the major 
social concerns of the day during work-time" (p32).9 
Nonetheless, she exhorts social work practitioners and 
educators to grasp the political nettle. To combat racism, 
they must produce theories of welfare which recognise that 
social work's position within the state system fulfils two 
functions: care and control. With a grand rhetorical 
flourish, she states, "Thus, to develop anti-racist social 
work, we need to cut the Gordian knot of social work as a 
complex and contradictory form of social control" 
(p35),10 and argues for a re-definition of the idea of 
professionalism in terms of taking sides against practices 
that perpetuate racial oppression and inequality, and 
eschewing a neutrality that condones the maintenance of 
the status quO. 11 
The last aspect of the racism permeating social work 
ideology that Dominelli examines here is the "colour-blind 
approach" and its claims that social work offers 
universality of treatment (p36).12 Dominelli argues 
strongly against treating everyone the same, ln the 
colour-blind sense, and also against treating all members 
of a particular ethnic group as if they were all the same. 
In short, she wants individual assessment, but within a 
framework that acknowledges the objective disadvantage 
faced by all black people as a result of racism. 
Dominelli's next target is social work education and 
training which, as the slogan heading the chapter 
proclaims, is "imbued with racism" (p41). She castigates 
the Central Council for Education and Training in Social 
Work (CCETSW), as the controlling and validating body for 
the social work profession, on several counts (p41): 
first, it "has failed to ensure that anti-racist measures 
become a compulsory part of the curriculum" allowing for 
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the continued dominance of anglocentric subject matter; 
second, it has failed to adapt its own internal structures 
along anti-racist lines by employing "sufficient numbers" 
of black people in policy-making bodies and in its staff 
composition; and third, it has failed to insist that 
teaching staff on CCETSW-validated courses reflect the 
racial/ethnic makeup of society. 
Consequently, an anglocentric bias is maintained in the 
theoretical material presented to students, limiting and 
distorting their understanding of 'non-white' culture, 
history and achievements. And practice placements 
similarly fail to equip the student for anti-racist social 
work: "practice placements are not geared to training 
students in anti-racist social work since countering 
racism is not specifically included in the student's 
programme. Anti-racist policies are usually lacking in 
placement agencies" (p41). There are not enough black 
practice teachers to provide adequate supervision in 
anti-racist work, and white practice teachers are, in the 
main, poorly equipped for this task, lacking a basic 
anti-racist perspective themselves. 
Dominelli examines the social work curriculum, with the 
intention of exposing the racism inherent in the social 
work literature. She notes, with Jansari (1980) and Denney 
(1983), that the social work literature has paid little 
attention to the question of racism per se. But for 
Dominelli, "the issue transcends this, for even literature 
aiming quite hard not to do so, unintentionally reproduces 
racist stereotypes and biases" (p42), and she cites a 
passage from a relatively recent text - by Coombe and 
Little (1987) by way of example. She chooses several 
"exemplary classic texts"13 on social work with black 
clients to demonstrate the ways in which the impact of 
racism on black people is largely ignored, allowing -
possibly even encouraging - the white worker "to think of 
black people as the problem to be addressed, thereby 
unintentionally harming black people's interests" (p43). 
This tendency 1S exacerbated by the application of 
traditional casework models in work with individual black 
clients. The casework approach personalises clients' 
problems, and mystifies the social work relationship: "it 
ignores the fact that it is primarily white social workers 
constructing a casework relationship with black people, 
thereby decontextualising 'race' and obscuring the power 
differential and privileges accessible to white 
professionals but not black clients" (p44). White people 
do not understand black people's daily experience of 
racism and rejection in British society and continue to 
respond, through traditional casework, as if black people 
had largely the same problems as other (white) people -
except for having more of these problems. Such a response, 
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for Dominelli, is entirely inadequate, and it downgrades 
the black person's formative experience of racism. 
Casework is n~t the only approach to be criticised, and no 
area of soclal work practice is found to be free from 
racism. Dominelli is equally critical of those using 
groupwork or community work with black clients (p46) for 
their failure to address the issue of racism. Even the 
more 'progressi ve' approaches 1 n the soci a 1 work 
l~terature are found wanting. For example, Pincus and 
Mlnahan fail to specifically address racism; feminist and 
Left/Marxist texts have fared no better and are equally 
lacking in relation to their analysis of racism. Dominelli 
then turns to an analysis of the different aspects of 
racism "inherent in current definitions of social work" 
(p47). She looks again at the "problematic of the casework 
approach", cultural racism, multi-cultural ism, and ways in 
which black resistance to racism is pathologised. 
Having launched an attack on virtually all aspects of 
white social work's organisation, Dominelli looks to the 
establishment of autonomous black groups and their role in 
an anti-racist strategy. The sub-heading tells the reader 
her Vlew of the importance of these organisations: 
"Autonomous black organisations must be respected by white 
anti-racist social work educators and practitioners" 
(p56). In the face of white people's fears as they start 
to loosen their hold on power by according to black people 
their legitimate right to organise separately, Dominelli 
makes a strong case for the necessity for black people to 
develop their own structures and organisations for mutual 
support and to oppose racism. She argues that social work 
training positively requires the establishment of such 
groups and outlines the benefits that will accrue to both 
black and white students and qualified staff (ppS6-60) 
when these groups are allowed to flourish. 
She then reinforces her earlier critique of the social 
work curriculum by listing the range of changes necessary 
to bring social work training into line with anti-racist 
thinking (pp60-65). Further, she proposes a radical shift 
in the organisation of practice placements, putting 
forward what she calls "the anti-racist apprenticeship 
model" (pp6S-67). Essentially, this would involve the 
student working with a black placement supervisor - and 
such placements would be a requirement rather than an 
optional extra in the training package. Dominelli does 
briefly consider the particular position of black students 
in social work training, but the emphasis of her work is 
on the necessity for white people, who occupy positions of 
power and influence vis a vis black people, to rethink 
fundamentally the theory and practice of social work 
education. Clearly, very significant changes in existing 
practice would be necessary to allow for the widespread 
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use of the apprenticeship model in training; most 
obviously, large numbers of black people would need to be 
drawn in to social work agencies and allied community 
groups, and CCETSW would need to re-examine its criteria 
for suitability of practice teachers, ensuring that these 
were revised in anti-discriminatory ways. 
Social work has traditionally set great store by the "use 
of self", the ways ln which social workers "use their 
personalities, sense of self, and experience ln 
establishing relationships with users of their services" 
(p18). So the ways in which the social worker contructs 
her understanding of herself and her world must be subject 
to close scrutiny. As has been noted, Dominelli 's interest 
ln 'the personal' lies less in her belief in the efficacy 
of individual casework than in her strong concern that 
unexamined attitudes are very likely to be racist 
attitudes and will therefore affect the individual's 
practice with, and relation to, black clients and 
colleagues. 
But white people can employ a variety of strategies to 
avoid examining their own attitudes and practices 
regarding raClsm. Dominelli therefore argues that a 
specific form of training must be undertaken by all white 
social work staff with the aim first of all of exposing 
the ways in which white people use or are constrained by 
these strategies and prevented from initiating and 
developing anti-racist action. The form of training she 
advocates is called anti-racism awareness training, and is 
designed to connect "the individual, organisational and 
structural elements of social interaction. Taking changing 
the system as its central point, anti-racism awareness 
training attempts to deconstruct racism by demonstrating 
how personal change affected through increased 
conSClousness of what one does as an individual fits into 
organisational and social policies and practices" (p73). 
For Dominelli, involvement in consciousness-raising 
activity and taking personal and organisational steps to 
challenge and eliminate racist practice are moral 
imperatives, rather than pragmatic/social options (pp76 
and 129). 
Having argued that anti-racist training is a prerequisite 
of personal and organisational change, Dominelli adds to 
this a number of other areas in which training would be 
required by white social workers wishing to work with 
black families ln an anti-racist way (p123). The 
imperative nature of the commitment to anti-racism is 
further reinforced ln the following statement: "white 
social workers wishing to develop anti-racist social work 
practice have no option but to initiate the organisational 
process of changing the perceptions, commitments and 
behaviour of colleagues, managers, employers and clients 
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1n this direction" (p124). 
I suggest that this leaves open the question of whether 
individuals can be made to have their consciousness 
raised. According to Dominelli, consciousness raising is a 
first and necessary step on the way to achieving 
anti-racist goals, but does it have logical as well as 
chronological primacy? Can individuals follow anti-racist 
policy directives (if such things exist) without having a 
'heart and soul' commitment to the anti-racist objectives? 
Could going on a course have an effect, in and of itself, 
if the individual were not already prepared at some level 
to allow for the possibility of change in himself? 
Dominelli's assumption seems to be that once presented 
with the evidence, the individual experiences a 'gestalt 
switch' and cannot be the same again, and yet, at the same 
time, "the power for white social workers to decide to 
accept the anti-racist struggle remains within them" (p79). 
How does social work cope, 1n the meantime, when white 
social workers come into contact with black 'clients'? The 
short answer, for Dominelli, is - badly. To demonstrate, 
she concentrates on social work practice with black 
families, arguing that most social work intervention takes 
place against the backdrop of the family (p93). She looks 
at the ways in which black family forms and ways of 
relating have been stereotyped and pathologised, and 
documents the damaging effects which social work using 
these (racist) parameters inflicts on the families 
concerned. 
Her working approach seems to be one of damage limitation 
minimise the amount of harm white social workers can do 
by effectively restricting their opportunities for direct 
work with black clients. In the case examples she presents 
(pp97ff), Dominelli restricts the white social worker's 
involvement in relieving the client's personal distress to 
referring him to an appropriate black organisation, though 
she allows that there may be useful practical tasks that 
can be handled for that individual (e.g. ensuring that he 
is receiving full entitlement to state benefits). But the 
main thrust of the worker's intervention would more 
properly be directed at bringing about organisational and 
political change for example, demanding adequate 
translation and/or interpreting services and employment of 
ethnic minority social workers, or campaigning against 
immigration laws that divide black families. Clearly, the 
individual social worker is going to be a very small voice 
calling for change, so Dominelli urges the development of 
collective forms of working. 
The theme 
organisational 
of collective action 
change 1S developed 
to bring about 
1n a discussion of 
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different ways of working on agency policies and 
practices. Dominelli highlights two broad directions for 
organisational change: employment policy and practice· and 
service delivery. The situation of black staff in s~cial 
work agencies is examined from different angles - the 
contradictory position of a new black professional middle 
class created by the race relations "industry" (pp131-35); 
the role of equal opportunities policy in setting the 
appropriate climate for anti-racist work and possible 
blocks on its effective operation (pp135-39); the use and 
abuse of Section 11 posts. Dominelli 's conclusions about 
suitable approaches to structural change are again 
encapsulated in a slogan to draw the chapter to a close: 
"collective strategies and methods are imperative ln 
implementing organisational change" (p143). 
Despite the impetus towards collective action, white 
social workers who want to engage seriously in the 
development of anti-racist practice are faced with a 
daunting set of tasks involving nothing less than "the 
transformation of existing social work practice and the 
social relations expressed through and within it". And, 
she continues, in fighting racism, white anti-racist 
social workers "will have to work simultaneously on the 
individual or personal level, the institutional or 
organisational level, and the structural level. This will 
require anti-racist social workers to work both on their 
own and collectively to deal with individual distress and 
structural constraints (p146)." 
Dominelli presents a series of case studies to suggest how 
the anti-racist social work advocate can operate in a 
variety of contexts (p146ff). But again, the personal 
context, the relationship between social worker and client 
is largely ignored, being reduced, in Dominelli 's account, 
to a referral to an appropriate mother-tongue or black 
organisation. She tells us later (p155) that white 
anti-racist social workers would "devote their energies 
towards bringing black and white people together on the 
basis of equality" but for me the mechanics of this 
undoubtedly useful and satisfying activity remain hazy. 
Nonetheless, the reader is cheered at the end by finding 
another slogan: "Anti-racist social work practice is good 
practice". 
Dominelli is clearly intending to light a fuse under 
social work, for, despite recognising its failings towards 
black and ethnic minority clients, social work has 
remained largely unchanged at the bureaucratic and 
professional levels. There are examples of positive 
changes in policy and practice, but these remain 
sufficiently rare for Dominelli to feel justified in 
launching her attack on the whole edifice of social work -
and beyond that, on society at large. 
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It is perhaps here that the book starts to come unstuck. 
Dominelli's antipathy to racism is evident and deeply 
felt, but the focus of her attack gets blurred by sliding 
between social work and wider society. I am not trying to 
depolit~cise social work as an activity, or hide the 
repreSS1ve characteristics of social work as social 
control. But there are particular features of social work 
to do with the fact that it is relationship-based work 
that bear close examination, and which differentiate it 
from other forms of social/agitprop activity; and by 
choosing to allow these features to escape serious 
scrut i ny, Domi ne 11 i has 1 eft a gap i n her text that 
reduces its impact as a statement about social work. 
Dominelli's prescription for the development of 
anti-racist practice involves demystifying the 'social 
work relationship' emphasising, rather, its material 
basis; social work here is about access to resources. Her 
reframing of social work practice commits the practitioner 
to action that shifts power and resources towards ethnic 
minority communities, leading to the development of 
"client-centred, community-based" provision in the control 
of the service users. I would share Dominelli 's criticism 
of the way casework, as traditionally practised, has 
tended to personalise problems and pathologise individuals 
who are, from a different pespective, victims of 
structural inequality and inadequate resources. But where 
does her account leave what has up to now been considered 
a key feature of social work, namely the social work 
relationship - which includes the use of self, the ability 
to listen and to empathise? Exactly what form of working 
relationship would emerge between social worker and 
client, and between social worker and colleague, operating 
within Dominelli 's framework? 
Having dispensed with the traditional casework 
relationship, Dominelli proposes the establishment of 
"egalitarian relationships" but, as I have said earlier, 
she does not explain how this state of affairs is to be 
achieved. And this is because her concern is not really 
with the individual - at least, not at the intimate level 
of interpersonal communication, the conversation between A 
and B. I suggest that Dominelli 's analysis does little to 
illuminate the process of communication and understanding 
encapsulated in the experience of dialogue with an Other. 
2.3 Black perspectives. 
Havi ng looked 
conceptualised 
consider the 
introduction to 
at how anti-racist social work 1S 
in the literature, I now move on to 
second broad approach outlined in the 
this chapter, and start by considering a 
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tex~ whose title proclaims its orientation to the race and 
soc1al work debate: Black Perspectives in Social Work 
(Ahmad, 1990). Early on in this slim volume, Ahmad sets 
out. her position: "Within the overall framework of good 
soc1al work practice for Black families the content of 
this book ~s pla~ed in the context of the'basic principle 
of care, 1nclud1ng some of the main principles of social 
work and professional ethos and values" (Ahmad, 1990:3). 
And, later on the same page, "Racism and oppressive social 
wor~ practices are in conflict with the 'caring' notion of 
soc1al work profession. It is impossible to be a caring 
practitioner and be racist or oppressive at the same time, 
however unintentionally".14 
Ahmad is critical of arguments that reduce racism to 
'racial disadvantage' and equate 'victims' with 'the 
prob 1 em' , and conc 1 udes, "Wi thout i dent i fyi ng the 
pervasive forces of racism in the identification and 
assessment of Black client' (sic) needs, social work 
profession may not only contribute to risk their 
credibility and accountability, but also jeopardise their 
own principles" (p8). So, from the beginning, Ahmad is 
setting out a position that includes an anti-racist as 
well as a black perspective. 
She nominates four key areas for attention: identification 
and assessment of need; empowerment; resources for change; 
and legislation. In each area, she uses case studies first 
of all to examine existing practice with all its (racist) 
flaws, and then to present an alternative way of working 
or thinking about working that does not, she argues, fall 
into the same racist traps. In the first section, for 
example, there is a discussion of the "Open File" system 
in one anonymous social services department (SSD) and the 
problems encountered by that SSD in introducing the 
policy, especially in relation to black clients (pp6ff). 
In Ahmad's analysis, the failure to implement the open 
file policy 1S taken as symptomatic of a more general 
failure in social work to respond adequately to black 
clients and to promote anti- or non-racist practice. She 
makes the point that "clientisation" could be conducive to 
the welfare of black people if it meant increased access 
to SSD-controlled resources and services, and 
"self-control and self-development" (p8); but in practice, 
the opposite tends to occur, and black people simply 
experience greater institutional control of their lives. 
If the basic processes of identification and assessment of 
need are wrong, skewed by racist assumptions, then social 
work cannot do otherwise than continue to fail black 
clients. And Ahmad shows how white social workers' 
judgements, 1n this case in relation to the open file 
policy, can be seen to misrepresent fundamentally those 
clients. 
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She looks at the accounts of the implementation and 
subsequent failure of the open file policy given by white 
social workers an~ reframes them from a black perspective; 
the 'reasons' glven by the social workers come to look 
more like excuses for inaction and maintenance of the 
status quo (p8). By shifting responsibility for the 
success of the policy onto the clients' shoulders) the SSD 
~an appear blameless) and effectively continue to operate 
ln the same old ways. For Ahmad) this is an opportunity 
wasted: white and black could have become allies "in 
tac~ling.manifestations of racism) in particular) personal 
raClsm ln assessment and recording) which is primarily at 
the root of cause factors" (p8). 
As I have indicated) Ahmad relies on extended analyses of 
casework with black families in different circumstances to 
bring out what) for her) are the salient features of 
social work from a black perspective. Her first example 
turns on the involvement of a Sylheti family with the 
health and social services (p9ff). Having noted the ways 
in which white professionals intervened both insensitively 
and unsuccessfully with both Mrs B. and her husband) Ahmad 
suggests that the assessment in this case was impaired by 
the inherent racism of the workers who were operating with 
a distorted view of black families) a Vlew which she 
characterises as "pathological framework" (p9). 
In her proposals for improving practice) Ahmad emphasises 
the importance of making positive use of clients' and 
community resources: social workers need to be able to 
recognlse the (different) strengths and positive 
contributions of black individuals and groups) and move 
away from the assumption that differences - for example in 
family forms or roles - are pathological. This message 
recurs through the book and is an essential component of 
the approach to practice that Ahmad is endorsing) namely) 
empowerment. Like Dominelli) the social work she approves 
moves away from the personal ising of problems commonly 
found in traditional social casework in the psychodynamic 
mode) and towards "joint ownership" of the issues to be 
resolved (p14). 
She notes the use by black professionals and groups of a 
de facto community social work approach) though it is not 
necessarily identified by the 'users' in those terms) and 
she sees such an approach as essentially more open than 
traditionally practiced 'white' social work. Breaking down 
the power of social work expertise or specialised 
knowledge by moving toward more cooperative ways of 
working is also a feature of empowerment) but can rebound 
on black workers who may be accused of over-identification 
with black clients and be forced to choose between that 
way of working and making a commitment to a more 
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traditional form of professionalism. 
~n th~ second case study (p15ff), Ahmad describes a case 
l~volvlng a black family where the widowed elderly mother 
glves up her own accommodation to live with her married 
daugh~er .. She charts the interventions by the different 
agencles lnvolved, and the unhappy outcome for the various 
family members. Ahmad's account of the actions of the 
Socia~ Services, the Housing Department and the family 
G.P. ln 'dealing' with Mrs. J. is deservedly critical, and 
she offers an alternative strategy based on a different 
assessment of the actual 'problem'. Ahmad's approach 
emphasises the element of community involvement and 
participation that she sees as integral to a black 
perspective. Four very brief case examples are provided 
and discussed (pp23-6) to show the damage that can be done 
by white social workers who fail to give due consideration 
to questions of race and racism when making assessments of 
black children. 
Following the discussion of identification and assessment 
of need, Ahmad devotes the next chapter (almost half the 
book) to an extended exploration of the concept of 
empowerment. The definition of empowerment that Ahmad 
adopts is drawn from a work by Solomon entitled Black 
Empowerment: Social Work 1n Oppressed Communities. In 
Solomon's usage, empowerment is a "process whereby the 
social worker engages ln a set of activities with the 
client or client system that aim to reduce the 
powerlessness that has been created by negative valuations 
based on membership in a stigmatized group. It involves 
identification of the power blocks that contribute to the 
problem as well as the development and implementation of 
specific strategies aimed at either the reduction of the 
effects from indirect power blocks or the reduction of the 
operations of direct power blocks." Ahmad comments on this 
quotation in the following terms: "Since racism is one of 
the maJor powerful forces that blocks social work 
empowerment in relation to Black clients, it is necessary 
to establish a framework for non-racist social work 
practice" (p34). So again, the articulation of a black 
perspective is linked with the development of anti-racist 
ways of working. 15 
Ahmad then looks at the possible application of the 
principles of empowerment to other social work approaches, 
in much the same way as Devore and Schlesinger (1981) 
discussed the extension of ethnic-sensitive practice to 
different forms of social work. The discussion of a 
"radical social work approach" (p45ff) shows that, for 
Ahmad, the principles of empowerment can be successfully 
incorporated into existing practice frameworks, a point 
further borne out by her case studies and examples 
relating to the "Task-centred approach" (pp50-55), the 
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"Unitary approach" (pp55-60) and the "Group Work approach" (pp61-69). 
Next, she briefly considers the "resources for change" 
that are available to the social work profession 
(pp74-84). Top of the list and, in Ahmad's estimation the 
"most, v~lua~le resource for social work change for r~cial 
equal1ty, 1S '''good practice'" (p74). She identifies six 
"necessary components of good practice resource" 
(pp74-75), and is then able to maintain confidently that 
"non-racist practice is good social work practice and good 
social work practice is good for all, whether Black or 
White" (p75). The other resources for change that she 
considers are the black community (pp77-78), black 
voluntary organisations (pp78-81), black workers (pp81-83) 
and anti-racist white workers (pp83-84). 
Ahmad devotes her final chapter to drawing out the 
implications of various p1eces of legislation in 
particular, the Race Relations Act 1976 and the Children 
Act, 1989 - and the White Paper on Community Care for the 
advancement of race equality in social work and social 
services' provision. She concludes on a positive note, 
arguing that while social workers cannot take 
responsibility for resolving the racism of British 
society, they can at least take on the challenge of trying 
to resolve the racism in their own profession and 
practice. Indeed, she claims that social workers have an 
obligation to work against the perpetuation of oppressive 
practices, and that this obligation will only be met 
through work that empowers the black families who come 
into contact with social services. 
Two other recent texts that take up the themes of 
anti-racism and black perspectives in social work are the 
collections of essays entitled Setting the Context for 
Change (NCDP, 1991) and One Small Step Towards Racial 
Justice (CCETSW, 1991). The writings in these two 
collections meet some of the criticisms that Dominelli 
(1988) levelled against CCETSW in relation to its position 
on anti-racism. In order to successfully complete the new 
DipSW, students must be deemed to have acquired a range of 
practice competences, and with the introduction of CCETSW 
Paper 30, a specific attempt has been made to introduce 
anti-racist requirements into the training programme. Each 
of these texts deals with the inclusion of anti-racist and 
black perspectives in social work education, training and 
practice, using contributions from black acad~mics, 
students and practitioners to pursue the curr1cular 
implications of CCETSW's explicit stance on anti-racism. 
As these texts reveal, the articulation of a black 
perspective on social work takes us into new territory and 
is an important challenge to the existing bases, 
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assumptions and values ln social work. The previously 
unheard voices of black professionals and service users 
move the whole social work enterprise into a more critical 
and self-analytical mode. But how - for both black and 
white to proceed, using that perspective, to the 
development of constructive and ethnically sensitive 
welfare services? MRP will, I suggest, involve something 
other than the acknowledgement by whites of the validity 
and necessity of the 'black perspective' in social work _ 
though as my later analysis of Ahmad's text indicates 
(chapter eight), there may be difficulties and challenges 
aplenty for the (committed) white reader trying to engage 
with a text written from a black perspective. 
The idea of a black perspective depends on the possibility 
that there may be a way of looking at the world - more 
particularly ln this context, at social work - that is 
essentially different for a black person by virtue of 
being black. 16 From this position, the 'problem' is not 
about being black per se; indeed, this is celebrated as a 
source of strength and cultural richness. Rather, the 
'problem' is redefined as residing in the attitudes and 
practices of (white) social workers and, beyond them, the 
social work institution which is in turn a product of the 
wider (racist) society. Social work itself - its beliefs, 
assumptions and procedures - is now a legitimate target 
for black dissastisfaction. Criticisms of social work 
training and practice have been hard-hitting and reinforce 
the view that it is the institution of social work that is 
inherently problematic. 
The articulation of an anti-racist perspective also 
questions the status and nature of the social work 
enterprise. Social work's self-image may be caring and 
even-handed, but this is no protection from the realities 
of practice ln a racist environment. Anti-racism 
challenges social work to re-examine both its premises and 
its priorities and to ally itself in the most practical 
way with the oppressed. In this way, anti-racist and black 
perspectives become part of a more general, 
anti-discriminatory position which is concerned with 
questions of broader social justice and equality. 
I will look in more detail in the next chapter at the 
development of the concept of racism and its peculiar 
entrenchment in our cultural language or currency, but the 
point I wish to draw out here is that.the emergence.of 
racism as a factor in the analysis of soclal work practlce 
has changed the nature of the discussion at its.h~art; It 
has pointed to an alternative way of conceptuallS~ng the 
problem', and thus invit~s the deve~opment 0: dlff~rent 
strategies for understandlng - and, ldeally, lmprovlng -
social work practice. 
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With the formulation of black and anti-racist 
perspectives, then, the terms of the debate about social 
work and, ~ace have changed: "colour = problem", i.e. the 
problematlsl~g, of ethnic minorities, has given way to a 
set, of poslt~ons that have the capacity to problematise 
soc~al work ltself. Having summarised the stages that 
socl~l work has gone through, the question of course 
remalns, "what next?" The discussion of the process of 
change that led from problematising ethnic minorities to 
the problematising of the social work enterprise itself 
has many resonances with feminist critiques of other 
institutions, critiques which move attention away from a 
"woman = problem" formulation and direct it towards the 
institutional procedures and practices that oppress women 
in different ways. In the light of this, therefore, it may 
be instructive to examine a parallel debate that seems to 
have followed a similar history. 
2.4 A comparlson of perspectives on race and gender. 
The area I have turned to - women in science - offers a 
useful structure for the analysis of social work practice 
in relation to ethnic minority clients. Most importantly, 
perhaps, it may also suggest a new direction for our 
thinking about the development of MRP. The following 
discussion draws extensively on the work of Sandra Harding 
(1986), from which all otherwise unattributed quotations 
in this section are drawn. 
Harding's task is to examine 'science' as currently 
constituted and practiced, and to ask whether science is 
sexist. To answer this question, she looks at evidence 
from different feminist critiques of science, ranging from 
the reformist to the more revolutionary; these move from a 
position that identifies only 'bad' science as the 
problem, leaving the basic value framework intact, through 
to a more radical reappraisal of the whole scientific 
enterprise where all assumptions are open to challenge. 
Her analysis involves a shift from what she terms "the 
'woman question' in science" - that is, an emphasis on the 
question "what is to be done about the situation of women 
in science?" (p9) to the new question being posed by 
some feminists: "'Is it possible to use for emancipatory 
ends sciences that are apparently so intimately involved 
in Western, bourgeois, and masculine projects?' - the 
'science question' in feminism" (p9). 
In an analogous way, I think the social work literature 
can be examined and the question asked, "Is social work 
racist?" While not seeking a perfect fit with Harding's 
conceptual framework, addressing this question will 
involve trying to draw up a parallel structure to explore 
the way in which assessments and critiques of social work 
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practice have changed over time and 1n response to 
different political/ economic/social circumstances. 
The focus 1S on a move away from "the 'race question' in 
social work" that 1S, asking what is to be done 
with/about black clients presenting at Social Services 
Departments? - towards consideration of "the 'social work 
quest ion' 1 n "Here the prob 1 em of termi no logy 
presents itself again, making this formulation hard to 
complete. What is the 'race' equivalent of 'feminism',as 
1n Harding's construction "the 'science question' in 
feminism"? 
'Feminism' does not simply signify the absence of 
androcentrism but has gained a more active sense. It 1S 
not just the swapping of a state of affairs that 1S 
pro-men for one that is pro-women. Feminism has, in some 
senses, involved challenging and attempting to refigure 
traditional male/female, masculine/feminine hierarchies 
with a view to allowing the development of new forms of 
social relations. At the same time, Harding's formulations 
denote a shift in the locus of the 'problem' - away from 
women, in the first case, and to a new location in the 
actual practice and structures of science, in the second. 
In a similar way, I have proposed an analysis of social 
work practice that shifts away from an assessment of black 
people as 'the problem', to a situation where social work 
itself is the problematic, viewed in relation to sets of 
behaviour that challenge white/black hierarchies of 
dominance and inferiority. For this reason, perhaps, the 
construction adopted earlier on the text, multi-racialism 
(as in the usage MRP), should be questioned as it does not 
adequately express the element of confrontation or 
challenge inherent in the active conception of feminism 
proposed. Therefore, at this stage, it may be that 
'anti-racism' is the more appropriate, although not 
entirely problem-free, term. 
My procedure 1n what follows 1S to present each of four 
basic critical approaches to science and scientific 
practice in the terms used by Harding, and to follow each 
such brief account with a discussion of its possible 
relevance to an analysis of social work and social work 
practice. 
i) Equal opportunities position. 
Harding observes that, "The criticism thought least 
threatening to science's self-understanding is that of 
unfair educational. employment, and status-assigning 
pract ices" (p58) ; however, 1 itt 1 e has been done to 
ameliorate this situation and bring in fair practices -
and this despite the view held by many that eliminating 
such inequities would not alter the fundamental nature and 
practice of science. 
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Her ~nalysis of women's continued poor showing and lack of 
publlC reward in this field is not directly related to 
straight numbers of women employed in science' that is to 
say that an increase in numbers did little to'improve the 
general position of female scientific employees, although 
of course, ln every age, some 'exceptional' women have 
always managed to break through and achieve status and 
acknowledgement for their contributions to scientific 
knowledge. Rather, Harding noted the following: "The 
broader social and political context in which 
discrimination against women in science occurs is part of 
gendered social relations more generally, and is part of 
the psychic landscape within which individual masculine 
scientists think about themselves as well as about the 
nature of science" (pSg). Thus, an understanding of the 
continued down-graded, subordinate position of women in 
SClence is intimately bound up with issues of gender 
identity and relative power in the broader society which 
governs and validates scientific activity. 
To turn to a consideration of an equal opportunities 
position ln social work: the argument is made that if 
recruitment and employment practices within Social 
Services Departments (SSDs) were made more fair, that is 
were not either intentionally or unintentionally 
discriminatory then this would open the way for more black 
workers to come into the social work system. At present, 
ethnic minority group members are underrepresented in the 
profession, and moves to change this, and bring the 
workforce more into line with the composition of the 
general population are being pursued. A 'representative' 
service, in this sense, is held to be a better service. 
However, assertions of this kind leave open more questions 
than they answer. Why should increasing the number of any 
one particular group within the SSD necessarily be a 'good 
thing'? Is there any automatic or necessary link between 
the size of the ethnic minority staff group in a given 
local authority and an improvement in the service 
provided? As Harding has already indicated, numbers, in 
themselves, do not tell the whole story. Other issues 
would need to be addressed before it could confidently be 
said that any real change in the SSD had occurred. For 
example, what is the likelihood of an ethnic minority 
individual being promoted to a senior management post? Are 
the admittedly larger numbers of ethnic minority staff 
found mainly in clerical or low-grade professional posts, 
with little chance of movement? Do black staff stay with 
the local authority? 
And perhaps the most important issue that the equal 
opportunities position fails to address - what is, or 
should be, the role of ethnic minority staff within the 
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SSD org~nisation? Do black staff 'succeed' in social work 
by beco~lng 'honorary whites', or is there a role for such 
staff slmply by virtue of the fact that they are black and 
t h 't ?17 no w 1 e. Do they have to become cultural experts or 
take on the r~le of departmental 'resource', obviating the 
need for whlte staff to engage with issues of race and 
alternative cultural norms? A simple head-count will not 
reveal the answers to questions such as these. 
ii) Feminist empiricism. 
In Harding's discussion, this Vlew holds that there may be 
instances of sexism within science, but that these are not 
indicative of a problem within the scientific enterprise 
itself; they are simply examples of 'bad science'. 
" ... [S]exism and androcentrism are social biases 
correctable by stricter adherence to the existing 
methodological norms of scientific enquiry" (p24). Thus a 
certain amount of tinkering will remove these peripheral 
problems, leaving the underlying structure of norms and 
values untouched by - perhaps even beyond - criticism. 
An equivalent construction in terms of social work and 
race could run something like this: there is, in social 
work, a core of values that is universal and fundamental -
perhaps relating to the essential 'human-ness' of all 
people, whatever the differences in their appearance or 
circumstances; an example here could be the colour-blind 
approach. There may be instances where social work 
practice with ethnic minority individuals has been 
insensitive, even racist in its effect, but such cases 
have arisen where the canons of 'good practice' have not 
been rigorously enough applied. Thus "social work" as an 
enterprise avoids the taint of racism, leaving the 
'problem' as one which could be removed if basic social 
work principles were maintained.Devore and Schlesinger 
seem to find themselves drawing similar conclusions about 
social work, though they would certainly not accept that 
ethnic-sensitive practice could start from a colour-blind 
position. 
While at first glance such a position seems very 
appealing, closer scrutiny shows that, at present anyway, 
it is both impractical and flawed. Good intentions, and an 
earnest desire to treat people fairly are not protection 
against the inadvertent racism of certain behaviours. 
Perception of another individual can never be entirely 
neutral in that the ability to make sense of what/who one 
is perceiving depends on a prior framework of meanings and 
experiences. So it seems implausible, as advocates of the 
colour-blind approach would claim, that race/racial 
appearance a very obvious physical marker - can be 
ignored, though an i~d~vidual may mak~ the ef~ort not to 
attach negative signlflcance to such lnformatlon about a 
client. An inherent problem of the colour-blind approach 
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is tha~ 'treating everyone the same' has frequently been a 
euphemlsm for treating everyone as if they were - or 
shou~d be white. And this, in practice, denies the 
partl~ular .circumstances and needs of black people, 
becomlng raclst in effect if not by intention. 
To look at the broader empiricist position aside from the 
particulars of the colour-blind approac~ three further 
difficulties can be noted: first, can r~cism, any more 
than sexism, be reduced to a "correctable social bias"? 
Any analysis of the concept of racism would suggest that 
it occupied a far more deep rooted and integrated place in 
our cultural map than such a description would allow. 
Second, is there any agreement about what should 
constitute the 'value core' of social work?18 And third, 
the status of what social work chooses to problematise is 
not itself neutral, but reflects the norms and biases of 
the wider (racist) society. 
iii) The feminist standpoint. 
According to this feminist critique of science and its 
organisation, "Briefly, this proposal argues that men's 
dominating position in social life results in partial and 
perverse understandings, whereas women's subjugated 
position provides the possibility of more complete and 
less perverse understandings .... The feminist critiques 
of social amd natural science, whether expressed by women 
or men, are grounded in the universal features of women's 
experlence as understood from the perspective of feminism" 
(p26). 
Without trying to contrive a too-perfect fit, I would 
suggest that translation of this approach into race and 
social work terms could take either of two forms, a 'soft' 
or a 'hard' version. The 'soft' version would assert that 
the social worker needs to understand the ethnic minority 
perspective and to be sensitive to the social experiences 
of minority group clients, as such experiences provide a 
unique staring point for the discovery of racial bias. The 
worker adopting this approach would be in the tradition 
described by Ely and Denney as "cultural pluralism" 
(1987:83-89). The form of practice envisaged by writers 
within this framework lays emphasis on the worker having 
knowledge of the client's racial/cultural/ethnic 
background, and using this knowledge ln a culturally 
sensitive way. 
As the discussion of cultural pluralism in chapter one 
noted this approach has its limitations, chiefly that it 
downg~ades the role and impact of racism on the lives of 
black people. Devore and Schlesinger (1981), while 
emphasising the importance of adequate c~ltural .kn~wledge, 
take their analysis one stage further wlth thelr ldeas of 
"eth-class" and the "ethnic reality" which incorporate an 
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understanding of the structural factors affecting black 
people in a racist society. 
The 'hard' version would start from the position that the 
whole social work edifice is suspect and riddled with 
eurocentric and/or racist biases. This view recognises the 
central and devastating effects of racism, and the 
structural position of ethnic minority groups in British 
society. It leads either to a form of structuralism or to 
the development of a 'black' alternative framework and 
practice in social work. Such an alternative could be 
conceptualised as different but not necessarily better 
than existing 'white' social work, or as 'better' in some 
sense yet to be defined. Practice examples can be found 
presenting criticisms of, or proposals for, social work 
from a specifically 'black' perspective. 19 
The 'standpoint' approach has a lot to offer current 
social work thinking in that it provides a much needed 
jolt to many hitherto unquestioned assumptions about 
appropriateness and effectiveness of services across 
cultural/ethnic boundaries. It brings to the fore a 
previously unheard group of voices, those of both black 
professionals and clients. One interesting question left 
unanswered at this stage, analogous to the question posed 
by Harding about feminist standpoint theory, is whether 
there is, or should be, one ethnic minority/black 
standpoint, or several different and cross-cutting 
standpoints which need to be viewed together. 
iv. Feminist postmodernism. 
Feminist postmodernism in Harding's discussion demands an 
acknowledgement of the validity and richness of women's 
'fractured' identities; that is, a recognition of the many 
voices within the general identity 'women', and the need 
for these voices to interact and challenge one another, 
rather than trying to produce 'the' one feminist 
standpoi nt. It is tryi ng "to el i mi nate the defensi ve 
androcentric urge to imagine a 'transcendental ego' with a 
single voice that judges how close our knowledge claims 
approach the 'one true story' of the way the world is" 
(p55). If not proposing a situation where 
epistemologically 'anything goes', Harding is at least 
envisaging an attempt to treat sceptically the most basic 
assumptions of science. 
Science is engaged in seeking certain kinds of knowledge -
and both the nature of that knowledge and the processes by 
which it is sought can be subject to critical assessment 
of the kinds suggested by Harding. Feminist science - or 
better, feminist sciences do not yet exist, but a 
struggle has been joined ~o bring ~uc~ new knowle~ge.bases 
and procedures into belng. Hardl~g sown descrlptlon of 
the present situation is worth quotlng at some length: 
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" 'Something out there' 1S changing social relations 
between races, classes, and cultures as well as between 
genders probably quite a few 'somethings' - at a pace 
that outstrips our theorizing. It would be 
historically premature and delusionary for feminism to 
arrive at a 'master theory', at a 'normal science' 
paradigm with conceptual and methodological assumptions 
that w7 all think we can accept. Feminist analytical 
categor1es should be unstable at this moment in history. 
The problem is that we do not know and should not know 
just what we want to say about a number of conceptual 
choices with which we are presented" (p244). 
Harding points to the need for critical dialogue between 
the participants involved in science and for an 
interrogation of the discourses of science, the traditions 
that condition the practices, attitudes, knowledge bases -
ways of knowing of both participants and critics. A 
similar approach could usefully be applied to social work, 
an enterprise that has an irreducible dependence on and 
involvement with language, with both spoken and written 
text (interviews, case files, conferences, court reports, 
etc. ) . 
Postmodernism, 1n the form presented by Harding, has 
something new to offer social work theory and practice. 
Within this frame of reference, the project now for social 
work is not to try and define the necessary conceptual 
and methodological assumptions for the enterprise to be 
known as 'anti-racist practice'. Such a project would be 
no more possible or desirable than the search for 'the 
feminist science'. A more realistic and urgent task would 
be the promoting of a process of critical dialogue and 
debate among the many different voices within and affected 
by the statutory welfare serV1ces. 
In the next chapter, I analyse the concept of racism and 
will be suggesting that it transcends the purely personal 
(the prejudice/cognitive component), and similarly, that 
it cannot be reduced to the impersonal consequences of 
particular political/historical/bureaucratic 
configurations. In a certain sense, racism blends the 
personal and the political; it is embedded in the social 
fabric of this country and assumes the character of a 
'linguistic resource'. A convincing definition of 
anti-racist practice needs to acknowledge the way in which 
racism structures and infiltrates different forms of 
discourse - including social work discourses. This view of 
racism reaches to the heart of our ways of knowing about 
the world; it raises basic questions of epistemology to do 
with how we understand and relate to what we encounter 
'out there'. My reading of the social work literature 
suggests that neither MRP nor anti-~acist practi~e h~ve 
been approached from this angle, and 1n fact that 1t w1ll 
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be necessary to look outside social work altogether to 
find an appropriate framework for analysis. 
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CHAPTER TWO - NOTES 
1. I will expand this point about the significance of a 
change 1n terminology in section 4 of this chapter. 
2. Though my later discussion of Dominelli (1988) in 
chapter seven suggests that such a move may not itself be 
without problems. 
3. All references in this section are to Dominelli (1988) 
unless otherwise indicated. 
4. This 1S an odd formulation for a structuralist: 'we' 
oppress 'them' because we think they are inferior. It 
suggests that ideology determines structure - so what then 
is the "core" of racism referred to by Dominelli on p2? 
5. The problems associated with establishing egalitarian 
relationships are similar to those that arise when 
Dominelli falls back on intuition, calling on "our 
intuitive responses" (p13) to guide white social workers' 
communications with black clients and fellow workers. How 
should we know which of our own intuitive responses to 
listen to? Do we treat all comments or responses which 
suggest that we have been racist in the same way and with 
the same importance? Which white or black people, for 
example, do we consider are entitled to pass such 
comments? Dominelli offers few clues. 
6. Other 
book, a 
seven. 
slogans 
point I 
in the same vein appear throughout the 
will explore in more detail in chapter 
7. Examples include Bailey and Brake (eds.) (1975), 
Corrigan and Leonard (1978), Pritchard and Taylor (1978), 
Simpkin (1979), Brake and Bailey (eds.) (1980), and Langan 
and Lee (eds.) (1989). 
8. This perhaps overlooks the point that decisions will 
always have to be made about access to resources. The 
problem is not about whether to ration, but to what degree 
and how. 
9. I cannot help being sceptical of this description which 
fails to chime with my own experience of inner-city 
fieldwork practitioners. Dominelli apparently here bases 
her understanding on an account of social work that was at 
least ten years old and which could not have predicted the 
effects of an extended period of aggressive cuts in 
welfare provision under Thatcherism. 
10. Is there necessarily anything intrinsically wrong with 
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contradiction? I pursue this point 1n later chapters. 
11. This is more modestJ but what about the other demands 
on social work? "Complex and contradictory" means just 
that. What happens when challenging racism means that 
someone else (equally 'deserving' or entitled to help) 
gets a poor deal? 
12. See Ahmed J Cheetham and Small (eds. ) (1986) J for 
discussion of the colour-blind approach. 
13. As the later discussion - particularly in chapter six 
suggests J the notion of "exemplary classic texts" is 
perhaps not as transparent as Dominelli supposes. 
14. All subsequent references in this section are to Ahmad 
(1990)J unless otherwise stated. 
15. It 1S interesting to note J in the light of the 
particular concerns of this thesis that Ahmad's 
terminology slides between "anti-racism" and "non-racism" 
with apparent unconcern. 
16. It also raises interesting questions about the nature 
of subjectivity that the social work literature has not 
yet begun to address. 
17. Several writers have started to look at this question; 
see J for example J Ahmed (1978)J Manning (1979)J Rooney 
(1980)J Rooney (1982)J and Liverpool (1982). 
18. There are many discussions in the literature about the 
'value core' of social work; see J for example J Walton 
(1982)J Timms (1983)J and Horne (1987). 
19. A number of articles and longer works have already 
been cited in the notes accompanying chapter one; 1n 
particular J see under numbers 4J 5 and 11. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FROM 'RACE' TO 'RACISM' 
3.1 Introduction. 
What lS 'race'? We all have a sense of what the term 
means, and most people could probably supply an 
'off-the-cuff' definition, if asked. Put all the 
definitions together, however, and the sharp edges of the 
term immediately become blurred, and it takes on the 
character of an "essentially contested concept"1. 
Nonetheless, 'race' or perhaps more correctly, the 
belief in race (Cashmore and Troyna, 1983:17) - has been a 
powerful force in history and remains still an influential 
factor in present-day social and political arrangements. 
In chapters one and two, I referred at various points to 
'racism' mainly in relation to its presence or absence 
as an idea in the social work literature. I offered no 
definition, treating the term as a given. In this chapter, 
I put the concepts of race and racism under scrutiny. I 
will trace the history and the range of ideas about race 
and their incorporation into political and social 
ideologies, and will then examine different theoretical 
Vlews of the components of raClsm, concluding with 
suggestions for an understanding of racism which will 
inform the rest of this study. 
3.2 The idea of race. 
The ultimate historical roots of this concept are obscure, 
but the idea of separate races is found in both the 
writings of the Ancient Greek philosophers and in the Old 
Testament. 2 The idea of race embraces ideas of inherent 
biological differences between groups of people, but has 
also been applied to language groups, national groups, 
religious and/or cultural groups and even to the whole of 
humankind mankind (the 'human race'). Linking these 
different usages is the assumption that line of descent is 
relevant to a group's current situation. The different 
conceptions of race also share the belief that human 
beings are "separable into types that are permanent and 
enduring", defined in relation to certain "immanent 
physical features" (Cashmore and Troyna, 1983:18). A 
definition combining emphasis on physical difference and 
lineage can be formulated: "A classificatory term broadly 
equivalent to subspecies. Applied most,frequently to human 
beings it indicates a group characterlzed by closeness of 
common' descent and usually also by some shared physical 
distinctiveness such as colour of skin" (Bullock and 
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Stallybrass (eds.), 1977:520). Yet even this appealingly 
straightforward statement is misleading as it gives no 
suggestion that 'race' has proved "notoriously fragile" 
when subjected to biological analysis (Cashmore and 
Troyna, 1983:17). 
Bloom (1971) and Tobias (1961) both make a case for the 
limi~ed ,usefulness of the term 'race', restricting its 
appllcatlon to a form of biological or anatomical typing, 
but strongly reject attempts to extrapolate from the 
biological to the social or political. 3 Their cases for 
even a strictly limited, biological usage are challenged 
by other evidence cited in brief by Ely and Denney 
(1987:1-3) and Davey (1983:18-20) which points to the 
conclusion that the present state of scientific knowledge 
cannot support the division of the world's human 
population into discrete and immutable racial types. On 
the contrary, the available evidence strongly indicates a 
level of genetic homogeneity within the species: lithe 
genetic differences between the so-called races of man are 
only slightly greater than those which occur between 
nations within a racial group, and the genetic differences 
between individuals within a local population are far 
greater than either of these" (Davey, 1983:19). The 
gradual emergence of this view as the reputable scientific 
consensus between the two world wars, and the linked 
demise of eugenic ideas in biology, is exhaustively 
documented in Barkan (1992). 
It can be argued, then, that what are termed 'races' are 
not genetically or biologically that dissimilar from one 
another, and that the variation in the human species can 
be perceived as a genetic continuum. Yet despite its 
apparent limitations, the notion of race has an extremely 
tenacious grip in everyday thought, out of all proportion 
to its biological or genetic significance. Why should this 
be so? The answer lies, in part, in the observation made 
by Ely and Denney that: "attempts to dismiss biological 
race as a figment of the imagination founder on the common 
sense ability to distinguish a Chinese person from an 
African" (1987:3). Leaving aside for the moment the notion 
of 'common sense', which is perhaps more problematic than 
Ely and Denney imply here, they have pointed to two very 
obvious 'facts of life', namely, that people are 
observably different from one another, and that human 
beings have an apparently inherent need to classify and 
order the world and all its phenomena into discrete 
compartments. 4 
Classification, at 
part of negotiating 
the world and its 
'perception of ... 
that have to be 
the most basic level, is an essential 
- literally and metaphorically - with 
i nhabi tants. Percept ion i sal ways 
and it is these objects of perception 
sorted into recognizable classes and 
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groups. Without the ability to place discriminably 
different objects, individuals or events together and 
tre~t them as if, for particular purposes, they were 
equ1valent, the individual would simply be overwhelmed by 
the mass of what are, strictly speaking, unique 
perceptions. Perception, then, is creative, "By its most 
profound nature, perception cannot be only an obedient 
reflection of reality, an adaptation to the data at hand' 
it. 1S also an active transfiguration giving meaning t~ 
be1ng." (Berdyaev, quoted in Macquarrie, 1973:28) More or 
less sophisticated criteria may be used, but the business 
of dividing up the environment into manageable units and 
constructing equivalence categories continues throughout, 
and underlies, our intellectual development. So what we 
can take from the discussion thus far is that, at root, 
classification is a form of social agreement and, as will 
become clearer below, the terms of that agreement are not 
arbitrary, but depend on the particular purposes or 
objectives of the classifier. 5 
While individuals can call on a range of categorising 
systems to make sense of the world, it is clear that some 
phenomena are easier to classify than others. Classifying 
objects 1n the natural world, for instance, is simpler in 
some senses than placing oneself or other people in social 
categories; and it is the processes whereby the latter 
occurs that are most relevant here. There are difficulties 
attendant on any attempt to assign individuals and their 
behaviours to social categories as the individuals under 
consideration have their own understanding of the events 
they participate in, and their own reasons, motives and 
purposes for performing particular actions which may not 
be transparent to an outside observer. 6 However, we try to 
make sense of those with whom we deal, and in order to do 
this we simplify the constantly shifting picture by 
creating constancies: "We attribute consistent and 
repeatable characteristics to others, either as 
individuals or as exemplars of social groups and respond 
to them according to their role, function, status, or 
group membership" (Davey, 1983:42). 
We all have to learn which characteristics to attend to 
when making social judgements about each other; children 
are aware of differences in skin colour, hair, dress, 
style of speech, and so on, from perhaps the age of four 
or five and will use these cues as the bases for 'person categori~s' to simplify and order their environments 
(Troyna and Hatcher, 1992). I~ is interact i on w~ th . other 
people within a particular soc~ety though, .that 1nd1cates 
how much attention should be pa1d to such d1fferences, and 
that teaches the child how they should be evaluated. Ely 
and Denney suggest that the child has a fundamental need 
to establish his own identity, and can only do that.by 
learning the rules of inclusion and exclusion operat1ng 
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withi~ his particular society: "He must be able to 
p~rce1ve ~he differences between the majority groups 1n 
h1S commun1ty and identify the one to which he belongs 
and, h~ must learn the appropriate behavioural and 
att1~ud1nal response towards people classified in a 
p~rt~cular way. Self identification can only be acquired 
w1th1n the context of the system of preferences and biases 
which exist in a society" (Ely and Denney, 1987:6). 
The desire to classify in itself need not be problematic -
that is, a classification of physical differences along a 
horizontal axis could provide interesting information in 
terms of helping our understanding of how differences 
between individuals and groups occur. A potentially more 
sinister effect is achieved when the axis is shifted to 
the vertical, and the simple, serial ordering of groups on 
the basis of ascribed racial characteristics is replaced 
by a moral hierarchy in which some groups or races are 
placed higher than others. The former come to be seen as 
better/superior, the latter as worse/inferior, and this 
new ordering readily engenders ideas about dominant and 
dominated races which become part of our commonsense 
understanding of the world. 7 
In deploying the term 'race', then, we are latching on to 
what are in fact superficial differences, employing 
selective perception to attach special significance to a 
small number of physically obvious features - notably skin 
colour and reaching conclusions about the nature or 
other essential characteristics of the individual bearing 
these outward distinguishing slgns. It is worth noting 
that the outcome is an emphasis on the negative 
associations of difference; this is not a situation where 
difference is noted but nonetheless still implies 
equality. There 1S an idea of inherent 
superiority/inferiority contained in this particular way 
of dividing up the world. 
So at this stage, it is being suggested that there are no 
races 1n the sense of immutable and discrete groups 
organised on the basis of certain phenotypical or 
genotypical characteristics. Physical and genetic 
differences do exist both within and between human 
populations, but there is no scientific justification for 
using these differences to rank the groups (races) 
hierarchically, and for then promoting unequal treatment 
on the grounds that one population is inherently superior 
to another. As Davey says, any justification for such 
treatment "must be sought in social and political 
relationships within and between societies rather than in 
the state of knowledge concerning biological differences" 
(Davey 1983:19). So the political and social usages of 
ideas' about race bear closer scrutiny, i~ order ,to 
understand the continuing importance of th1S otherw1se 
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'empty' concept. 
Up to the beginning of the 19th century, race was 
considered ln terms of lineage or common ancestry, and 
s~gnif~ed "a. line of descent, a group defined by 
hlstorlcal contlnuity" (Husband, 1982:13). However, around 
the turn of the century, with the ascendancy of science, a 
change occurred. 8 Particularly under the influence of the 
work.of Cuvier, race came to signify "an inherent physical 
quallty. Other peoples are seen as biologically different" 
(Banton, 1977:18). Although the definition was still 
uncertain, people began to assume that mankind was divided 
i~to races according to criteria of permanent physical 
dlfference. And theories about fixed differences between 
peoples quickly led to theories about inequalities between 
them. Racial (or racist) ideologies were constructed, 
based on the notion that these races might not all be of 
equal standing. 9 
The impact of Darwin's speculations about human evolution 
on perceptions of 'race' was enormous, at a time of 
colonial expansion when Europeans were coming into contact 
with and having to make sense of a vast range of peoples 
and customs. "If man had originated not by special 
creation but by evolution, it was perhaps natural to 
suppose that human races might represent stages in the 
process, or the branches of an evolutionary tree" (Baker, 
quoted in Cashmore and Troyna, 1983:22). Darwinism, which 
could have supported the view that 'all men are brothers', 
was instead diverted into a wholly opposite social theory 
where the races were seen as struggling for survival and 
only the 'fittest', most superior would win through - at 
the cost of the weakest. By definition, therefore, 
conquerors were obviously superior and were thus entitled 
to exploit the natural and human resources of the 
vanquished. 10 
Other theories emerged which aimed directly at finding 
'scientific' foundations for the already widely-held 
assumptions about the inherent superiority of whites; 
these included the neotenic theory and theory of 
recapitulation. That succeSSlve theories were mutually 
contradictory seemed little impediment to their 
advance.11 These approaches are mentioned here not simply 
as interesting relics from the nineteenth century's 
fascination with science, but as examples of the power of 
racist ideologies to maintain a hold through time 
regardless of their lack of foundation. As late as 1971, 
the neotenic argument was invoked by Eysenck in the course 
of the race and IQ debate, to support his assertion of the 
naturally advanced cognitive and intellectual abilities of 
whites over blacks (Gould, 1980:220). 
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The power exercised by ideas of race in the twentieth 
century cannot be overlooked: the large-scale development 
of extreme forms of nationalism and fascism such as Nazism 
may ,have passed J but the concept of racial superiority 
perslsts. As events in Eastern Europe and in the states of 
the former ~SSR show J ethnic and/or national identity 
remalns a hlghly significant and emotionally charged 
factor in the lives of large groups of people J and 
provides a focus around which to organise social and 
political demands. In BritainJ the fear - or worse J the 
experlence of racially-motivated violence remains a 
factor in the lives of numbers of black people. Neo-Nazi 
and extreme right-wing groups maintain a presence on the 
fringes of mainstream political life and J perhaps more 
insidiouslYJ ideas of race have been reconfigured to allow 
for their inclusion in everyday, 'respectable' political 
debate - a point I shall explore further in section 3.4 of 
this chapter. 
3.3 Learning to be prejudiced: the cognitive structures 
and strategies of raClsm. 
"Race is not a problem: it's something that people create 
as a problem" (Cashmore and Troyna, 1983:30). 
The previous section put forward the view that race and 
hence raClsm, belong more to the social world than the 
'natural': race was presented as a largely social 
construct which has exercised a lasting influence on the 
minds and actions of the members of many different 
societies. This section concentrates on the cognitive 
processes by which individuals and groups learn and 
perpetuate racist ideas and practices. The focus here is 
on racial and ethnic prejudice. 'Prejudice' is an aspect 
of, but is not synonymous with, 'racism' (eCeS, 1982:47), 
but as it constitutes the essential attitudinal component 
of racism, it bears examination. 
While it would be oversimple to say that prejudice is 
wholly personal, it is nonetheless a 'mental attitude' -
one, in common usage, that is "inflexible" and "based on 
unreliable, possibly distorted, stereotyped images" of 
specific groups (Cashmore and Troyna, 1983:36) - and, as 
such, forms part of the psychological baggage of the 
individual. Still clarifying terms, 'stereotypes' are 
taken to be generalisations about particular groups of 
people made on the, basis,of i~complete, inac~ur~te, or 
simplified informatlon; ldentlcal characterlstlcs or 
properties are then attributed to individuals, purely on 
the basis of membership of that group. In Davey's 
formulation J "Sterotypes are judgements concer~in~ a class 
or category of people we 'know' about, as dlstlnct from 
people we know individually" (Davey, 1983:46). 
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Various theories have been advanced to account for the 
emergence of prejudice and these can be grouped under 
three headings: phenomenological, psychodynamic, and 
structural. Phenomenological theories start with the 
assumption that "a person's perceptions of his environment 
are of <?rucial importance in understanding his behavior" 
a~ th~y lnflue~ce the nature of his reponses to different 
sltuatlons (Wrlghtsman, 1972:287). So the individual's 
perceptions, rather than the external world become the 
objects of study. For example, Wrightsman p~esents this 
situation: an individual will respond aggressively to 
minority group members if they are perceived as hostile or 
threateni ng. Thus, "Genui ne conci 1 i atory behavi or on the 
part of the Black Panthers ... is irrelevant if white 
policemen have been brainwashed to believe that the 
Panthers are out to get them" (Wrightsman, 1972:277). 
This is uncontentious as far as it goes. If an individual 
believes 'A' to be true, she will act as if it were true. 
But this hardly advances matters to any great extent. In 
the example above, does the 'genuineness' derive from the 
Panthers' perceptions of their behaviour or from an 
external observer's? (Presumably, if the police were able 
to perceive it as genuinely conciliatory, it would no 
longer be appropriate to talk of them having been 
"brainwashed" into the opposing point of view.) Are the 
police literally unable to admit the idea of "genuine 
conciliatory behavior" into their assessment of the 
activities before them? 
Further, Wrightsman's comments do not indicate what 
consideration should be given to the reasons why the 
individual perceives the world one way (e.g. negatively) 
rather than another (e.g. positively). The policemen in 
the example have not decided on a whim that the Panthers 
are "out to get them" - they have been "brainwashed". I 
have suggested earlier (section 3.2) that category sets 
are constructed rather than given to consciousness - and 
the choices are not arbitrary. One final problem with 
phenomenological accounts of prejudice has to do with 
procedure; one might ask how the perceptions of another 
individual could be accurately studied. So, although the 
underlying assumptions of this approac~ can.be clear~y 
enough stated, example does little to lllumlnate thelr 
application. 
Psychodynamic theories deal with the "prejudiced 
personality" and locate the origins and patterns of 
prejudice in personal conflicts and/or maladjustments 
within the individual. Such theor~es poin~ to ~he 
functional aspect of prejudice, suggestln~ t~a~ lt ~ulflls 
a need in that individual. 12 But lndlvlduallst or 
psychological theories alone cannot account for the 
prevalence of prejudice in whole groups which include 
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indiv~duals of widely differing personality types and life 
experlence (Bethlehem,1985:100) and have been criticised 
for underestimating the "cruciai institutional pressures" 
that, cause, or promote discrimination and prejudiced 
behavlour ln individuals regardless of personality 
structure and personal beliefs (Stone, 1985:28-29). 
Structural theories trace the emergence of prejudice not 
to individual pathology or perception but to the shared 
, , 
experlence of group membership. "For the most part," 
argues Davey, "individuals do not interact with each other 
in ad hoc ways but as members of social collectivities 
national, ethnic, religious or socioeconomic entities, i~ 
circumstances which are not of their own creation" (Davey, 
1983:11). Thus, the relationships within and between 
groups are shaped by broad political, socioeconomic or 
cultural factors which exist beyond the will or complete 
control of individuals, and which regulate the conduct of 
members of the respective groups. Individuals behave in 
ways which they consider appropriate for the particular 
groups to which they belong; so prejudice may be an 
'acceptable' response in terms of conformity to certain 
group expectations, where these are forged ln a context of 
basically hostile intergroup relations. 
The theoretical approaches presented above all contribute 
to an understanding of the genesis of prejudiced attitudes 
and behaviour, but each offers at best only a partial 
Vlew. Prejudice is rooted both ln the psychological 
processes of the individual and ln the sociocultural 
milieu within which she operates, and a broader account is 
needed to incorporate both these interdependent aspects. 
Van Dijk (1987) takes the analysis one stage further in a 
wide-ranging study whose object is to examlne the 
processes whereby racism is communicated in a multi-racial 
society. His analysis of the cognitive dimensions of 
prejudice is framed within a broader 
information-processing paradigm, and takes account both of 
the psychological processes involved in the acquisition 
and maintenance of prejudiced attitudes, and the social 
context within which these attitudes are expressed through 
act ion. "Prej udi ce i s not just a 'menta 1 state'; it not 
only involves the (trans)formation of ethnic attitudes, 
but actually operates through flexible strategies for the 
processing of group-based ethnic or racial inf~rmation . 
... [P]rejudice is not just 'what' people "thlnk a~~ut 
ethnic out-groups, but also 'how' they do so. (van D1Jk, 
1987:181) 
He proposes that prejudice has five distinct properties: 
fi rst, it is a 'group atti tude', that is, a shared 
attitude among members of an in-group and not just a 
personal opinion. Second, the recipients of the prejudiced 
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attitude are "one or more other groups ('out-groups') that 
are ,a;;umend, to be different on any social dimension", 
Ethnlc attltudes concentrate on differences attributed 
to the Supposed ethnic or racial characteristics of the 
out-group. Third, the overall attitude towards the 
out-group is negative, and the differences associated with 
the out-group are negatively evaluated in relation to some 
of the values, interests or objectives of the in-group. 
Fourth, the negative opinions within the ethnic attitude 
are based on stereotypes or biased models of the 
out-group. Van Dijk suggests that effectively a double 
standard operates ln the processing of information about 
ethnic minorities or other out-groups, which favours the 
construction of these biased models. It is perhaps useful 
to add here that prejudice characteristically also 
features over-classification; that is, individuals learn 
to habitually maximise or exaggerate the differences 
between groups, while minimising the differences within 
groups or categories. And last, prejudice is socially 
learned and used. It shapes inter-group perception and 
influences interaction within and between groups to the 
benefit of the in-group. 
The properties of prejudice discussed above are predicated 
on one obvious assumption - that individuals believe that 
they can successfully distinguish out-group members from 
those of their own group. As the discussion in section 3.2 
indicated, learning to classify and group objects and 
people is a necessary step in the development of the 
thinking of a social being; but the classification process 
is neither neutral nor necessarily benign. 
Van Dijk suggests that the beliefs and opinions that go to 
make up ethnic attitudes are organised around a number of 
basic categories: appearance, origin, socioeconomic, 
sociocultural, and personality characteristics (van Dijk, 
1987:203-213). These categories provide an effective 
structure for social information processing. He proposes 
further that prejudice is structured hierarchically, such 
that the respective categories follow an order of 
importance, and hence of acquisition. So in-group members 
will take note first of appearance and origin, then 
socioeconomic factors, and so on through the list, in 
classifying members of a 'new' - that is, unfamiliar -
ethnic or other social group. 
Thorough analysis of these categories reveals a basic 
structure which is composed of three main features; these, 
van Dijk suggests, characterise all dominant group 
relations with minorities, and the c~itive 
representation of those relationships among dominant QrQup 
members. They are difference and inferiority, competition, 
and threat. To repeat an earlier point, difference is 
agaln evaluated negatively; ethnic minorities have 
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different cultures, behaviours, norms or alms, and these 
are treated as inferior to the dominant groups' ,14 
~aving ad~Pted a classification scheme for ordering people 
ln~o ~oc1al groups,15 individuals will work hard to 
m~lnta1~ ~hat system, even in the face of potentially 
dlsconf1rm1ng evidence. Davey suggests that individuals 
~earn .flexible strategies for processing social 
lnformatlon, selecting and highlighting those items which 
are conso~ant with their preconceptions, and reshaping -
or screenlng out altogether - those data or encounters 
that could challenge them (Davey, 1983:48). Two types of 
error or manipulation are possible in assigning objects or 
people to particular categories: over-inclusion - that is, 
including items in a group which do not exhibit the 
specified criteria for group membership and 
under-inclusion that is, excluding an item which does 
possess the required characteristics. Where the difference 
in value between social categories is large, it is more 
likely that errors of over-inclusion into a negatively 
valued category will take place, while errors of 
assignment into the positively valued class will tend 
towards under-inclusion. In this way, membership of the 
dominant group remains tightly regulated. 
In the course of the above discussion, I have put forward 
the V1ew that prejudice performs a socially useful 
function for certain groups in society, protecting and 
reinforcing a positive evaluation of the norms, goals, and 
other socioeconomic and cultural interests of the majority 
social group at the expense of ethnic minority groups: 
"The basic organizational setup of negative ethnic 
attitudes 1S geared toward the development of prejudiced 
opinions that can be used as ideological protection 
against infringements by the out-group on the interests of 
the in-group" (van Dijk, 1987:221). 
3.4 The politics of race: the reproduction of racism 
inside and outside social institutions. 
The preceding discussion has examined two key concepts -
race and prejudice. Race was found to be a concept with 
little biological or genetic explanatory value which has, 
nonetheless been given purchase in a wide range of 
historical 'circumstances. Prejudice concerns an attitude 
set constructed from socially acquired and maintained 
beliefs about the significance of race, constructions 
which by and large, favour one group (the in-group) at 
the ~xpense of others (out-gro~ps). The vali~ity or 
otherwise of the assumed racial dlfferences on whlch s~ch 
attitudes are predicated is less relevant than the soclal 
uses to which they have been put. 
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This next section examines further the linking of ideas of 
race and . d' . M i ~re]u.lce lnto the complex phenomenon of racism. 
y ~tentl~n lS to look at racism from two angles, 
offerlng flrst a political/structural account of its 
development and consolidation in British culture (section 
3.4), :ollowed by an analysis of the discourses of racism, 
that ~s, the ways in which racist ideas and attitudes are 
communlcated .withi~ a society (section 3.5). Although for 
purposes of dlScusslon these two aspects of racism will be 
~resent~d as separate, the practical effect is that they 
lntertwlne, supporting and reinforcing one another. It is 
the task of the final section to suggest a framework for 
understanding racism that encompasses the dimensions 
discussed previously, and allows it to be seen as at 
. ' present, an lntegral part of a white (dominant group's) 
Weltanschauung. 
i) Race, colonialism and imperialism. 
The grounding of ideas about race in particular historical 
and political configurations extends the notion of race as 
a socially constructed, non-neutral basis for 
classification. Gilroy proposes that 'race' should be 
viewed as "an open political category, for it is struggle 
that determines which definition of 'race' will prevail 
and the conditions under which it will endure or wither 
away" (Gilroy, 1987:39). This suggests that ideas of race 
will become important where issues of power are at stake 
and, particularly, that acknowledgement of differences 
based on ascribed racial characteristics may assume a 
special significance where they provide a rationale for 
social and economic divisions which protect the interests 
of certain dominant groups. 
There is evidence that the idea of race in Britain has a 
history that obviously predates the colonial era,16 but as 
I suggested earlier in this chapter, it seems that a 
change of conceptualisation occurred around the beginning 
of the nineteenth century which supported and justified 
the colonial domination of people of different racial 
types. Slavery became an integral part of the political 
and economic exploitation of the peoples of Asia and 
Africa that characterised the British Empire. It is 
suggested that the position at the unassailable top of the 
imperial pile promoted a particular mentality among 
British people, one which has remained - in the shape of a 
lasting consciousness of white superiority - despite ~he 
dissolution of the empire which originally engendered It. 
And the extended period of colonial and imperial dominance 
has had implications for political structures at home: "in 
view of the fact that, for four centuries, white 
colonialists have dominated the non-white populations they 
colonized and incorporated onto their empire, it is to be 
expect e9 'th.at~€ {)as ~ c t r~nds in the U: K. ' s sta-fe 
i nst i tU:t1 ons an-d -o~at 1 ons wlll express the , nterests of 
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whites; in particular, those of the white ruling class" 
(Cashmore and Troyna, 1983:119). 
The function of race ideas under capitalism has been 
explored from a Marxian perspective, which defines race 
relations as a product of material relations. Cox, in the 
1940's, argued that capitalism benefits from a divided 
work~ng class; ,therefore, any means that splits the 
worklng class lnto fragments and fosters antagonisms 
betw~en different groupings could be pursued by 'capital' 
as lt would help prevent workers from recognising their 
common exploitation and uniting in opposition. Race 
provides an effective focus around which to organise such 
splits. Workers are encouraged to see each other as 
different and therefore unequal, and to ally with their 
own race at the expense of their 'real' class interest. 17 
CCCS (1982) have traced the relations between race and 
power, superiority and inferiority in colonial societies, 
and the way these have developed into the networks of 
inequality that structure capitalist social formations. 
They do not suggest that Britain's imperial and colonial 
past has completely determined present day racist 
ideologies and practices, nor do they assume that 'race' 
can simply be reduced to 'class'; what these authors do 
clearly state is that racism, "as it exists and functions 
today has to be located historically and in terms of 
the wider structures and relations of British society" 
(Solomos et al, 1982:11). 
i i) The 'new raci sm' . 
While ideological remnants from the colonial past still 
remaln embedded in British social attitudes, these are 
given a new twist in the racist accounts given of the 
present political and economic situation. The cces authors 
have charted the historic development of ideas about race, 
leading up to the elaboration of what they describe as a 
'new racism' in Britain in the 1970's and early 1980's, 
the key feature of this contemporary brand of racism being 
its redefinition of 'race' in terms of culture and 
identity or what van Dijk calls "ethnicism" (van Dijk, 
1987:28):18 Lawrence (1982) and Barker (1983) link this 
'cultural ising' of racism to other ideological 
redefinitions of the time which arose with the 
articulation of a new conservative philosophy, allied to 
the economic decline and diminution of global ihfluence 
experienced by Britain in the post-wa~ per~o~,19 an~ the 
"organic crisis" this has produced ln Brltlsh soclety: 
"The fear that society is falling apart at the seams has 
prompted the elabo~ation of theories ab~ut,r?,,;e which turn 
on particular notlons of culture. The allen cultures of 
the blacks are seen as either the cause, or else the most 
visible symptom of the destruction of the 'British way of 
life'" (Solomos, et al., 1982:47). 
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Ess~d (1991)J tOO, charts the development of a new form of 
r~clsm. which moves away from the earlier 
blolo~lcal/pseudo-scientific theories which supported the 
colon~al brand of exploitation J and turns instead to 
theorles of cultural difference. "At the same time" she 
notes, "'ethnic' forms of oppression have emerged that are 
fed by strong (nationalistic) identification with the 
cultural heritage of the group. These 'ethnic'-directed 
forms of oppression are an inherent part of the cultural 
pluralism model" (Essed, 1991:13). The possibility that 
cultural pluralism can become an oppressive social form is 
echoed by Ahmed who sees 'multiculturalism' being 
subverted by the 'new right' in ways that are clearly not 
to the benefit of ethnic minority groups in this country 
(Ahmed J 1991). 
The thrust of the 'new racism' is the essential J the 
necessary, difference between British culture and 'the 
rest'. The debate is no longer about assimilation or even 
integration J but focusses on the almost mystical 
relationship between Britain J British culture and the 
British who are J within this analysis J authentically 
white. Birthplace J even rights of citizenshiPJ take second 
place to "membership of the nation" (Lawrence J 1982:85)J 
which is the exclusive preserve of the indigenous white 
population. Culture and a shared tradition become the 
determinants of group membershipJ and they are defined so 
as to exclude black minorities J however this contradicts 
the historical connections between 'the British' and the 
populations of the ex-colonies and dependencies. 
One of the appeals of this form of racism is that J as 
Barker observes, it purports to provide a theory of human 
nature. "Human nature is such that it is natural to form a 
bounded community, a nation, aware of its differences from 
other nations. They are not better or worse. But feelings 
of antagonism will be aroused if outsiders are admitted." 
(Barker, 1983:21) The 'it's only natural' argument gave a 
(spurious) universality to the claims of those like Enoch 
Powell who were calling for stricter controls on black 
immigration on the grounds that each community needed and 
deserved its own homeland (Barker, 1983:20ff). Settling in 
an 'alien' environment was thus wrong for both blacks and 
whites. Blacks could never achieve a true sense of 
'Britishness', because of their different cultures and 
traditions, and Britain could not pursue its own destiny 
while suffering the diluting presence of non-British 
minorities within the fabric of white society; the unity 
of the nation, its very 'way of life' was threatened. 
This discourse J or way of conceptual ising race in terms of 
culture explicitly distances itself from the language of 
superio~ity and inferiority. Cultures are different, and 
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it is presented ~s only right and proper for each group to 
seek to defe~d lts own way of life. The siting of race in 
the new terraln of culture allows it to remain an integral 
part ,of the political framework at a time when cruder 
theorles of biological determinism have been largely -
though not yet absolutely - overthrown. 
3.5 The discourse of racism. 
Having looked at the macro-level of political and economic 
structures and the organisation of racist ideologies, the 
following discussion turns to the micro-level of 
interpersonal communication, and the forms of linguistic 
exchange that allow racism to be reproduced and 
transmitted within and between social groups. In terms of 
the reproduction of racism within social work, this 
micro-level is of particular relevance to a consideration 
of practice, where the 'enounter' or relationship between 
practitioner and client is under scrutiny. The framework I 
have adopted here takes a linguistic turn which prefigures 
the direction of the remainder of the study; it is a form 
of discourse analysis, taking discourse in its widest 
sense, which looks both at the immediate conversational 
structures and strategies that permit the transmission of 
raClsm, and the wider discursive frameworks, the 
'everyday' background, within which such exchanges are 
embedded. This approach is derived from insights drawn 
from three wide-ranging studies of racism by, van Dijk 
(1987), Hewitt (1986), and Essed (1991). 
The first analyses racism from a white point of view. It 
is van Dijk's contention that white people 'learn' about 
ethnic minorities less through observation and interaction 
with the other group than through talk and text; therefore 
in his study, attention is focussed on how people in the 
white (dominant) group talk about ethnic minorities in 
their society and how they "express, convey, or form 
ethnic beliefs or attitudes in such everyday 
conversations" (van Dijk, 1987:21). The task for van Dijk 
is to throw some light on these processes. 
Hewitt looks at friendship patterns between black and 
white adolescents, focussing on language - in particular 
the use of creole or patois - and its relationship to 
ethnicity and intergroup relations. While he concentrates 
on friendship, his purpose is not to celebrate these 
examples of inter-racial acceptance and support, but 
rather to use these relationships to better understand the 
perpetuation and transmission of racism: "In paradoxically 
seeking where racism a~pears not to be, o~e ~ould l~arn 
more about its mechanlsms of reproductlon (Hewltt, 
1986:6). In the most recent study of the three, Essed 
(1991) takes the experiences of a narrowly-selected group 
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of black women as her base for a discussion of what she 
te~ms "everyday" racism. As my concern is principally with 
whlte responses to and responsibility for racism, I give 
the greatest space ~o discussion of van Dijk's work here, 
~hough reference wlll be made to the other studies to 
lllustrate particular points. 
"Dominant group members regularly engage in conversation 
about ethnic minority groups in society, and thus express 
and persuasively communicate their attitudes to other 
in-group members. In this way, ethnic prejudices become 
shared and may form the cognitive basis of ethnic or 
racial discrimination ln inter-group interaction" (van 
Dijk, 1987:11). Van Dijk structures his analysis of the 
processes of communication of racism around five lines of 
enqulry. The first aims to clarify the cognitive 
dimensions of racism. A discussion of the cognitive bases 
of racism, in particular the formation of 'ethnic 
attitudes', was presented in section 3.3 above, so van 
Dijk's analysis of attitude is simply summarised here: 
"Prejudice was analysed as a specific form of negative 
ethnic attitude, which was described as a hierarchically 
and categorically organised cluster of negative general 
oplnlons ln semantic (social) memory. Such prejudiced 
schemata organize socially shared ethnic oplnlons 
according to categories such as origin, appearance, 
socioeconomic status, sociocultural properties, or 
personal characteristics of ethnic groups and their 
members" (van Dijk, 1987:391). 
The second strand of the enquiry is designed to analyse 
how ethnic prejudice is expressed or signalled in 
conversation. The structures of prejudiced discourse are 
presented in some detail, starting with an exposition of 
the general principles and practices of modern discourse 
analysis which covers the topics of conversation, 
story-telling, argumentation, style and rhetorical 
operations - and moving on to attempts to relate these to 
the specifics of prejudiced talk. 
However while talk, informal social interaction, lS 
crucial for the expression, reproduction and diffusion of 
racism in society (a point reinforced in both the other 
studies), it is not the only channel available. A wider 
'discourse environment' exists, providing the public or 
social framework within which such talk is embedded. 2o Van 
Dijk lists possible comp~nents o~ this disc~urse 
environment the news medla, magazlnes, educatlonal 
materials novels, comics, films, advertising, political 
speeches, ' laws, regulations and institutional 
documentation (1987:40). 
His comments on the negative representation of race ln the 
news media are extended and developed in relation to the 
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discussion of sources of prejudiced talk, and of the 
social and ideological context of prejudice reproduction 
but, briefly, he observes that people look to the media to 
provide topics for everyday conversation and information 
about areas of life that cannot be drawn from their 
personal experience or routine contact with others - for 
example, national statistics on crime or unemployment, 
demographic trends among minority groups, housing 
conditions and educational circumstances of ethnic 
minorities. So the kind of information the media purvey is 
of crucial importance in setting the parameters for some 
types of conversation. If the media deal largely in 
stereotyped and negative representations of ethnic 
minorities, then these biassed images will be the ones 
carried forward into casual conversation. The conclusion 
that van Dijk draws, then, is that prejudiced talk is 
structured and takes place within a 'non-neutral' 
discourse environment. 
Van Dijk's third approach lS to examlne the interaction 
strategies that regulate discourse about ethnic 
minorities. Different interaction strategies may be 
followed ln a conversation about ethnic minorities (for 
example, positive self-presentation, negative 
other-presentation, face-saving, or persuasion), but 
prejudiced talk itself takes place within a communicative 
context that is bound by interpersonal and social 
constraints. So the individual has to operate a flexible 
strategy for processing and reproducing social 
information, responding to cues and signs within the 
conversati onal context: "These constrai nts may well be 
conflicting and demand that negative opinions about ethnic 
minority groups be formulated in terms of ethnic or racial 
tolerance, or dissimulated in other, strategically 
effective ways" (van Dijk, 1987:12.)21 
The next line of enquiry involves an analysis of majority 
group participants' understanding, evaluation and 
representation of prejudiced discourse, and the location 
of the sources of the beliefs and opinions from which 
negative ethnic attitudes are formed. Van Dijk considers 
here the interpersonal communication of negative ethnic 
attitudes in prejudiced talk among in-group members, and 
the development and communication of a dominant ethnic 
consensus within that group. 
One of the points that recurs in van Dijk's study is that 
ethnic prejudice is a social phenomenom and not just the 
expression of personal attitudes .a~d be~iefs. People 
acquire attitudes as m~mbers of.s~eclflc soclal groups and 
define themselves ln Opposltlon to other groups -
majority/minority, white/black, law-abiding/criminal, etc. 
Prejudiced discourse promotes the development and 
communication of a dominant ethnic consensus among the 
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1n-grc:>up, ,a consensus which, van Dijk suggests, 1S largely 
negat1ve 1n relation to ethnic minorities. 
This negative consensus is carefully constructed and 
maintained, even without there being any explicit 
commitment among the majority group to perpetuate 
racism. 22 As Essed notes, "It is important to see that 
inte~tionality is not a necessary component of racism ... 
It 1S not the nature of specific acts or beliefs that 
determines whether these are mechanisms of racism but the 
context in which these beliefs and acts operate" (Essed, 
1991 :45). In-group members draw information from a wide 
discourse environment, both public and interpersonal, and 
this interacts with personal beliefs and experiences as 
well as with broader social attitudes about ethnic 
minorities, in a complex process of communicative 
reproduction. The interactional relevance of talk in this 
process is fundamental. In talking about other people as 
members of specific out-groups, in-group members re-affirm 
their own position and social identity and, at the same 
time, "enact various forms of inter-group conflict, 
dominance and power, and other macro social dimensions of 
racism" (van Dijk, 1987:22).23 
Van Dijk found that within their overall discourse 
environments, individuals relied on certain sources for 
information about ethnic minorities, and the most 
significant of these sources were the mass media and 
personal communication in the form of stories about ethnic 
minorities who, in the context of his survey (Amsterdam in 
the Netherlands and San Diego, California) were usually 
characterised as 'foreigners'. He found, further, that 
negative information about ethnic minorities predominated 
over positive. People tended to remember, and pass on, 
this negative information, reproducing from their sources 
"precisely those topics that confirm the dominant 
prejudices of a racist society" (van Dijk, 1987:178). Even 
where individuals claimed not to share the negative 
opinions they were reporting, they were nonetheless 
familiar with, and able to talk about, these opinions. 
Van Dijk suggests a number of reasons why individuals tend 
to retain, and subsequently reproduce, negative 
information 1n preference to positive (p335), but the 
result is that the negative material becomes the stuff of 
new stories about ethnic minorities that are passed on 
down the communicative chain, to become the new received 
wisdom, the 'facts', in talk about ethnic minorities. The 
lack of positive information about ethnic minorities in 
the commonly available sources prevents the formation of 
anything approaching an anti-racist consensus. 24 New data 
are processed, and 'tailored' to fit the existing picture 
of what we 'know' about ethnic groups: "People tell or 
hear hardly any positive things about foreigners, and if 
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they do, they ignore, forget, or disagree with that 
information. Disagreement with, or rejection of negative 
information 1S much less frequent" (Van Dijk, 1987:336). 
Thus, a consensus emerges based on, and reinforced by, a 
powerful network of socially shared prejudices. 
Van Dijk's last major line of enquiry is an examination of 
t~e social ~nd ~deological context within which prejudiced 
d~scourse lS sltuated. "Talk is embedded in more complex, 
hlgher-level systems of social information processing 
within groups, which also involve institutional discourses 
such as that of the media, politics or education" (Van 
Dijk, 1987:12).25 The main points that he makes are that 
prejudiced talk fulfils a range of social functions 
(several are listed on p.394) which contribute to the 
creation and maintenance of a particular climate or 
attitude within the dominant group, about the relevant 
out-groups. This climate is favourable toward the 
in-group, and largely unfavourable to the out-groups - ln 
this case, ethnic minorities, who are presented ln 
consistently negative and stereotyped ways. Prejudice, in 
brief, serves to maintain the dominance or power of the 
in-group and its members in a racist society. 
The In-group is not completely homogeneous, and not all 
members play the same part in the production and 
reproduction of negative ethnic attitudes. Van Dijk 
ascribes a special role to certain dominant sub-groups 
within the white majority community whom he sees as making 
a significant contribution to the formulation of racist 
attitudes and practices and their communication to society 
at large, principally through the mass media. These groups 
include, "politicians, civil servants, journalists, 
academics, professionals, members of the various state 
institutions (judiciary, police, social welfare agencies, 
and so forth), and all others in control of public and 
dominant discourse types"; in other words, those 'elite' 
groups distinguished by political or social power or by 
cultural dominance. These groups provide the dominant 
definitions of the ethnic situation and, as the basic 
providers of information, "preformulate the categories, 
the relevancies, the topics, the agenda, and the 
evaluation" with respect to ethnic minorities (van Dijk, 
1987:348).26 
Everyday talk about ethnic minorities often reproduces 
media stories which are, in turn, (re)formulations of 
various other types of discourse for example, 
parliamentary debate, institutional decisions or 
regulations, police or court reports, academic research 
reports (van. Oi j k, 1987: 361) provi ded by the el i te 
grOUps 1 i sted above. Indeed, van Di j k suggests that 
dtsc6urse is the maln type of social action and 
in~et~ction for th~ elite groups, so if their ethnic 
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attitudes are made manifest it will be through discourse, 
in ~ext or ,t~l~. So he concludes that "elite groups 
~rovlde, the lnltlal (pre)formulations of ethnic prejudice 
ln soclety, and that the media are the major channels and 
the communicative context for such discourse"(p361). 
In Commun!cat!ng Racism, van Dijk starts from the position 
th~t raClsm lS a problem of white, dominant groups and is 
n~lth~r, th~ pr~blem ~f, nor is it caused by, ethnic 
mlno~ltles ln whlte soclety. The object of his study is to 
examlne how ethnic prejudices are expressed, communicated, 
and shared within white society through the mass media and 
also the 'low level' medium of interpersonal, everyday 
talk, with a view to understanding the mechanisms through 
which racism is reproduced. 
After setting out the theoretical instruments needed for 
an analysis of the interpersonal communication of ethnic 
attitudes ln conversation, van Dijk looks at the 
structural and strategic properties of two maJor 
components of the communication process (ethnic) 
attitudes and discourse. He suggests that ethnic attitudes 
and opinions are "preformulated" by a range of elite 
sub-groups within the dominant white community and that 
these attitudes become part of the social fabric through 
their representation and reinforcement in the mass media. 
People rely on the media, and to some extent on 'stories' 
based on personal experiences, for data about ethnic 
minorities. 27 These data, which are largely negative in 
relation to ethnic groups, are reproduced through informal 
(prejudiced) talk. 
The general norms and values of a society need not be 
overtly racist indeed, explicit expressions of white 
superiority may well be negatively sanctioned - for a 
negative ethnic consensus to prevail: "Simply by living 
out the cultures in which racist codes (ideas, 
stereotypes, narrative motifs and language) are embedded, 
participants often 'do racism' through even the simplest 
and most mundane acts of communication, and sometimes with 
only the dimmest recognition of what is occurring" 
(Hewitt, 1986:225). This consensus is difficult to 
challenge because counter-arguments and alternative 
information, which could contribute to a positive 
assessment of ethnic minorities, are largely absent from 
public discourses. 28 People lack the,socially sanc~i~ned 
data with which to rebut racist storles and the oplnlons 
based on them and do not learn to challenge or contradict 
racist thought and talk. Discourse in general, and talk in 
particular, thus continue to be cruc1a1 sites for the 
reproduction of racism in society. 
3.6 Towards an understanding Of racism. 
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"Racism is an abstract property of social structures at 
all levels of society that manifests itself in ethnic 
pre~udices as shared group cognitions, in discriminatory 
actlons of persons as dominant group members as well as 
i~ t~e actions, discourses, organization, or r~lationships 
wlthln and among groups, institutions classes or other 
social formations" (van Dijk, 1987:28).' , 
The preceding discussion has tried to locate the ways in 
which ideas of race operate at various levels in society. 
An examination of biological or genetic definitions of 
race found such definitions to be of limited usefulness, 
and to be unable to account, by themselves, for the 
considerable influence exercised by the concept of race in 
everyday thought. It is clear, though, that judgements 
have historically been made about others on the basis of 
what we now know to be largely superficial physical 
differences - for example, in skin colour - and particualr 
characteristics assigned to individuals who display the 
chosen features. So the emphasis in this discussion has 
been on racism, the social and ideological constructs that 
have been built around the concept of race. Three broad 
focuses were chosen: the cognitive dimensions of racism, 
political or structural accounts, and a linguistic or 
discourse-based approach to racism. 
Racism, crudely, involves prejudice - that is, a negative 
ethnic attitude - plus the power to make a particular view 
of the world stick. But this is not the whole story of 
racism. Ideas of race are politically and historically 
specific, and can playa crucial role in the development 
of the individual's social identity, defining relations 
between in-group and out-groups, dominant and dominated, 
majority and minority. Both van Dijk and the eees authors 
present analyses of society that give particular 
significance to the role of elite groups in the 
construction and maintenance of prejudiced attitudes and 
racist practices. There is an assumption in both works 
that some groups have political and/or sociocultural power 
which they exercise largely to the benefit of their own 
members. 29 Further, it is axiomatic that racial 
categorisation is functional in maintaining the power of 
the dominant group(s) at the expense of others. The power 
dimension is examined in the structural analyses of eees 
via the notion of hegemony and in the discourse-based 
approach of van Dijk, ln terms o~ t~e. "elite 
preformulation" of ideas about ethnic mlnorltles and 
ethnic attitudes. 
This 
ideas 
from 
ideas 
is not to suggest a form of conspiracy theory, where 
of race are completely controlled and manipulated 
the top, by dominant or elite groups, who allo~ such 
to trickle down to the wider po~ulation accordlng to 
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a particular political logic. For while I have made a case 
for t~e role of certain groups in perpetuating and 
promot1ng a r~stricted range of ideas about minority 
groups, that 1S not to say that racism is simply a tool 
for one group to use to the detriment of another. Van 
Dijk's approach appears to imply that elite groups have a 
level of detachment that it could be argued does not 
exist. Racism is not something that belongs to, but does 
not touch, an in-group and can be applied to an out-group 
like a coat of paint. 
Van Dijk locates his analysis within a curiously 
ahistorical context. That is to say that he presents an 
account which starts with the (racist) status quo and 
investigates the reproduction of racism through a detailed 
examination of the range of discursive frameworks and 
strategies available in the societies concerned. What he 
perhaps downplays is the involvement of the elite groups 
in the very 'tradition' that they can admittedly also 
manipulate with a degree of efficiency. Racism has not 
been invented by any of the elite groups he mentions; it 
is already 'present to hand', intricately woven into the 
discursive structures he examines. Elite groups are no 
doubt culpable to the extent that they perpetuate rather 
than challenge discriminatory structures, but they cannot 
necessarily be held responsible for their creation. 
Ideas of 'race' are deeply embedded in the structure and 
fabric of society and shape the categories available for 
social information processing. The analyses presented 
suggest that a dominant (negative) ethnic consensus is 
achieved, and that this both reflects and confirms the 
common-sense view of white superiority as 'how the world 
really is'. Alternative V1ews of the world, 
counter-information or arguments, may exist but do not 
have the same status 1n public or interpersonal 
communications between whites, so there is little with 
which to challenge the prevailing consensus. "[Ideologies] 
work most effectively when we are not aware that how we 
formulate and construct a statement about the world is 
underpinned by ideological premises; when our formulations 
seem to be simply descriptive statements about how things 
are (i .e. must be), or of what we can 'take for granted'" 
(Hall, quoted in Lawrence, 1982:47). 
It lS the ubiquity of ideas of 'race' that I wish to 
underline here. Van Dijk's discourse-based analysis 
presents racism as a 'resource' for talking ab~ut ethnic 
minorities, rather than as a frame for a much wlder range 
of discourses. The extent to which racism infiltrates and 
, colour ~ , soc i a 1 r el at ion san d dis co u r s e . en vir 0 ~ men t sis 
perhaps best expressed" through the notlon of everyday 
racism' coined by i~sed. The idea of the 'taken for 
grarted', of' commons~5"e f, has been explored by a number 
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of writers concerned with understanding the ideological 
constructions encountered in a structurally unequal 
society, and the role these play in maintenance of the 
status qUO. 3D But Essed incorporates the idea of the 
'everyday' into her analysis of racism, in such a way that 
racism becomes an integral component of all social 
~elations: "Everyday racism is the integration of racism 
1nto ,everyday situations through practices (cognitive and 
be~av1oral ... ) that activate underlying power relations. 
Th1S process must be seen as a continuum through which the 
integration of racism into everyday practice becomes part 
of the expected, of the unquestionable, and of what is 
seen as normal by the dominant group. When racist notions 
and actions infiltrate everyday life and become a part of 
the reproduction of the system, the system reproduces 
everyday racism" (Essed, 1991 :50). 
Not all racism is 'everyday' racism, in Essed's usage; the 
concept refers specifically to the reproduction of racism 
through routine, repeated practices which are familiar to 
the point of being unquestioned. "Everyday racism does not 
exist in the singular but only as a complex as 
interrelated instantiations of racism. Each instantiation 
of everyday racism has meaning only in relation to the 
whole complex of relations and practices." (Essed, 
1991 :52) It is in this context that racism is presented as 
a 'linguistic resource', embedded in both public and 
interpersonal communications - written and spoken - and in 
social structures and institutions, shaping our categories 
of understanding. 31 This usage of 'racism' accords it a 
significance in all forms of interpersonal contact in the 
sense that it becomes a 'given' part of the communicative 
framework within which we all function. It operates at the 
level of 'common sense' - largely implicit, unthought, and 
untheorised - relying on its 'everydayness' to maintain a 
purchase on a range of discourses, including those which 
inform or structure the organisation and practice of 
social work itself. 
So the force of what can be called the cultural or 
linguistic resource position 1S that it locates racism ( 
similarly sexism, classism, and so on,) in a very 
particular way in the texts and more broadly discursive 
structures of society. From this perspective, racism is 
not something 'bolted on' to an otherwise fair and open 
society, which carries the implication that with 
sufficient good will, ingenuity, and energy we could 
somehow 'unbolt' it and consign it to the scrapheap. If 
racism inheres in a wide range of discourses, including 
those of social work itself, th~n a different approach 
will be necessary which rethin~ the task of removing 
racism from those discourses in suen a mechanistic way. 
How then, given the linguuistio resource position, to 
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conceptualise the 'social work task' ln relation to MRP? 
Wha~ ought social work and social workers to do about 
raClsm? How can we become 'anti-racist' or 'non-racist'? 
How do we even decide which of these two possibilities to 
pur~ue are they sequential, in that having somehow 
havlng become 'anti-racist'. one can then transcend this 
state to become entirely 'non-racist'? Can we opt to 
become one but not the other? Does the idea of being 
either 'anti-racist' or 'non-racist' start us off on the 
wrong journey anyway, looking for a new fixed albeit 
ideologically more correct, subjectivity?3~ In te~ms more 
directly to do with social work, we can ask what form 
would/could a critique of 'traditional' social work take? 
How can we think about the move towards 'anti-racist' or 
'non-racist' social work, and what is the nature 
(conceptual, moral and intellectual) of this process? What 
implications does the linguistic resource position have 
for the 'interim' relationships between white social 
workers, black social workers, white clients and black 
clients? 
The kinds of lssues raised by the linguistic resource 
position create problems for the empirically-minded social 
worker or researcher because, as the formulations above 
indicate, such matters are not readily amenable to 
empirical study. We cannot find out what anti-racist 
social work is by watching what people who claim to be 
anti-racist social workers do. This would beg the whole 
question of the nature, definition or existence of 
something called 'anti-racism'. The difficulty 
(impossibility?) of trying to move from 'what is' to 'what 
ought to be', the so-called naturalistic fallacy, is not 
unique to social work, and in articulating the kinds of 
questions and concerns outlined above, we have, I suggest, 
moved from the realm of the empirical into a different 
territory, the normative and philosophical. 
My concern ln what follows is to look at the implications 
of the linguistic resource position for the racism vs 
anti-racism or non-racism debate in social work through an 
approach drawn from the philosophy of language. My 
particular focus will be the branch of philosophy know~ as 
hermeneutics which I will consider from two perspectlves 
one associated with the work of Gadamer, the other with 
the writings of Derrida, and it is to a fuller discussion 
of these two perspectives that I now turn. 
1 . Lukes 
"concepts 
dispute". 
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CHAPTER THREE 
NOTES 
(1974:16) uses this expression in relation to 
whose application 1S inherently a matter of 
2. Cashmore and Troyna suggest that both Aristotle and 
Hippocr~tes took an interest in the physical appearances 
of var10US groups (Cashmore and Troyna, 1983:19). In The 
Politics, Aristotle apparently builds on the work of 
Hippocrates concerning the effects of climate on the 
health and disposition of individuals; in chapter seven of 
Book Seven, Aristotle poses the question of what kind of 
natural qualities the citizen of a polis should possess. 
His answer is based on what amounts to a form of 
geographical determinism, derived from his assessment of 
Greek states and "the racial divisions of the world" 
(Aristotle, 1962:269). 
He suggests that the European races and those of the "cold 
regions" are "full of courage and passion but somewhat 
lacking in skill and brain power", with the implication 
that "while remaining generally independent, the lack 
political cohesion and the ability to rule over others". 
Asiatic races remain subject and enslaved because, while 
they have an abundance of both brains and skill, they lack 
courage and will-power. It will perhaps not be surprising 
to learn that Aristotle found that 'the Hellenic race', 
"occupying a mid-position geographically, has a measure of 
both. Hence it continues to be free, to have the best 
political institutions, and to be capable of ruling all 
others, given a single constitution." (Aristotle, 
1962:269) This exercise in geographic one-upmanship is not 
pursued further, but it is clear which 'race' Aristotle 
considered superior. 
The story of Noah, in Genesis, contains an early 
expression of the idea that humankind is divided into 
separate groups on a biological basis. The three sons of 
Noah were said to have founded three distinct lines of 
descent; that is, a monogenist theory was proposed, for 
the various lines of descent would have had a unity in 
their one common ancestor, Noah. A more detailed account 
of both monogenesis and its alternative, polygenesis, can 
be found in Gould J 1983:141ff. 
3. Bloom's point is that racial categorisation has some 
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use, but only at the level of 
types. There are discernible 
between groups of people, but 
social qualities in themselves: 
defining gross physical 
biological differences 
these have no moral or 
"The major biological variations of mankind are as natural 
~s deposits of minerals, and like these deposits, they are 
19nored or exploited as men think profitable .... The 
meaning of race has become subordinated to the myth of 
race: it 1S politically and socially profitable to 
emphasize the biological differences of mankind, and to 
minimize (or to deny) the biologically more important 
universality" (Bloom, 1971:15). 
See also 
ideologies 
ideologies. 
Nash 
and 
(1962) on the development of racial 
the "logical confusions" supporting such 
4. See Savory (1970) for detailed discussion of 
classification. In relation to this drive to order the 
environment, he says: "Classifying is an innate mode of 
thinking [C]lassification demands comparison with 
other, similar entities, and is founded on a detection of 
the differences between them." This perhaps suggests that 
the differences between the entities being considered do 
exist, are significant, and are available for all to find 
if they look sufficiently carefully. It gives no hint that 
the decision to highlight certain differences rather than 
others may be a matter of choice, rather than a simple 
'reading off' of available 'facts' about the entities 
under observation. 
5. See Dean (1980), especially p.8. 
6. This problem is discussed at length in Winch (1958). 
7. The belief that certain groups should occupy superior 
or inferior positions in this assumed hierarchy is 
discussed by Cashmore and Troyna (1983) and CCCS (1982) in 
terms of the "it's only natural" argument. 
8. See Banton (1988), especially chapter two. 
9. Gobineau for example, wrote about the assumed inherent 
, . ...inequality between the races, and h1S contr1but1on 1S 
considered both by Kedourie (1974:72-73) and by Banton 
(1977:40ff). See also Bernal (1987) for an argument 
suggesting that ancient Greek history was.rew~rked.or 
reconstructed during the nineteenth century, 1n llne w1th 
then current racial theories. 
10. Bethlehem (1985:57ff) draws a linfk hbetwleen 
contemporary racial theories and the history 0 t e save 
trade and the plantation economy. He suggests that a kind 
of racial theory was necessary that would justify the 
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clearly exploitative treatment of other human 
required by that economy. See also Banton (1977) 
"racializing of the West" and Gould (1980:243). 
beings 
on the 
11. Neoteny and recapitulation theory are both discussed 
by Gould (1980:214-221). For further discussion of 
recapitulation theory, see also Banton (1977). 
12. A~ e~ample here would be Adorno's theory of the 
authorltarlan personality, which is discussed in Bethlehem 
(1985:101ff). More generally, the particular need 
envisaged varies considerably and may include "the 
maintenance of self-esteem ... the working out of inner 
conflicts by displacement, as in the various versions of 
frustration-aggression theory... or performing other 
utilitarian and social adjustment functions for the 
individual's personality" (Davey, 1983:9). 
13. For a general discussion of the concept of 'ethnicity' 
and the nature and role of ethnic groups, see Glazer and 
Moynihan (1975). 
14. A dominated group need not necessarily be an ethnic 
minority; that is, numerical inferiority may not be the 
significant factor in the relationship. South Africa 
provides a current example of an ethnic minority 
dominating a numerically vastly superior population. 
15. See Davey (1983) on racial awareness and social 
identity. 
16. See Miles (1989:chapter one). 
17. For further discussion of race and class, see Cashmore 
and Troyna (1983), Stone (1985) and Gilroy (1987). 
18. Miles (1989:62ff) 
idea of a 'new racism'. 
offers a critical analysis of the 
19. For an interesting perpective on the then current 
political scene, see also Held's discussion of power and 
legitimacy in contemporary Britain. Held looks at the way 
Mrs. Thatcher re-activated and, in a sense, again made 
respectable, British pride in and commitment to "the 
traditional symbols of the British nation-state[,1 ... 
precisely those symbols associated with Gre~t Britain, .th~ 
'glorious past', the empire and internatlonal prestlge 
(He 1 d J 1984: 348) . 
20. This wider 'discourse environment' is the setting ~or 
the "everyday racism" analysed by Essed (~991~. ~er po~nt 
is the pervasive nature of racism and ltS lnflltratlon 
into every level of discourse. 
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21. ,The, negative dimension of tolerance, and its 
contrlbutlon to the maintenance of a racist culture is 
explored by Essed (1991: particularly 202-212). 
22. The following quotation from Hewitt reinforces this 
point: "In many cases, however, racist forms remain 
undetected as such partly because the assumed consistency 
of communication is white, and the impulse to monitor 
expression for offensiveness is not interactively 
established. Such instances, where racism is embedded in 
the very means of communication, provide the clearest 
examples both of 'unintentional racism' and of the more 
overt examples of 'intentional racism'." (Hewitt 
1986:225-226) , 
23. See Hewitt's (1986) study for further exploration of 
the interactional relevance of talk. 
24. In 
try to 
by the 
is also 
addition, Essed notes the way ln which those who 
oppose racism are themselves in turn problematised 
majority society (Essed, 1991:270-278). This point 
made by Domi nell i (1988). 
25. See also Fairclough (1989). 
26. See also van Dijk (1993). 
27. For a fuller discussion of the role of the press in 
perpetuating particular images of ethnic minority groups, 
see van Dijk (1991). 
28. This is certainly not to say that such data do not 
exist. Numerous texts by black authors present the 'other 
side' of the story of the experiences of minority 
communities within a racist society, testifying to the 
strengths and resilience of these groups and individuals, 
and their active responses to racism. See, for example, 
Bryan, Dadzie and Scafe (1985), Gilroy (1987), and also 
Essed (1991). 
29. The view of power being used here broadly follows 
Lukes' (1974) analysis. 
30. For example. 'common sense' is discussed by Garfinkel 
(1967), Barker (1981:22-25), Lawrence (1982:47ff), and 
Fairclough (1989:passim). 
31. Hewitt makes a similar point, as the following passage 
illustrates: 
"the inventory of formulaic 'opinions', the accompanying 
sets of unstated cultural assumptions and the stereotypes 
which function like motifs in social narratives of race, 
together constitute the cultural ma~eri~ls (the 'code' in 
the sense in which I have been uSlng lt here) generated 
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from social and economic relations (and from other 
cultural materials autonomously) which return as a 
resource language through which 'race relations' are 
perceived. This code is dependent for its meaning and 
capacity for transmission on a specific social context (or 
on a confluence of several such contexts). Furthermore J 
the code may be augmented and expanded by items whichJ 
generated from local and specific conditions J have 
themselves become formulaic" (HewittJ 1986:223). 
32. Post-structuralism has challenged the idea of a fixed 
subjectivitYJ an essential 'centre' around which the 
individual's identity is structured; see J for example J 
Weedon (1987:74-106) and Belsey (1980:passim) for 
discussions of subjectivity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
HERMENEUTICS AND SOCIAL WORK 
4.1 Introduction. 
At the end of the previous chapter, I proposed an 
understanding of racism that acknowledged its role as a 
'lingu~stic reso~rce'. The linguistic resource position 
emphas1ses the 1ntegration of the individual black or 
white, professional or client, racist or anti-ra~ist, into 
a complex and always evolving language-practice network. 
This network is neither completely determined nor 
completely under the control of any individual or group in 
the sense that no-one creates society anew, or is wholly 
and unavoidably governed by the strictures and norms of 
the society in which he happens to be born.1 We can act in 
different ways in relation to what already exists 
(socially, culturally, politically), but we cannot simply 
'step outside' that language-practice network into a space 
that has not yet been named. 
Social work 1S made up of a series of cultural and 
intercultural encounters, each of which involves, depends 
on, language; at issue are attempts at communication, ways 
of 'seeing' and knowing, different practices that need to 
be understood. And how can this process of understanding 
itself be understood? There are different ideas about the 
place and nature of understanding in social interaction 
and, specifically, the social work 'encounter' ,2 though it 
has commonly been discussed in terms of empathy, a concept 
on which a whole school of social work practice has been 
built - the so-called client-centred approach. 3 But looked 
at from the perspective of the linguistic resource 
position, the main social work issues vis a vis 
anti-racism become a special case of questions at the 
heart of the debate about hermeneutics. 
In this and the following chapters, I will present a 
consideration of hermeneutics in two of its manifestations 
and discuss the possible application of each to the 
problems previously outlined in relation to race and 
social work. The two dimensions of hermeneutics discussed 
in this study are the hermeneutics of tradition associated 
with the writings of Gadamer, and the more radical, 
deconstructive approach of Derrida. After some preliminary 
comments on the general features of hermeneutic 
philosophy, the remainder of this chapter is devoted to a 
more detailed examination of Gadamer's hermeneutics and an 
assessment of its potential contribution to an 
understanding of social work with ethnic minorities. 
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Chapter, five continues the philosophical theme but moves 
the dlSCUSS' t ' 
, 10n ,on 0 the perhaps more uncertain and 
problematlc terraln of deconstruction. 
Thompson (1981 : 36-41 ) , Howard (1982: 1 -34) • and 01 son 
~ 1986) ,e~ch 1 <?ok at the history of hermeneut i cs, 1 ocat i ng 
ltS or1g1n~ 1n the theory and practice of interpretation 
of theolog1cal texts, and charting the development-
through the work of Schleiermacher and Dilthey - of a 
'philosophi~al' hermeneutics. Philosophical hermeneutics 
takes as 1tS focus the problem of understanding the 
'other' giv~n the embeddedness of each party to the 
encounter 1n her own 'tradition' or cultural and 
historical matrix. The basis of any and all understanding 
in language is emphasised: "Language does not produce a 
formulation of something we might have already understood 
pre-linguistically, but it is the mode of Being qua 
meaningful understanding as such" (Bleicher, 1980:116); 
and the key to any such act of understanding is textual 
study and analYSis. 
Hermeneutics emphasises the "context-bound character of 
interpretive understanding" (Hoy, 1991:155) and takes it 
as axiomatic that "with interpretation the contextuality 
is formative; the specific situation is what determines 
the very form and direction interpretation will take" 
(Bohman at al., 1991:12). Context refers not just to the 
placement of a particular passage within a larger work, 
but to the historical and cultural tradition(s) within 
which the encounter with the text takes place. And the 
text is the bearer of a tradition no less than the 
individual who reads it.4 
Gadamer's version of hermeneutics provides an approach to 
the problem of understanding and interpretation based on 
dialogue communication aimed at reaching an 
understanding through agreement about the matter in hand 
(die Sache. in Gadamer's terms). For him, the hermeneutic 
problem "is concerned with achieving agreement with 
somebody else about our shared 'world'. This communication 
takes the form of a dialogue that results in the 'fusion 
of horizons'." (Bleicher, 1980:3) The notion of a 'fusion 
of horizons' will be explored in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
At this level social work could almost be the paradigm 
case for herm~neutic understanding, providing an object 
for Gadamer's notion of praxis to refer to: social worker 
and client, each with her, own personal and 
cultural/institutional 'history', Slt acros~ the table to 
talk about. and reach a form of understan~lng about. the 
'problem' brought by the client. A~d 1n the case of 
multi-racial practice (MRP) - the meet1ng of two cultures 
or historically constituted frames of reference 
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(traditions) the encounter with difference throws the 
question of understanding into the sharpest relief 
beca~se, characteristically, hermeneutic understanding 
ob~a1ns w~en ~ne seeks to understand the unfamiliar or 
allen, def1ned 1n terms of cultural or temporal distance. 
~hile ~he above description is accurate as far as it goes, 
1t Obv10usly leaves out a good deal. The following section 
attempts to outline the treatment of ideas about 
understanding in social work and then to examine the 
positive contribution that a hermeneutic approach could 
bring to social work practice, as well as the criticisms 
and limitations of such an approach. 
4.2 Understanding in social work. 
The potential interest 1n hermeneutics for social work 
derives from the latter's concerns with understanding. 
Social work, conceptualised within whatever framework, has 
one recurrent feature, namely an attempt at understanding 
between the social worker and the client. Much has been 
written about the nature of that attempt and the 
relationship that can follow from it, about the kinds of 
activity both social worker and client are and should be 
engaged in while 'doing social work' or 'being social 
worked'. Yet if, at one level, social work is about the 
understanding possible between one person and another 
(whether face-to-face or in print), the nature of the 
process through which this understanding is reached has 
remained opaque. 
That understanding is possible at all is commonly 
explained by recourse to concepts such as a common human 
nature or empathy. These linked ideas are found in the 
client-centred approaches to social work and in 
discussions of counselling,5 which prioritise a notion of 
'the social work relationship' depending on the use of 
self, so-called 'active' listening, and the ability to 
'enter the client's world'. In looking first at the 
suggestion that universality, or an appeal to our common 
human nature, provides the basis for interpersonal 
understanding, I turn to Hugh England's text, Social Work 
as Art, for an approach that seems to depend on a clear 
belief in a common human nature. 6 
England's text, I believe, highlights some of the major 
problems with an approach predicated on an ill-defined 
notion of universality which glosses over questions of 
power and inequality. The the~r~t~cal part o~ the 
discussion is framed around the act1vltles and experlences 
of "the worker" who is portrayed as male throu~hout. And 
it is in this context that we learn about the lmpo~tan~e 
of universality: "The worker knows about the cllent s 
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meaning because the worker's own 'human nature' tells him 
what ~ tis to exper i ence J for examp 1 e J i nte 11 ectua 1 confuslo~ or particular emotional intensity ... He himself 
knows, ln general, what it is to experience such mental 
and emotional states and can sensitively extrapolate from 
them. ... It is a reference to our own 'common human 
nature'" (England, 1986:28). The part of the book dealing 
with accounts of actual casework carried out by three 
practitioners is by contrast exclusively female - both 
workers and clients described in the case studies are 
women. England makes no comment on this transition but as 
Billington's (1990) analysis of this work shows, f~minists 
would find it hard to see a place for themselves in 
England's apparently gender-free commonality, and would 
highlight the absence of consideration of gender issues in 
defining social and personal 'reality'. 
As the discussion of 'common sense' ln chapter three 
suggested, decisions about what should be considered 
'common' between different individuals and communities are 
neither arbitrary nor neutral, but reflect particular 
distributions of power, helping to maintain the position 
of some groups or individuals in relation to others. The 
assumption of a 'common human nature' can obviate the need 
to address questions of inequality of power and resources. 
And as with gender, so also with race. We may indeed all 
be the same under the skin, but there is a real danger 
that reliance on the superficially sympathetic notion of a 
common humanity minimises the impact of racism on the 
world-view of both majority and minority ethnic groups. As 
I have previously indicated, colour blindness has not 
proved a satisfactory basis for the development of 
multi-racial or anti-racist practice in social work. 
Wilkes uses the idea of a common human nature to account 
for the possibility of understanding between individuals 
and to support her plea for a more humane social work 
practice with what she calls "undervalued groups" (Wilkes, 
1981). She argues that, "if we are to understand a person 
we need to know how he or she sees their world. We do this 
by the method of recreating what is alien and past ... 
There is a common human nature that transcends cultural 
and personal differences and it is because people are 
partly alike that understanding another person is 
possible" (Wilkes. 1981:106). Gadamer would seem to be 
making a similar point in his,emphasis on t~e struc~uring 
role of effective history ln understandlng and ln the 
statement "Every conversation automatically presupposes 
that the' two speakers speak the same language" (Gadamer, 
1979:347), but the activity he d~rives ~rom this is very 
different from that envisaged by elther Wllkes or England, 
and moves him away from the idea of understanding as a 
form of empathy or intuitive recreation of the other's 
world which informs both of the 
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latter's accounts. 
So what exactly is the 'empathy' against which hermeneutic 
unde~standing is defined? For a concept that has figured 
prom1nently 1n social work literature education and 
practice, as the key feature of th~ client-centred 
appr~aches,7 it proves quite difficult to explain its 
work1ngs. The basic sense of the term seems to be that 
empathy implies the ability to understand the world-view 
and inner feelings of another person and to be able to 
convey that understanding back to the other' that is it 
. , , 
1S essentially a psychologistic conception of 
understanding. It involves more than just acknowledging 
the validity or authenticity of another person's point of 
view though that 1S seen as a necessary if not 
sufficient condition for the experience of empathy. 
Somehow, the empathic social worker is able to 'go beyond' 
this point and, while engaging with a client "responds 
from the frames of reference of his (sic) client, for he 
can see the world through the client's eyes" (Egan, 
1983:23) .8 
Quite how this occurs, however, is not clear. Neither is 
it clear that the criteria that are cited as evidence that 
empathy has successfully been practised and experienced 
are satisfactory. To take the first point: empathy is 
portrayed as the practice of entering the other person's 
world, of being able to understand the other from his 
frame of reference, without the helper/worker actually 
adopting that frame of reference himself. But what then is 
the status of the worker's own framework of understanding 
while this encounter takes place? Is the worker attempting 
to 'bracket out' his own experience and disengage from his 
own system of referents and experiences whilst in the act 
of empathising?9 
Accepting the difficulty - indeed, the impossibility - of 
shedding one's own framework of understanding is essential 
to a hermeneutic approach to an encounter with difference. 
Thus the futility of trying to 'get inside' another person 
is recognised, and an understanding based on the 
linguisticality (see section 4.4 below) of our shared 
existence is sought. Another person's position can never 
be absolutely understood from their perspective because, 
by definition it ;s their perspective, coloured and 
conditioned by their personal history and engagement with 
tradition. "Understanding is not about 'getting inside' 
another person, or the immediate fusing of one person in 
another. To understand what a person says is ... to agree 
about the object, not to get inside another person and 
relive his experiences" (Gadamer, 1979:345). 
Thus, Gadamer turns from a psychologically-based account 
of understanding, to one rooted 1n the experience of 
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dialogue, and the paradigm for understanding becomes 
translation. 1o Understanding someone alien is most akin 
to the process of translation from one language to 
another. The art of translation is not to seek a word-for 
word equivalence, but rather to say in one language what 
has been said in another. As Habermas observes, "the act 
of translation highlights a productive achievement to 
which language always empowers those who have mastered its 
grammatical rules: to assimilate what is foreign and 
thereby to further develop one's own linguistic system" 
(Habermas, 1970:338). 
Translation and, analogously, interpretation are therefore 
both creative and self-reflective: "as the translator must 
find a common language that preserves the rights of his 
mother tongue and at the same time respects the 
foreignness of his text, so too must the interpreter 
conceptualize his material in such a way that while its 
foreignness is preserved, it is nevertheless brought into 
intelligible relation with his own life-world" (McCarthy, 
1984:173). This brings us to the idea of understanding as 
a fusi on of hori zons. For Gadamer, 'hori zon' expresses the 
idea of our (historical/cultural) perspective which is 
necessarily always both finite and limited, but which can 
move and expand to adjust to interaction with an 'other'. 
"It should not be conceived in terms of a fixed or closed 
standpoint; it is 'something into which we move and which 
moves with us'" (Holub, 1991:58). 
Moving on to the second problem identified above: how are 
we to know when empathy has been present in an exchange? 
According to Egan (1983:78), the criterion for recognising 
empathy at either of the levels he describes (primary or 
advanced) is that the remark or communication "hits the 
mark" as evidenced by the response it elicits from the 
other person. It could be assumed, by extension then, that 
a contribution by the helper that does not "strike home" 
or "ring a bell" for the client 1S not after all 
accurately empathic, that the worker has somehow 
misconstrued some aspect of the client's world and 
therefore drawn illegitimate conclusions. But Egan's model 
does not necessarily lead to that conclusion. Rather, it 
allows for the possibility of the client's view of the 
world being somehow faulty and the worker having a more 
accurate or objective understanding which the client had 
not yet arrived at, or might be otherwise resisting (Egan, 
1983:131 and 135). 
The task for the worker in that situation would be to try 
to present the client with alternative formulations of the 
problem in order that the client mig~t reach a m~re 
objective understanding. But the questlon must rema1n, 
when differences of opinion or interpretation arise, which 
version of reality prevails. The idea that social work 
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operates as both a form of care and a form of social 
control has been well-aired,11 and the ambiguity of the 
social work role is readily seen in cases where clients 
are presenting with or are deemed by the welfare 
authorities to be exhibiting problems caused by 
dysfunctional behaviour. The very description of certain 
b~havi~urs or attitudes as 'dysfunctional' already carries 
w1th 1t a heavy ideological baggage, and social workers 
are not immune to the social influences at work in such 
situations. 
This problem of power, of adjudicating between different 
world-views J is of course not unique to the kind of social 
work practice I have been describing. A similar point 
could be made about the process of understanding outlined 
in Gadamerian hermeneutics, namely that differences in the 
access to power of participants in a dialogue will affect 
the quality of the interchange, and run the risk of 
deteriorating into the imposition of the more powerful 
partner's view on to the weaker. Gadamer's defence would 
be that a genuine attempt at reaching understanding with 
the other requires the questioner (or, in social work 
terms J the worker) to accord a certain normative authority 
to the object of understanding, and to proceed on the 
assumption that it may have something to teach her; this 
1S the case whether the object of understanding is a text 
or another person. In the latter case, Gadamer makes this 
comment: "In human relations the important thing is to 
experience the 'Thou' truly as a 'Thou', ie [sic] not to 
overlook his claim and to listen to what he has to say to 
us. To this end, openness is necessary" (Gadamer, 
1979:324).12 
How satisfactory this stance proves is considered in 
relation to criticisms of Gadamer's position, ;n section 
4.5 below; but for now, I would suggest that the 
implication of this discussion for social work is to 
challenge the validity and usefulness of the concept of 
empathy as a guiding principle for practice and to 
recogn1se that the involvement of social workers in their 
own personal and institutional histories necessarily 
shapes their understanding of others, whether clients or 
colleagues. With this is mind J I turn now to a discussion 
of a hermeneutic approach to understanding. 
Gadamer's main work, Truth and Method, takes the form of 
an extended reflection on the nature of interpretation or, 
as Gadamer himself notes more precisely, the "phenomenon 
of understanding and the correct interpretation of what 
has been understood" (GadamerJ 1979:xi). The following 
discussion is necessarily partial, concentrating on 
dimensions of Gadamer's hermeneutics that seem to me of 
particular relevance to the social work enterprise. 13 In 
this context, I will organ1se my comments around an 
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examination of three aspects or characteristics of 
understand~ng: the role of prejudice in understanding; 
understandlng as practical-moral engagement or phronesis; 
and the dialogic nature of understanding. 
4.3 Understanding and prejudice: the role of tradition. 
Gadamer's analysis of the link between understanding and 
pre~udice starts from the contention that, put at its most 
baslc. all understanding involves a prior orientation 
towards the object at hand (Gadamer, 1979:236). He 
describes the assumptions or working hypotheses that we 
all use to orientate ourselves in this way as prejudices 
(die Vorurtei7e) , endorsing an archaic usage of the word 
that seeks to return it to its literal meaning of, simply, 
'pre-judgement', without the pejorative connotations the 
word has now acquired. 14 In this sense he is perhaps 
saying nothing more challenging than Fairclough, who would 
hold that tithe way people interpret features of texts 
depends upon which social and more specifically, 
discoursal, conventions they are assuming to hold" 
(Fairclough. 1989:19).15. But prejudice occupies a very 
particular role in Gadamer's conception of understanding, 
and a lot rests on the success, or otherwise, of his 
re-positioning of this awkward term. 
The process of rehabilitation pursued by Gadamer is not 
without problems, as Warnke's (1987) discussion shows. I 
set out the main points of this discussion below as it is 
important for an overall assessment of the hermeneutic 
approach in view of the central role that Gadamer accords 
to prejudice in structuring our understanding; and it 
necessarily directs attention onto another key concept in 
the hermeneutic worldview, tradition. 
Gadamer attempts to rehabilitate the notion of prejudice 
to counter what he sees as the continuation of the 
Enlightenment's "prejudice against prejudice which 
deprives tradition of its power" (Gadamer. 1979:240) and 
its elevation. in turn, of a spuriously detached or 
transcendent rationality. Ricoeur comments, "For Gadamer, 
prejudice is not the opposite pole of a reason without 
presupposition; it is a component of understanding, linked 
to the finite historical character of the human being" 
(R i coeur, 1981: 71 ) . 
Warnke (1987) follows the process of rehabilitation 
through three stages. The first step calls to mind 
Gadamer's account of the hermeneutic circle in textual 
understanding; this involves the claim that "understanding 
a text always involves a projection of its meaning on the 
basis of a partial experience of it" (Warnke, 1987:76). 
Thus, when starting to read a book or viewing a picture, 
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we ar7 already bringing a set of expectations and assump~lons to that experience. Expectations may need to 
be revlsed - for example, if the text in hand turns out to 
be by Joe Shakespeare, rather than William - but the new 
assumptions prompted by this new information will in turn 
inform and help to shape the reader/viewer's understanding 
of the text as a whole. This dynamic interaction of part 
and whole makes up the hermeneutic circle. 
Si mi 1 ar 1 y J "any understandi n9 of an obj ect 1 s an 
understanding of that object as something. In other words, 
all understanding involves projecting a meaning on one's 
perceptions that is not strictly contained in the 
perceptions themselves" (Warnke, 1987:75). And the 
structures we use, consciously or unconsciously, to 
perform this initial projection of meaning are 
'prejudices' or 'pre-judgements'. What we consider to be 
rational judgements derive from and function within 
"pre-disclosed interpretive frameworks derived from 
cultural-historical existence" (Dicenso, 1990:97). Reason 
itself, therefore, is also constituted historically: "the 
idea of an absolute reason is impossible for historical 
humanity. Reason exists for us only in concrete, 
historical terms, l.e. it is not its own master, but 
remains constantly dependent on the given circumstances in 
which it operates" (Gadamer, 1979:245). 
The second step that Warnke identifies is the assertion 
that "interpretive projections of meaning are rooted in 
the situation of the interpreter" (Warnke, 1987:77). This 
reinforces the role of prejudice, in that there is no 
neutral j context-free standpoint from which to engage with 
the matter in hand, whether text, work of art, or other 
object of understanding: "To try and eliminate one's own 
concepts in interpretation is not only impossible, but 
manifestly absurd. To interpret means precisely to use 
own's own preconceptions so that the meaning of the text 
can really be made to speak for us" (Gadamer, 1979:358). 
Even the scientific attitude is just that - an attitude 
that depends on placing the object within a particular 
context and adopting certain rules and procedures for 
observation and accumulation of knowledge. 
So at this stage, Gadamer is saying both that an 
individual's understanding necessarily involves a 
projection of 'full' meaning on the basis of incomplete 
and partial information, and that this projection is 
rooted in the person's particular situation, vantage 
point expectations, and the like. Does the inevitability 
of ~rejudice in Gadame~'s .s~nse then co~si~n. all 
understanding to pure sUb]ectlvlty? Are all lndlvldual 
prejudices or orientations towards the text or other 
matter at hand, die Sache, equally valid? Is there any way 
of distinguishing between purely personal or subjective 
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interpretations and 'authentic' understanding? 
The third stage in Gadamer's rehabilitation of prejudice 
and clarification of the role of tradition, according to 
Warnke (1987:78), places his analysis at some distance 
from this form of subjectivism. Gadamer's hermeneutics 
develops and depends on - the idea of situatedness or 
"thrownness" (Geworfenheit) , and its determining role in 
our ability to understand the meaning of any text (text 
analogue) or situation. He draws on Heidegger's analysis 
of understanding rooted in "the concerns of the 
interpret i ng subj ect or ... ina st ruct u re of pract i ca 1 
involvements" (Warnke, 1987:78), but specifically locates 
this structure of involvements in history.16 We are indeed 
'thrown' into a historical and cultural matrix which we 
have not chosen, but this does not mean that our 
understanding of a text or event must be arbitrary. 
Rather, "our understanding stems from the way in which the 
event or work has previously been understood and is thus 
rooted ln the growth of a historical and interpretive 
tradition" (Warnke, ibid). The tradition already mediates 
the event or text in the sense that it provides the 
ground-rules for deciding what objects should be deemed 
significant, worthy of consideration, and what kinds of 
questions should be posed about them. 
The relation between historical situation and tradition, 
on the one hand, and understanding on the other, is 
explored by Gadamer (1979:267ff) through the joint ideas 
of "effective history" (Wirkungsgeschichte) and "effective 
historical consciousness" (wirkungsgeschicht7iches 
Bewusstsei n) . Bl ei cher defi nes the term "effect i ve 
history" as the "on-going mediation of past and present 
which encompasses subject and object and in which 
tradition asserts itself as a continuing impulse and 
influence" (Bleicher, 1980:266). To put the same point 
somewhat di fferent 1 y, "effect i ve hi story" concerns "the 
process of cultivating an awareness of the ways in which 
understanding has been shaped by historical forces" 
(Dicenso, 1990:82), and it is this awareness that 
constitutes "effective historical consciousness".17 
So understanding is achieved through a recognition of 
effective-historical processes, though the point of 
Gadamer's emphasis on the historicality of understanding 
is to emphasise that knowledge of those processes can 
never be complete. Our perspective on any given event or 
object of understanding is necessarily always partial and 
finite. But it is the particular situation in which we 
find ourselves that provides the 'horizon' from which our 
understanding can proceed. Gadamer maintains that 
involvement in a particular historical or linguistic 
context does not prevent us from understanding other 
languages, cultures or events from our own past. Indeed, 
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it is that very involvement that provides or suggests an 
orientation towards the object and places it within a 
context. "The interpreter does not approach his subject as 
a ~abu7a rasa ... Rather, he brings with him a certain 
horlzon of expectations of beliefs and practices, 
concepts and norms - that belong to his own life-world. He 
sees the subject from the perspectives opened by this 
horizon" (McCarthy, 1984:172). 
Gadamer presents understanding as a process of reaching 
agreement (with the Other) about die Sache, a process 
which is encapsulated in the notion of the fusion of 
horizons. But the nature of the consensus sought is left 
ambiguous, depending on the exact interpretation given to 
the idea of 'fusion'. Gadamer seems to waver between two 
interpretations, one strong and the other weaker, though 
perhaps more tenable overall. The first, strong, sense 
requires substantive agreement between the interpreter 
and the views expressed by the Other; that is, one party 
acquiesces in the view of the other in a "concrete unity 
of judgment" (Warn ke, 1987: 106) . 
I have characterised the second interpretation as 
'weaker', but I suggest that it may in fact lead to a more 
illuminating practice. This verSlon of the fusion of 
horizons is arrived at "by restoring the dialectic of 
points of Vlew and the tension between the other and the 
sel f" (Ri coeur, 1981 : 75). Both the interpreter and the 
text or other aspect of the tradition that is being 
examined move within their own horizon. Understanding is 
achieved by allowing one's own horizon to be open to the 
other, by entering into a dialogue within which both one's 
own prejudices and those of the other are thoroughly 
tested. I discuss the dialogic nature of understanding 
more fully in section 5.3, but allude to its significance 
here to explain the nature of the process of understanding 
Gadamer envisages. Within this view of the fusion of 
horizons, understanding involves a transformation of the 
original positions of both interpreter and text or other 
object of understanding, a dialectical process whose end 
point18 represents a new stage of the tradition. 
On this view, understanding can also include disagreement 
we simply agree to disagreej but the process of trying 
to achieve a better understanding of the matter at hand 
will have involved searching examination of each party's 
prejudices and assumptions and obliged each to i~c~rpo~ate 
a serious consideration of the other's posltlon lnto 
his/her own framework. Knowledge of the points on which 
one disagrees with or remains unconvinced by the other's 
arguments enriches one:s ,own und~rstanding as su~el~ as 
does the experience of flndlng prevlously held convlctlons 
being validated by the other. 
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Gadamer's rehabilitation of prejudice seems to leave a 
number of issues unresolved. The question still remains 
whether, in the light of the inescapable influence of 
prejudice, truth can be distinguished from personal 
preference or whether any interpretation of the matter in 
hand can be seen as valid? To confront the spectre of 
arbitrary, inaccurate or just whimsical interpretations, 
Gadam~r introduces the presumption of unity, which expands 
the ldea that we approach a text already anticipating or 
projecting a meaning, in order to understand it (the 
hermeneutic circle of part and whole). Warnke summarises 
this development as follows, " ... the presumption here is 
that the text forms a unity, an internally consistent 
whole, and that one can use the regulative ideal of unity 
to assess the adequacy of one's interpretations of its 
various parts" (Warnke, 1987:83). The presumption of unity 
commits the reader of a text to an understanding that in a 
certain sense ;s 'true to itself'. But it does not 
confront the broader problem of misunderstanding or of 
adjudication between two equally consistent readings. 
Consistency by itself cannot guarantee truth. 
If the text itself cannot provide a standard apart from 
internal consistency against which to measure our 
understanding. where should we look for authorisation or 
justification for particular interpretations? We cannot 
move 'outside' the text, for instance to appeal to the 
author's supposed intentions, because extra-textual 
evidence in turn must also be considered from the point of 
view of the hermeneutic circle, and so on ad infinitum. 
So Gadamer introduces a new assumption which can allegedly 
provide a criterion or standard for discriminating between 
alternative, but equally self-consistent, interpretations 
of a text's meaning. Gadamer calls this the 
"presupposition or 'fore-conception' of completion" 
(1979:261). To try and avoid arbitrary or idiosyncratic 
interpretations of a text, "we are fundamentally open to 
the possibility that the writer of a transmitted text is 
better informed than we are, with our previously formed 
meaning. (1979:262) In essence, therefore, our engagement 
with a text or other object for understanding commits us 
to according that object a certain normative authority; we 
allow at least for the purpose of that encounter, that 
the w~rk before us can tell us something authentic. 
Thus begins a process of putting our own prejudices into 
play; in this way we sift and test them, to sort the 
legitimate from the illegitimate, the justified from the 
unjustified (Gadamer, 19~9:246ff). "The filterin~ out <:,f 
the 'legitimate' prejudlces occurs in the dlalectlc 
between otherness and familiarity, between object and 
tradition that is initiated by the temporal distanc~: 'It 
not only' lets those prejudices that are of a partlcular 
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and limited nature die away, but causes those that bring 
about genuine understanding to emerge clearly as such' 
(pp.282, 263-4)" (Bleicher, 1980:111). We take the risk 
that we might be wrong, might know less about the matter 
before us than the subject or text we are engaged with, 
though Gadamer does not commit us to an irreversible 
acceptance of the other's authority. Having provisionally 
gr~nted the object of understanding an authority over us, 
t~lS n~netheless leaves open the possibility of 
w1thdraw1ng acceptance of that authority in the future. 
But does the anticipation of completeness resolve the 
earlier problem of misunderstanding and misinterpretation 
by making the object of study itself the standard of 
truth? How can we tell whether the new understanding we 
have achieved through allowing the object to exercise an 
authority over us is actually any less arbitrary or 
misleading than the old prejudices we have now discarded? 
And is there any way to tell whether our new understanding 
is anything other than simple acquiescence in the views 
expressed in the text? 
A dissimilarity of viewpoint or even apparent falsity of a 
text or other work of art 1S not, according to the 
anticipation of completeness, a reason to reject new 
material. Indeed, the effect of such an encounter should 
rather be to encourage us to make more strenuous efforts 
to be educated by it; it allows our prejudices to be more 
thoroughly tested than an encounter with the cosily 
familiar. "Hermeneutic analysis demands a respect for the 
authenticity of mediated frames of meaning: this is the 
necessary avenue for understanding other forms of life, 
i.e., generating descriptions of them that are potentially 
available to those who have not directly participated in 
them" (Gi ddens, 1976: 145) .19 So at what stage shou 1 d we 
stop trying to learn from our object? We seem to run the 
risk that, "if we do not simply interpret works so that 
they comply with our own beliefs, we will end up learning 
from truth-claims we ought long ago to have dismissed" 
(Warnke, 1987:89-90). The answer Gadamer provides is not 
wholly satisfactory, involving a further elaboration of 
the role of tradition in shaping our understanding. 
As Gadamer has made clear before, the object of 
hermeneutic understanding is not neutral, presented to the 
naive observer free from any pre-judgement. The object is 
itself "already a fusion of the interpretations of a 
tradition" (Warnke, 1987:90), so engaging with the object 
involves an encounter with the tradition itself. The 
anticipation of completeness commits us to accord a 
normative authority to the object of understanding; thus, 
;n a certain sense, we have necessarily accorded authority 
to the tradition: "The tradition is not only the source of 
the old interpretations that we test in anticipating 
94 
comp~eteness; our new interpretations are themselves 
readln~s of the tradition's authoritytl (Warnke, 1987:90). 
Essentlally, we seem to have swapped a commitment to 
person~l prejudices for an allegiance to the past, 
accordlng to Warnke. approaching a conservative defence of 
tradition which has brought Gadamer into conflict with 
writers like Habermas, who find in 'tradition' a force 
much more Obviously open to challenge. 2o 
The relation of the above to the concerns of anti-racist 
social work must now be drawn in. In broad social work 
terms, the role of prejudice and tradition can be 
articulated: while social work as currently practised is 
not a monolithic enterprise. the state bureaucracies which 
today organise mainstream social work have developed out 
of a particular welfare tradition that has its roots in 
the charitable organisations of the Victorians. 
Assumptions about the role and purpose of individual acts 
of charity and about the wisdom of state involvement in 
individuals' private lives, ideas about the rightful 
recipients of aid - the 'deserving poor' contrasted with 
the feckless and idle - and appropriate modes of service 
deliverys all have a history which bears on current 
understandings of the social work enterprise. But 
hermeneutics goes beyond the simple acknowledgement of 
situatedness and makes powerful claims for the authority 
of tradition. 
The defence of prejudice and the authority of tradition by 
Gadamer "presupposes that we are carried by the meanings 
of the past before we find ourselves in a position to 
judge them. Or to put it in other terms. we are spoken to 
before we speak; we are posited in tradition before we 
posit tradition; we are situated before we are free to 
criticize this situation ll (Kearney, 1991:60). We allow the 
tradition to assert authority over us. Gadamer makes a 
strong case for the rationality of the choice to accept 
the authority of tradition (Gadamer, 1979:245ff), arguing 
that it is not simply a matter of blind obedience. We can 
choose to preserve our tradition or allow it to be 
challenged, though as Gadamer notes, "Even where life 
changes violently. as in ages of revolution, far m~re of 
the old is preserved in the supposed transformatlon of 
everything than anyone knows" (1979:250). 
So if the general bias is towards continuity, what can be 
done within a tradition that is in some sense deeply 
flawed - as is the case, arguably, in a society the draws 
on a racist tradition? I shall consider this point further 
in section 4.6, when I look at criticisms of Gadamer's 
position. 
4.3 Understanding as phronesis. 
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Gadamer sees a crisis in contemporary praxis - even a 
deformation of the idea of praxis - in the exaggerated 
role .accorded to science and scientific/technical 
expertlse a~d the downgrading of practical-moral knowledge 
as the.basls f~r social and political decision-making. He 
approprlates Arlstotle's insights into the characteristics 
of practical reason or phronesis, and its differences from 
and relations to both theoretical knowledge and technical 
skill~ and draws from them a relevance to present day 
questlons and concerns. 21 
Understanding does not take place in a vacuum, but 
involves a moment of application. Understanding, 
interpretation. and application are not discrete, 
separable elements of hermeneutics, but are internally 
related; "every act of understanding involves 
interpretation, and all interpretation involves 
application" (Bernstein, 1983:38). Bohman et al. underline 
this point, with the following comment: "Gadamer claims 
that interpretive understanding is always already 
application, since the situation that prestructures 
interpretation always calls for an application, always 
demands some response from us ln the pursuit of the 
purposes through which we encounter the situation" 
(1991:12). The way in which understanding is pursued is 
crucial; for Gadamer, it takes on particular importance as 
a form of moral-practical engagement. "It is Aristotle's 
analysis of phronesis that ... enables us to understand 
the distinctive way in which application is an essential 
moment of the hermeneutical experience" (Bernstein, 
1983:38). 
Ethical know-how can be distinguished from theoretical 
and, more particularly, technical knowledge on three 
counts (Gadamer, 1979:283-289) which can be summarised as 
follows: firstly, there is a difference between moral and 
technical knowledge in terms of the relation of knowledge 
to its application. We can learn a technical skill and can 
also forget it. "Phronesis (prudence) as practical 
knowledge is internalized knowledge and cannot be 
forgotten if it is not needed at the moment" (Bleicher, 
1980:126). Technical knowledge, in Warnke's estimation, 
"is a matter of fulfilling a general norm or paradigm as 
best as one can given one's materials and tools" (Warnke, 
1987:93). But with moral knowledge, one needs to be able 
to decide which general norm or paradigm is at issue, and 
then make a decision to act which applies the general norm 
to the particular situation. For example, what is 'right' 
or 'courageous' or 'selfless' cannot be decided in the 
abstract but only in the context of a situation ;n which 
a right: courageous or selfless act is require~. Ethical 
knowledge, thus ;s "a matter of understandlng ho~ a 
general norm is to be given concrete content - or what ltS 
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meaning is with regard to a particular situation" (Warnke, 1987:93). 
Secondly, technical and moral knowledge are distinguished 
by a fundamental difference in conception of the relation 
betwe~n means and ends. Technical knowledge is particular 
and 1S related to the achievement of particular ends. 
There is no obligation to consider anew each time the 
suit~bility of the means employed to achieve the 
part1cular technical objective. Moral knowledge, by 
contrast, has no "merely particular" end but is concerned 
with "right living in general" (Gada~er, 1979:286).50 
there can be no knowledge in advance as it were of the 
right means to adopt to achieve the e~d in any pa~ticular 
case, "[f]or the end itself is only concretely specified 
in deliberating about the means appropriate to a 
particular situation" (Bernstein, 1983:147). Means and 
ends stand in a reciprocal relationship. 
And the third point which differentiates moral from 
technical knowledge lies in the concern of the former with 
other human beings. Moral knowledge concerns "the 
knowledge of what others, as opposed to oneself, ought to 
do" (Warnke, 1987:94). It is manifested not in the 
imposition of one's own knowledge on another on the 
grounds that it might be good for them, but rather a 
fundamental openness to what might be good for that other 
person, with their different experiences and 
circumstances. In Gadamer's words, the person with this 
kind of moral understanding "does not know and judge as 
one who stands apart and unaffected; but rather, as one 
united by a specific bond with the other, he thinks with 
the other and undergoes the situation with him" (Gadamer, 
1979:288). 
Each of these points demonstrates the role of application 
in understanding; ethical knowledge consistently involves 
an application of general principles in specific real-life 
circumstances. And Gadamer goes on to suggest that textual 
understanding, and indeed all authentic understanding, is 
motivated by the same process the application of a 
general normative understanding to different concrete 
situations. 
The idea that social work has a moral base is not new22 
but has not led to any clear agreement on the exact nature 
of the values that should inform practice. Different texts 
offer competing 'shopping lists', each with its own 
implications for action. 23 But social worker~ dai~y find 
themselves in, and must make some sense of, sltuat10ns of 
"uncertainty, uniqueness and value conflict': ~5chon, 
1983:49). The emphasis of the id~a of ph~ones!s 1S t~at 
understanding arrives only 1n con]Unct10n w1th 
application; that is to say, that moral decisions depend 
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~n ,a~ interpretation of the particular features of that 
lndl~ldual case, and its identification as an example of a 
~artl~u~ar ,moral dilemma or situation; following such 
ldentlflcatlon, an appropriate course of action must be 
adopted. This 1S not the world of technical means/ends 
rationality. 
The three dimensions that distinguish moral-practical from 
theoretical and technical knowledge can be examined in 
relation to social work concerns to see how relevant the 
idea of phronesis is to understanding in social work. Whan 
(1986) approaches this issue from a viewpoint informed by 
readings of both Gadamer and Bernstein,24 and identifies 
in social work a sense of practice as practical-moral 
engagement that differentiates it from technique, however 
skilled. Whan's account places social work firmly in the 
moral realm; he is critical of the depersona1ising nature 
of technical rationality when it is applied to 'human' 
situations. This way of problem-solving concerns itself 
only with the most efficient means to achieve given ends, 
and does not allow any consideration of the quality or 
morality of the ends themselves. Social work is not just 
about technically efficient processes for the distribution 
of services and resources25 but operates with a sense of 
personal involvement or engagement. and it is to this that 
hermeneutics speaks. 26 
Whan's article briefly considers the possible application 
of phronesis in social work practice, and suggests the 
need for a particular moral approach to the business of 
social work. I would like to take the discussion a stage 
further and consider how the concept of phronesis might 
assist ;n the development of ideas specifica11y about 
multi-racial and anti-racist practice. 
The first point that distinguishes moral knowledge is that 
it is internalized and cannot be forgotten, but there can 
be no advance prescription for its application. The 
general norm is only really understood through the attempt 
to apply it in a particular situation. I do not think it 
contentious to present the goal of eradicating racism as 
morally inspired. But the difficulty in achieving such a 
goal has, as I have argued, left social work in some 
disarray. I would suggest that this may in part be because 
there is no 'once and for all' solution to the problem of 
racism. such that if we all behaved in a particular way, 
or if our social institutions were to be organised 
differently, racism would quietly evaporate. What 
constitutes 'racism', and by extension, 'anti-racism', 
cannot always be specified in advance. It is only through 
finding ourselves in a situation where we feel obliged to 
act in an anti-racist way that the content of such an act 
can be specified. 
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Th~s can perhaps be illustrated in relation to the second 
p~ln~ conc~rning moral knowledge: means/ends rationality. 
W1th1n soc1al services departments. procedural steps have 
bee~ ,taken. ~ften in association with 'equal opportunity' 
pol1c~esJ t~ 1ncrease the numbers of ethnic minority staff 
th1S be1ng held to somehow improve services to ethnic 
minority clients and show a commitment to anti-racism. But 
as the discussion in chapter two indicated. an increase in 
the number of members of a particular group need not in 
itself be proof of anything very much. Procedural change 
can remain at the technical level. without fundamentally 
affecting the claimed end to decrease racism within 
social services departments. Unless there is a reciprocity 
between means and ends. such that "the consideration of 
the means 1S itself a moral consideration and makes 
specific the moral rightness of the dominant end" 
(Gadamer. 1979:287), attempts to change the moral focus of 
social work in this way will be of limited use. 
Concern for others and commitment to another's good rather 
than to maximising personal benefit clearly fit with the 
aims of multi-racial and anti-racist practice. Indeed, it 
is hard to conceive of social work without at least some 
acknowledgement of the idea of concern for others, though 
of course the form in which this concern is expressed and 
the action deriving from it will vary considerably, 
depending on the prejudices, in Gadamer's sense, of the 
social worker. 
4.5 The dialogic nature of understanding. 
In Truth and Method, Gadamer attempts "to disclose 
'linguisticality' (Sprach7ichkeit) as the basic mode of 
human existence." (Dallmayr & McCarthy, 1977:287); he 
explores "the linguistic character of understanding to 
show that, despite our situatedness, understanding is 
nonetheless possible" (Warnke, 1987:81). That is to say, 
speaking one set of languages, having a given set of 
categories or prejudices does not cut us off from other 
language cultures or even from our own past. "Language is 
the middle ground in which understanding and agreement 
concerning the object takes place between two people" 
(GadamerJ 1979:345-6). All understanding is linguistic -
meaning does not, indeed cannot, exist 'outside of' 
1 anguage: 1 anguage i s format i ve of "modes of Bei ng" 
(Dicenso, 1990:54). 
Understanding, achieved through the 'fusion of horizons', 
is conceptualised as a kind of discussion or dialogue 
between different points of view; and Gadamer consequently 
looks to the conditions of conversation to illuminate 
those of understanding in general. Each partner in a 
genuine conversation devotes herself entirely to the 
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matter at hand, and to achieving an understanding of the 
truth with regard to that matter.27 This involves a 
reco~ni~ion of the limitations of one's own knowledge and 
a wlll1ngneSS to learn from the contribution of the other 
~arty, ~oints summed up in the presumption of the docta 
19norantla: each individual's viewpoint and hence 
knowledge. is necessarily partial limited and 
historically constrained; there is no position of absolute 
knowledge from which to judge the contributions to the 
dialogue. so each partner joins the conversation with the 
awareness that, in a certain sense, she does not know 
about the matter before her and therefore should allow for 
the possible truth of other views. Thus, each partner 
stands 1n a special relationship to the other: "Each 
partner must thus be taken seriously as an equal dialogue 
partner, as someone who, despite heritage, quirks of 
expression or the like is equally capable of illuminating 
the subject matter" (Gadamer, 1979:347). 
A genuine conversation is a process of "integration and 
appropriation" (Warnke, 1987:101), whose outcome 1S a 
unity about the subject at issue, a shared understanding 
where the reciprocity of conversation leads to a new 
position that represents neither party's original view, 
but rather an advance over the positions maintained by 
each at the beginning. Dialogue of this kind involves a 
co-determination of the knower and the known, to use 
Dicenso's expression (1990:81). Again, it is worth 
repeating that the understanding achieved is not 'better' 
in the sense that it approximates ever closer to some 
ideal or transcendental form of absolute knowledge. 
Conversation has a dialectical nature, but Gadamer does 
not assume the necessity for any particular telos. 
This conversational/dialogic pattern is repeated, for 
Gadamer, in any hermeneutic engagement with aspects of our 
own or another tradition: "The focus of understanding, 
1 i ke that of di a1 ogue, is the 'truth' of the 
subject-matter at issue; this requires taking seriously 
the claims of one's text (in the broadest sense), defining 
and testing one's own prejudices against these claims and 
coming ... to a new understanding of the subject-matter at 
issue" (Warnke, 1987:101-102). 
Gadamer's account of the dialogic nature of understanding 
has clear relevance for social work. Everyday practice in 
social work is after all characteristically seen - and 
often caricatured in terms of 'the social work 
interview', or rejected with such comments as "social 
workers don't do anything; they just ta1k".28 Within 
social work there is an approach to practice that suggests 
that the simple experience of being involved in a 
conversation in which one ;s treated with respect and 
acknowledged as "conversible with"29 that such an 
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experience lS, ln itself, therapeutic. 
While .it wo~ld be unrealistic to expect every duty social 
work lntervlew in a busy inner-city office to conform to 
the conversational standards that mark a true hermeneutic 
experience of understanding, the dialogic model offers a 
useful regul ati ve ideal, and puts the onus for 
successfully achieving understanding as much on the social 
worker as on the client. "If the quintessence of what we 
are is to be dialogical and this is not just the 
privilege of the few - then whatever the limitations of 
the practical realization of this ideal, it nevertheless 
can and should give practical orientation to our lives. We 
must ask what it is that blocks and prevents such 
dialogue, and what is to be done ... to make such genuine 
dialogue a concrete reality" (Bernstein, 1983:163). 
4.6 Criticisms of Gadamer's hermeneutics. 
Hermeneutic understanding 'fits' comfortably with the 
humanist, client-centred approaches to social work, 
although it is worth emphasising again that Gadamer's 
notion of the "fusion of horizons" differs significantly 
from the concept of empathy found in (for example) Egan 
(1983), and discussed earlier in this chapter. And while a 
hermeneutic approach clearly offers an opportunity to 
achieve greater understanding of the Other, and thence of 
ourselves as culturally and historically situated 
individuals, there is nevertheless a very real possibility 
of such an approach lapsing into a conservative 
acqulescence in the status quo. This is a familiar 
criticism of the Gadamerian version of hermeneutics, 
strongly associated with Habermas in particular, and 
challenges Gadamer on two main counts: the question of the 
distribution of power ln dialogic situations; and the 
authority of tradition. 
The distribution of power comes into question because 
dialogue, it is argued, can become another means of 
control if it fails to take account of the possible power 
imbalance between the partners in the exchange. Eagleton 
encapsulates the problem ln his reference to "the 
monologue by the powerful to the powerless" (Eagleton, 
1983:73). Do the participants in a conversation or 
encounter with a text have equal power in the exchange?30 
Or is it rather the case that those with more power, 
whether as representatives of a dominant culture (white vs 
black) or institutional tradition (social worker vs 
client), can control a dialogue an~ ensure that it lS 
constrained within 'acceptable' boundarles? 
At this level, the criticism perhaps just amo~nts to the 
truism that those with power would generally llke to hang 
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on to it and will control dialogic, as well as other, 
si~uations if given half a chance. But I think that two 
p01nts can be made that deepen the criticism of Gadamer's 
herm~neutics and present a more serious challenge to its 
prem1ses. The first relates to the association of 
hermen~u~ic~ ~ith ~an apolitical notion of interpretive 
commun1t1es 1n whlch "sets of shared prejudices ... are 
held together by cultural consensus" (Bohman et 
a7.,1991:9),31 a view which begs more questions than it 
answers. For Gadamer presents consensus as itself an 
uncontentious idea, assuming rather than proving its 
existence, and ignoring or avoiding a discussion of "the 
character, dynamics, and tactics of power and domination" 
(Bernstein, 1983:156). Yet as the preceding remark by 
Bernstein suggests, this concept may not be entirely 
transparent, and some account needs to be given of the 
exercise of power and domination in the manipulation of 
social consensus. 32 
The second, related, point has to do with the nature of 
language and discourse, and concerns the possibility that 
genu1ne dialogue is undermined or prevented by the 
existence of "systematically distorted communication" 
(Habermas, 1970a). Habermas shares with Gadamer a concern 
at the rise of technical rationality which has, they would 
both argue, "reduced the vocation of reason to a 
utilitarian calculus of means and ends, to a purely 
instrumental function" (Kearney, 1986:220). But this 
common concern has different implications in each case. As 
we have seen, Gadamer takes us back to the tradition 
within which we are placed and urges a dialogue with it or 
aspects of it based on a mutual respect and willingness to 
learn from the exchange. Habermas takes a less benign view 
of the process of dialogue and the role of tradition and, 
while he follows Gadamer's 'linguistic turn', draws on an 
understanding of language as "a medium of domination and 
social power; it serves to legitimate relations of 
organized force. Insofar as the legitimations do not 
articulate the power relations whose institutionalization 
they make possible, insofar as these relations merely 
manifest themselves in the legitimations, language is 
also ideological" (Habermas, 1970:360).33 
Habermas's analysis of language use and communication 
depends, in part, on two connected ideas: the first is 
that everyday speech is subject to distortion through the 
workings of ideology, and the second is ~hat ~here.is -.in 
principle at least - the "ideal speech sltuat1on" 1n whlch 
all participants to an exchange have equal access to and 
free choice of the full range of speech acts. Habermas 
himself refers to the ideal speech situation as "neither 
an empirical phenomenon nor merely a c~n7truct, b~t rathe~ 
an unavoidable reciprocal presuPPoslt1on of dlscourse 
(quoted in McCarthy, 1984:310), and uses it as the 
102 
~egulativ~ ideal by which to appraise instances of 
systematlcally distorted communication". 
Habermas suggests three criteria for marking out 
systematically distorted communication from 'pure' 
communicative action~ it involves l1a deviation from the 
rec~gnised ~ystem of linguistic conventions; it is 
manlfested 1n the rigid repetition of behavioural 
patterns; and it betrays a discrepancy between the various 
lev~ls of ,communication, so that actions and expressions 
bell e w~at 1 s sai d" (Thompson, 1983: 134) .34 At thi s 1 evel , 
the notlon of systematically distorted communication seems 
particularly apposite for the consideration of dialogue in 
a racist society. It clearly resonates with the experience 
of 'everyday' racism described by Essed (1991), and 
perhaps accounts for the ability of a majority ethnic 
group to portray itself as 'tolerant' towards minorities 
while maintaining a racist status quo. 
Ideology operates to promote "a 'false consciousness' 
which distorts communication and conceals the exercise of 
domination" (Kearney, 1986:223). So Habermas calls for a 
critique of ideology, a critical social theory that will 
expose the traditional suppression of generalisable 
interests, and make way for the free and equal 
communicative exchange between all social agents that 
characterises authentic human discourse. To elucidate the 
process of unmasking the distortions and 'false consensus' 
that are the products of 'pseudo-communication', Habermas 
turns to psychoanalysis. Just as psychoanalysis identifies 
"the mechanism in which we repress socially unacceptable 
motives and channel them into acceptable forms of 
expression" (Bleicher, 1980:156), so, in turn, will the 
form of critical theory proposed by Habermas seek "to 
dissolve systems of power through the interpretation of 
ideologies which restrict the realm of public debate" 
(Thompson~ 1983:135). 
While Gadamer assumes the general accessibility of meaning 
within a tradition, Habermas's task is to bring to light 
repressed meanings which support the self-delusions of 
particular groups within a stratified society. "The dead 
weight of given socio-political interests and forces 
sedimented in social institutions and reflected in 
everyday language precludes the, unrestric~ed 
self-clarification of these members subJected to lts 
regime" (Bleicher, 1980:158). The critique of ideology, 
motivated by belief in the possibility o~ the ideal :p~ech 
situation provides the vantage pOlnt for crlt1cal 
reflectio~ that Habermas would argue is lacking ln 
Gadamerian hermeneutics. 
Habermas's analysis of the impact of power and domination 
ln dialogue, of which I have given only the briefest 
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outline, is itself open to challenge, notably by Gadamer 
who argues that the concept of critique can be more than 
adequately accommodated within the scope of 
hermeneutics. 35 
However, Habermas's position cannot be dismissed at this 
stage, as it also incorporates the second criticism I have 
mentioned, leading to a serious attack on the particular 
role of tradition in Gadamer's hermeneutics. 
Understanding, for Gadamer, is necessarily linked to the 
involvement of the interpreter or dialogue participant in 
a particular socia-historical matrix, and is achieved 
through the engagement of the interpreter's 'horizon' of 
experience with that of the Other in that encounter. The 
process of understanding is appropriation, the 
assimilation of an alternative viewpoint in terms which 
make sense to the interlocutor. An encounter with the 
Other, and the attempt to seek meaning in that exchange, 
offer the opportunity to increase one's self-knowledge. 36 
That is not to say that the Other is an object or tool for 
use by the questioner to gain further personal insight; 
but that, for Gadamer, the dialectic of the process of 
understanding commits both parties to accepting the 
possibility of change in their own assumptions and 
prejudices in relation to their own traditions. 
So in social work, adopting a hermeneutic approach to 
understanding involves an openness and humility on the 
part of the social worker when confronted by the 
'otherness' of the client. In Gadamerian terms, the 
involvement of a white social worker with a black client 
opens the possibility of the social worker gaining greater 
understanding of her own role and place in a largely 
white-serving bureaucracy and broader white-dominated 
culture - if she is prepared to take the risk of engaging 
1n a genuine dialogue. Understanding, then, will have a 
reflexive dimension, but is there not a danger that any 
adjustments to the worldview of that person will merely be 
self-serving? An encounter with difference sharpens one's 
understanding of one's own tradition, in Gadamer's terms, 
but could it not also just confirm the essential 
'rightness' of what one already knows? 
And even allowing for the possibility that both parties 
are willing and able to take on the challenge of a genuine 
conversation and are prepared to change, how does one deal 
with the negative aspects of tradition? Gadamer presents 
'tradition' as "a linguistic body of commonly shared 
assumptions" (Kearney, 1986:223) to which we accord a 
normative authority. But there is no guarantee that our 
tradition is intrinsically benign. As Habermas indicates, 
'tradition' may shelter all manner of ideological 
distortions and repressions and still claim authority over 
us. 
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In relation to the specific concerns of this thesis, 
th~refore, what is one to do if the tradition from within 
Whl~h one speaks ;s fundamentally flawed - for example, by 
raClsm, as the linguistic resource position suggests? The 
~rocess of understanding involves putting one's prejudices 
1nto play, and attempting to sift the 'legitimate' from 
the 'illegitimate' ones. But what criteria inform the 
decision to keep or reject particular prejudices? I have 
already drawn attention to Warnke's criticisms of 
Gadamer's stance on this issue, and suggest that his 
position is, finally, unsatisfactory and may leave us 
hanging on to beliefs and assumptions we ought long ago to 
have discarded. Gadamer argues that hermeneutics need not 
be uncritical, simply that all critique takes place from 
within the horizon of the critic. But having accepted that 
there is no 'meta-narrative' outside tradition that could 
justify or invalidate our prejudices, and rejecting the 
Habermasian option, hermeneutics slides uneasily under the 
weight of the authority of tradition into an accommodation 
with the status quo. 
The emphasis on the authority of tradition raises a 
further question: is hermeneutics ethnocentric? This 
question is addressed specifically by Hoy (1991), and is 
answered in the negative. 37 The question of ethnocentrism 
arises out of hermeneutics' insistence on 
context-boundedness in interpretation and understanding. 
Given that all understanding takes place from within the 
particular 'horizon' or historical-social context of the 
individual and, further, that understanding always 
involves application to the present situation of the 
interpreter, can one infer that hermeneutics condones 
ethnocentrism? 
Gadamer's hermeneutics is reframed by Hoy as a form of 
"critical pluralism", in which "what counts as real is 
determined internally within an interpretation and is not 
something external to the interpretation that the 
interpretation is about" (Hoy, 1991:160). Hoy's position 
1S that the claim that understanding and interpretation 
are necessarily context-bound is not, of itself, 
pernicious; neither is it ethnocentric in the pejorative 
sense in which the term is most commonly used, if the 
interpreter remains open to the differences between her 
understanding and that of others, while acknowledging her 
own historicity. Problems arise, however, when this 
awareness of difference is obscured by the misguided 
expectation "that every other understandin~ of th~ world 
converge on one's own" (Hoy, 1991:156). It 1S the lmpulse 
towards convergence that is oppressive, rather than the 
inevitable situatedness of one's understanding 1n a 
particular social and historical matrix. 
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Hoy suggests that the self-reflective moment of 
hermeneutic understanding occasioned by an encounter with 
others who have a different self-understanding should not 
be conceived as a move towards understanding ourselves 
'better', but rather that it offers us the chance to see 
ourselves differently from before: "we could admit that 
our understanding both of ourselves and others changes, so 
that new problems emerge .... The self-understanding would 
be ~better' only to the extent that we see through our 
earl1er myths about what we were doing when we thought we 
were observing others" (Hoy, 1991:175), and would not rule 
out the possibility of self-critical reflection. In 
essence, then, Hoy reiterates Gadamer's counter-arguments 
to Habermas's challenge to the authority of tradition, and 
makes a case for hermeneutics involving a critical 
dimension that guards against the hegemonic drive towards 
convergence that he (Hoy) identifies with the pernicious 
aspect of ethnocentrism. 
In an attempt to mediate between the hermeneutics of 
Gadamer and the critical social theory of Habermas, 
Ricoeur sets up a position which perhaps allows for a less 
rigid interpretation of the authority of tradition. Having 
first summarised the antinomies between the two approaches 
(1981:78ff), Ricoeur then argues that Gadamer's 
hermeneutics of tradition contains within itself the 
possibility of a critique of ideology. "For as soon as we 
acknowledge that tradition 1S not some monolith of 
pre-established dogma but an ongoing dialectic of 
continuity and discontinuity made up of different rival 
traditions, internal crises, interruptions, revisions and 
schisms - as soon as we acknowledge this, we discover that 
there exists an essential dimension of distance at the 
very heart of tradition. A distance which actually invites 
critical interpretation" (Kearney, 1992:61). 
This throws a different light on the authority of 
tradition, and raises the interesting possibility that 
there may not be one tradition but rather a multiplicity 
of interacting and cross-cutting traditions. This is 
reminiscent of the stand Harding takes on feminist 
postmodernism (Harding, 1986), and suggests a direction 
for the move beyond both Gadamer's and Habermas's 
conceptions of hermeneutics, and away from the position 
Ricoeur stakes out in his bid to reconcile these two 
approaches. Thus, while acknowledging Habermas's critique 
of Gadamerian hermeneutics, I have looked elsewhere for a 
corrective to it partly because I incline to the view that 
Habermas's own theory of "ideal speech situations" is 
unrealistic. I have been drawn to consider, therefore, 
some ideas based on what I have chara~teri7ed as the o~he~ 
'wing' of hermeneutics, the more rad1cal deconstruct1ve 
, h D 'd 38 approach associated W1t err1 a. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NOTES 
1. For example, an individual can choose to act in ways 
that are odds with the cultural norms of his community; 
the idea of "rule-governed" behaviour (cf Winch, 1958) 
implies the possibility, in some circumstances at least, 
of breaking, changing, or plain ignoring the rules. In 
terms of the use of language: within literature, 
challenges to the classis realist novel demonstrate the 
possibility of operating otherwise than in the culturally 
dominant forms. At the level of everyday language use, one 
could perhaps cite the use of non-standard forms of 
English by minority ethnic groups. 
2. See, for example, Whan (1979), Gammack (1982), Imre 
(1984) and Whan (1986) on social work understanding. 
3. Carl Rogers is probably the author most strongly 
associated with client-centred casework (see chapter one, 
note 7). For an approach based on the use of empathy, see 
Egan (1983). 
4. See Thompson (1983:40-41) for expansion of this point. 
5. For the purposes of this study, the article by Lago 
(1981) on cross-cultural counselling is particularly 
relevant, and contains further useful references related 
to conselling practice and theory. 
6. I comment further on this book in chapter six where 
literary theory is discussed, for England has attempted to 
apply literary critical techniques and analyses to the 
production and reception of social work texts. Although 
not without problems, this work nonetheless represents an 
imaginative move towards a rethinking of social work's 
activities. 
7. See Howe's discussion (1987:96-120) of what he calls 
the "seekers after meaning"; influenced by the theories of 
Carkhuff and Truax, this group is exemplified, in his 
view, by Rogers, England, Goldstein and Wilkes. 
8. Egan's formulation does not suggest any limits to the 
exercise of empathy, and it would seem initially that 
there are no barriers to the range of situations or 
encounters in which the empathic worker can operate. It is 
therefore with some surprise that one comes across his 
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comments on the role of "indigenous helpers" (1983:86). 
Acknowledgement that language itself might not be 
completely transparent is found in Lago (1980:60-61); the 
author suggests that in a cross-cultural meeting, 
differences can multiply when participants are working 
with different assumptions about lang ag u e use. 
9. cf Winch (1958) and understanding other 'forms of 
life'. Also, see Giddens (1976:149). 
10. In this, Gadamer differs from other writers within the 
tradition of linguistic philosophy, like Habermas or 
Wittgenstein, who liken the process of understanding to 
that of socialisation in one's primary language. 
11 . See, for exampl e, Corri gan and Leonard (1978) 
Pritchard and Taylor (1978), and Simpkin (1979). 
12. This point, summarised by Gadamer as the 
"presupposition or fore-conception of completeness", 1S 
examined in more detail later in this chapter. 
13. A work as dense as Truth and Method touches on more 
than I can appropriately indicate here, where my analysis 
of Gadamer's text is presented in a very specific context, 
namely its possible contribution to the race and social 
work debate. For an excellent, lucid account of Gadamer's 
hermeneutics which clarifies both the positive and 
negative aspects, see Warnke (1987); also Bernstein (1983, 
1986). 
14. Dicenso (1990) discusses Gadamer's idiosyncratic usage 
of "prejudice" and his conflation of this term with the 
more neutral "pre-judgment ll • finding such an elision 
unsatisfactory. 
15. With the assumption, explicitly stated in Fairclough, 
that discoursal strategies and conventions are centrally 
related to questions of power. 
16. Ricoeur draws together the ideas of projection and 
"thrownness" that Gadamer takes from Heidegger in the 
following statement: understanding "must be described 
initially, not in terms of discourse, but in terms of the 
'power-to-be'. The first function of understanding is to 
orientate us in a situation. So understanding is not 
concerned with grasping a fact but with apprehending a 
possibility of being. [T]o understand a text, we shall 
say, is not to find a lifeless sense which is contained 
therein, but to unfold the possibility of being indicated 
by the text. ~hus we shall ~emain. fa~thful ~o the 
Heideggerian not1on of understandlng Wh1Ch 1S esent1a1ly a 
projection or, to speak more dialectically and 
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paradoxically, a projection within a prlor being-thrown" 
(Ricoeur, 1981 :56). 
17. See also the discussion ln Ricoeur (1981:73ff). 
18. The designation 'end' is meant only for the purposes 
of that enquiry or dialogue. Gadamer is not proposing that 
understanding moves inexorably towards a position of 
absolute knowledge. One's horizon can shift, but it 
remains essentially open to the possibility of 
encountering new texts or other objects of tradition. 
19. This is perhaps the position the social worker is in, 
when trying to understand and subsequently re-tell (either 
verbally or in written form) the client's story. 
20. I take up the quest ion 
conservatism and his statements 
tradition in section 4.6 below. 
of Gadamer's alleged 
on the authority of 
21. See Bernstein (1983) for a consideration of the use of 
the concept of phronesis in Truth and Method. In the 
course of this discussion, Bernstein makes the point that 
Gadamer's appropriation of Aristotle is "an 
exemplification of what he [GadamerJ means by opening 
ourselves to the truth that speaks to us through 
tradition" (Bernstein, 1983:39; and see also 148-150). 
22. See, for example, Butrym (1976) and Wilkes (1981). 
23. See, for example, Bailey (1980), Timms (1983), and 
Howe (1987). 
24. Bernstein in fact challenges the assumption on which 
Gadamer raises his approach to understanding, namely that 
a sufficiently broad consensus exists to provide the 
framework for the expansion of understanding through 
dialogue informed by the exercise of phronesis 
(1983:156-160). He is in turn challenged by Dicenso 
( 1990 : 106-1 08) . 
25. Though even this would presumably be carried out on 
the assumption that such a distribution was in some sense 
a 'good thing'. 
26. cf. Schon (1983) on the failure of the predominant 
model applied to professional activity technical 
rationality and his acknowledgement of a creative, 
dynamic element in practise which cannot be codified 
according to the norms of technical rationality, but which 
can apparently be learned. 
Also see England (1986), though I would suggest that 
ther~ are problems with his conclusions. 
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27. This is not an esoteric exercise, but an intensely 
practical activity as Giddens observes (1976:150-151). 
28. See, for example, Mayer and Timms (1970) and Sainsbury 
et al (182: 172). 
29. lowe this expression to Michael Whan 
. , 
an (unpubllshed) seminar presentation 
Institute of Technology in 1989. 
who used it in 
at Cranfield 
30. The idea of equality in relation to a text may sound a 
little eccentric, but I have in mind here Manlove's advice 
to treat all works with equivalent scepticism. He says 
firmly, "never take things for granted" (Manlove, 
1989:14), and goes on to urge a critical attitude towards 
all literature, even "a text in which some authority ... 
appears to tell us what to think" (Manlove, 1989:16). 
Anyone who has felt critical towards an acknowledged 
example of 'great literature' will perhaps recognise the 
difficulty of asserting the right to an alternative judgement. 
31. cf Fish's 
communities". 
(1980) discussion of "interpretive 
32. The earlier discussion of van Dijk's and Essed's work 
particularly, underlines the relevance of this point to a 
consideration of racism. 
33. Habermas developed his views on language into a theory 
of communication, which appeared in 1981 as Theorie des 
kommunikativen Hande7ns, (translated into English as 
Theory of Communicative Action, the first volume was 
published in 1984, the second in 1987). 
Without attempting a full exposition of Habermas's theory 
of communicative action, which would place it in the 
context of the wide-ranging and often eclectic writing 
about critical social theory that have appeared over a 
period of about thirty years, I concentrate on his work to 
the extent that his criticisms highlight possible problems 
within hermeneutics. So here, I will look at Habermas's 
analysis of the impact of ideology on communicative 
practice, and his consequent challenge to the dialogic 
approach to understanding endorsed by Gadamer. This is not 
to say that Habermas abandons the commitment to dialogue 
in toto, but rather that he presents the unconstrained 
dialogue of Gadamer's hermeneutics as an ideal not as an 
existing practice. 
There is an extensive secondary literature providing 
exposition and critical discussion of these ideas; see, 
for example, Bernstein (1983), Thompson (1983), McCarthy 
(1984). Rasmussen (1990), Holub (1991), and Honneth and 
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Joas (eds.) (1991). 
34. The 'logic' of deconstruction, of course, lS that a 
text always operates on this level, undermining its own 
proclaimed position; there is no ideology-free space. 
35. See McCarthy (1984:187ff) for a succinct summary of 
Gadamer's counter-arguments. Thompson takes the view that 
'systematically distorted communication' is "an ambiguous 
and questionable concept" and opposes its extension from 
the psychological to the social plane (Thompson, 
1983:133-136). 
36. cf Marcus and Fischer (1986). 
37. Rorty's appropriation of Gadamer's hermeneutics takes 
a different angle on the issue of ethnocentrism and the 
guiding role of tradition. He asks not just whether 
hermeneutics 1S ethnocentric or not, but whether it 
matters if it is. Adopting a somewhat provocative 
attitude, Rorty claims both a positive answer to the 
primary question and a cheerful negative to the second. 
For an account of the pragmatic position he advocates, see 
Rorty (1980) and the discussion of his work in Bernstein 
(1983). 
38. This is clearly not the only possible response to 
traditional hermeneutics; I have mentioned Ricoeur (1981), 
who develops an alternative position based around the 
ideas of narrativity and action as text. See also Thompson 
(1983) for a discussion of what he designates "critical 
hermeneutics". 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RADICAL HERMENEUTICS AND SOCIAL WORK: A DECONSTRUCTIVE 
APPROACH 
5.1 Introduction. 
To introduce the philosophical concerns of this thesis, I 
identified two approaches to hermeneutics, characterised 
as 'traditional' and 'radical', and related them to the 
work of Gadamer and Derrida respectively. Having examined 
the possible application of the hermeneutics of tradition 
to social work, and in particular to social work with 
ethnic minorities, I concluded that while the premises of 
such an approach are congenial, there is nonetheless a 
real danger that according authority to tradition 
restricts the scope - and maybe even the possibility - of 
criticism of that tradition. In other words, Gadamerian 
hermeneutics has a latent conservatism that is perhaps 
misplaced if the tradition is flawed - by racism, for 
example, as the cultural/linguistic resource position 
suggests. 
The possible danger of complacencey or cosiness vanishes 
swiftly in the face of the often mischievous irreverence 
of deconstructive criticism as applied by Oerrida. The 
essentially benign practice of pursuing understanding 
through an ethically-informed dialogue with 'the other' in 
all its cultural and historical manifestations collapses 
into the endless unpicking of a chain of meaning. 1 Each 
link in the chain is exposed to a thorough-going and 
sceptical examination to try and tease out the forces 
which hold a given meaning or reading together and, 
perhaps more importantly, keep alternative readings at 
bay. This practice, known variously as strong or 
deconstructive reading, opens the door to a very different 
kind of understanding from that of the hermeneutics of 
tradition explored in the last chapter. In what follows, I 
look at the ways in which Derrida's position complements 
Gadamer's,2 but goes beyond it by adopting a critical 
practice that interrogates and challenges the dialogic 
assumptions on which the latter's hermeneutics is based. 
My intention will be to draw out the implications and 
resonances of both Gadamer's and Oerrida's position for 
the race and social work debate that provides the focus of 
this thesis. 
5.2 Radical hermeneutics and language. 
One obvious place to start investigating the relations 
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between Gadamer's and Oerrida's hermeneutics is perhaps 
their respective attitudes towards language and 'text'. 
While hermeneutic understanding depends. in broad terms, 
on te~tual analysis, the process of analysis as well as 
~he ldea ,of 'text' itself is open to a range of 
~nterpr~tatlons. The procedure for achieving understanding 
1S ~n~,saged by Gadamer as a dialogue with the object of 
tradltlon. whatever form that object may take. Thus. the 
interpreter or interlocutor may literally start a 
conversation with another speaker, or initiate a dialogue 
with a written work, a piece of visual art or other 
cultural product in the manner described above in chapter 
four. 
By taking dialogue as the model for Understanding, it 
could be argued, Gadamer privileges speech in relation to 
writing. Derrida himself challenges this priority of 
speech over writing and accordingly adopts a different 
approach to the problems of understanding and meaning 
which he derives from a particular (poststructuralist) 
conception of language itself. To understand the force and 
significance of this challenge, which I have stated in the 
baldest terms. we can first turn to a consideration of the 
nature of language to see what is at stake. This will 
involve a brief exposition of Saussurefs linguistics. to 
set the context for the moves taken by Derrida and others 
beyond the structuralism derived from Saussure. The next 
step will be to follow Derrida's analysis of the history 
of Western philosophy and its dependence on what has been 
characterised as a 'metaphysics of presence'.3 This will 
be followed by an outline of the specific approach to 
language and understanding associated with the work of 
Derrida; and lastly. in this section, I will present an 
account of the reading practice associated with this 
approach. 
i) Structuralism. post-structuralism and deconstruction. 
'Structuralism' is the general term for a movement with 
adherents from across a range of disciplines and fields of 
study who share a characteristic way of thinking about 
structures derived from an understanding of Saussurean 
linguistics. They are concerned with the way different 
elements of a signifying system (whether of ideas or 
knowledge, or of cultural practices, and ~ocial 
institutions) are held in place and glven meanlng by 
structures which underlie and generate the various 
phenomena that come under ob~ervation. Th~ pr?ctice of 
structuralism involves uncoverlng and expllcatlng these 
structures and producing models of the signifying systems. 
As Young puts it: "The structuralist procedure of seeking 
out recurrent elements and their patterns assumes that the 
final model will consist of an autonomous entity of 
interdependent parts which condition each other 
reciprocally. It also assumes that meaning and 
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signification are both transparent and already in place, 
as well as the possibility of objective scientific 
verification of its findings" (1981:3). 
It would 7eem useful, at this stage, to briefly sketch in 
the key pOlnts of Saussure's linguistic theories - to draw 
out the nov7lty and significance of his view of language, before looklng at the use Derrida makes of Saussure's 
work, and his critique of it. As I noted above, 
~au~sure's theories of language, his attempt to found a 
SClence of language', provided the basis for the 
development of systematic structuralism in other 
diSciplines; any sign system or signifying practice could 
be approached with the structural methodology borrowed 
from linguistics. Levi·Strauss, for example, applied this 
method to the anthropological study of myth and of kinship 
systems. I mention Levi-Strauss here as he, along with 
Saussure himself, is used by Derrida4 to illustrate the 
limitations, indeed the impossibility. of the 
structuralist project, implicated as it is within the 
metaphysics of presence. 
"It is Saussure's insistence on a pre-given fixed 
structuring of language, prior to its realization in 
speech or writing, which earns his linguistics the title 
'structural' " (Weedon, 1987:23). This quotation from 
Weedon alludes to the distinction made by Saussure between 
langue and parole: langue is the abstract system of norms, 
rules and conventions which underlies and governs the 
formation and meaning of any linguistic act; and parole 
refers to individual utterances, the everyday productive 
uses of both spoken and written language. "Linguistics is 
not concerned with the positive realisation of language 
but with the differential structure which allows those 
particular productions. It is that distinction that 
Saussure captures in his terms langue and parole. Langue 
refers to the specific set of systematic differences which 
allow the production of particular utterances of parole" 
(MacCabe, 1979:439). 
One further distinction made by Saussure is relevant here: 
that between the 'synchronic' and the 'diachronic': to 
study a system 'synchronically' is to isolate it 
historically and analyse it as a functioning totality at a 
given point in time; 'diachronic' analysis attends to 
patterns of change across time. Thus, Saussure proposed 
that the proper object of a science of language would be 
the synchronic study of langue. 5 
With the parameters for his new science in place. Saussure 
could then analyse the chains of signs that comprised the 
abstract system of langue. Signs, he suggested, consist of 
a 'signifier' (a sound or graphic image) and a 'signified' 
(the concept or meaning). The relationship between the two 
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components of the sign is an arbitrary one; there is no 
natural or inherent connection between the sound image and 
the concept it Serves to evoke. In Eagleton's example 
"the .th~e~ black marks c-a-t are a signifier which evOk~ 
the ~lgn1f1ed 'cat' in an English mind .... [But] there is 
no lnherent reason why these three marks should mean 
'cat', other than cultural and historical convention. 
Contrast chat in French" (1983:97). 'C-A-T' signifies by 
virtue of its difference from other possible formations, 
for example 'bat' or 'cot'. Nonetheless, 5aussure does 
allow that, while signifier and signified are only bound 
together by convention. they do take on the nature of a 
completed sign and are "united in the brain by an 
associative bond", forming a "two-sided psychological 
entity" (Saussure, quoted by Young, 1981:2). 
Having taken the step of dissolving any necessary relation 
between signifier and signified, Saussure formulated the 
further insight that the relation between the whole sign 
and its referent (i .e. what the sign refers to) is also 
arbitrary. Meaning is no longer referential but simply 
relational: "language is not a nomenclature, a way of 
naming things which already exist, but a system of 
differences with no positive terms" (Belsey, 1980:38). So 
the notion of difference or differentiation applies here 
too. The sign is in a sense empty; it has no positive 
content, no essential or intrinsic meaning; rather, 
meaning is negatively defined as an effect of the sign's 
difference from others in the language system. Harland 
(1988:15) likens this to the holes in a net: "specified by 
their boundaries but empty in themselves". 
While a working definition of structuralism may be more or 
less adequately composed. drawing on the attachment of 
different disciplinary approaches to the work of Saussure, 
'post-structuralism' presents different problems of 
definition. On one level, the term applies to the movement 
within linguistics and other disciplines away from or 
beyond structuralism. But the position is at once both 
more and less complicated than this, and the nature of the 
'away from' and 'beyond' in the above formulation is not 
at all clear-cut. Harland finds valid distinctions between 
'structualism' and 'post-structuralism', but examines both 
within a framework he characterises as 
"superstructuralism" (1988). 
Culler (1983:22ff) acknowledges that in some cases there 
are problems deciding whether a certain author is a 
structuralist or post-structuralist, and even in 
differentiating structuralism as an approach or practice 
from post-structuralism; but again ~e seems to writ~ ~ith 
the understanding that the latter 15 a tenable posltlon, 
offering the following. a~s~ssment .o~ ~ts task: " ... 
structuralists and sem1ot1clans optlmlstlcally elaborate 
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theoretical metalanguages to account for textual 
phenomena; post-structuralists skeptically explore the 
paradoxes that arise in the pursuit of such projects and 
stress that their own work is not science but more text" 
(Culler~ 1983:24-25). Thus, language continues to provide 
a cruclal focus for attention within poststructuralism: 
"For poststructuralist theory the common factor in the 
analy~is. ~f social organization, social meanings, power 
and lndlvldual consciousness is 7anguage. Language is the 
place where actual and possible forms of social 
organization and their likely social and political 
consequences are defined and contested. Yet it is also the 
place where our sense of ourselves, our subjectivity, is 
constructed" (Weedon, 1987:21). 
Different forms of post-structuralism can be identified, 
but all share a common assumption, namely that "meaning is 
constituted within language and is not guaranteed by the 
subject which speaks it" (Weedon, 1987:22). One strand of 
post-structuralism draws on insights from psychoanalysis, 
particularly the work of Lacan;6 a second strand focusses 
on the history of discourses, on the relationships between 
language and power, discursive framework and social and 
political institutions;7 the third strand, deconstruction, 
concentrates on analysis of text, the relationships 
between and within texts and is associated most strongly 
with the work of Jacques Derrida. And, as I have indicated 
already, it is this third approach that informs my 
understanding of the race and social work debate. 
ii) Logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence. 
Derrida's approach to problems of meaning and 
understanding draws on a particular interpretation of the 
Western metaphysical tradition that runs from Plato to 
Hegel and beyond. He sees this tradition as being governed 
by 'logocentrism', using the term "to characterise the 
recurring propensity of Western thinking to centralise or 
ground its understanding on notions of 'presence' (70gos)" 
(Kearney, 1986:115). Derrida's challenge is to do away 
with any attempt to provide foundations or grounds 'below' 
or 'beyond' the language categories and social meanings 
that make up the "ordinary socially created 
intelligibility of the world" (Harland, 1987:68) and, on 
this view, provide the only reality we can know. In this 
section I will look at the 'history' of this 
philoso~hical position,S the workings of logoce~tr~s~, the 
conceptual ordering it promotes and the slgnlflcance 
accorded to voice or speech within this tradition. 
Logocentrism is the term applied by Derrida to ways of 
thinking that depend on a metaphysics of presence, that 
is a belief in a transcendental presence that fixes and 
gu~rantees linguistic meani~g but which itself remains 
beyond question. Western phllosophy, he argues, has been 
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governed by the attempt to describe the 'fundamental' the 
really 're~l '; an~ this urge to designate a centre, o~igin 
or ,groUndlng prln~iple invites a way of thinking that 
deflne~ by excluslon. Logocentrism, then, entails the 
establlshm~nt of,a conceptual hierarchy based on a series 
o~ phllosophlcal dualisms: presence/absence, 
11teral/metaphorical, mind/body, speech/writing, to give 
some examples of binary distinctions that have exercised 
considerable power within the Western tradition. In each 
case" the fi~st term assumes superiority; it is the term 
assoclated wlth presence, with self-authenticating 
meaning, while the second represents a fall away from full 
presence: it is defined as inferior, and is characterised 
by a lack, "a complication, a negation, a manifestation, 
or a disruption of the first" (Culler, 1983:93). 
Derrida draws on Saussure's theories of language to 
furnish material for his challenge to logocentrism. 
Logocentrism's elevation of the literal is treated with 
suspicion; indeed, "Derrida denies the very possibility of 
literal meaning. This is because the literal assumes the 
absolute self-presence of meaning, whereas in fact, 
according to Saussure's own formulation, language is 
constituted by differance - it is 'form and not a [sic] 
substance' It (Young, 1981 : 15). For Saussu re, sign systems 
are constituted through difference - and, to use Derrida's 
own coinage, through differance as well,9 the sign is an 
arbitrary construct, depending for its explanatory force 
on its relations of difference from other signs within the 
overall system of signification. The signifier never 
'catches up' with the signified, and the sign always 
remains different from itself, and cannot achieve the 
moment of pure self-presence posited by logocentrism. This 
rather opaque formulation can be expressed more simply, by 
saylng that the word for an object, experience, mental 
state and so on is not the same as the thing itself, a 
point to which I will return. 
But having taken this stance, apparently in opposition to 
the claims of the metaphysics of presence, Saussure 
appears to retreat from the full implications of his own 
insights and, as Derrida shows, to fall prey to the 
dictates of logocentrism himself. Saussure's work is 
unavoidably involved in the very tradition it undermines; 
it challenges logocentrism while remaining bound by the 
terms it disputes. Derrida does not present this as a 
fault in Saussure's thinking, a mistake that could have 
been avoided. On the contrary, it demonstrates that one 
cannot 'leap outside' of the governing tradition or way of 
thinking, but must adopt an ~lternative strat~gy. to 
question the conceptual hierarchles of everyday thlnklng. 
Such a strategy would engage with the ruling conceptual 
apparatus but from a position of unavoidable involvement: 
"The move~ents of deconstruction do not destroy structures 
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from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor 
can they take a~c~rate aim. except by inhabiting those 
structures. Inhabltlng them in a certain way because one 
always inhabits, and all the more when 'one does not 
suspec~ it. Operating necessarily from the inside, 
borrowlng all the strategic and economic resources of 
subversion. from. the old structure. . .. " (Derrida, 
1976:24)j 1n thlS way, deconstruction works to unsettle 
established systems of thought. 
The practical implications of the involvement in 
logocentrism can be seen in the phenomenon of 'political 
correctness' and associated attempts to somehow purge 
language of all racist, sexist, classist. ageist or 
otherwise offensive connotations. The motivation to do 
this may be worthy,10 but the attempt - from a Derridean 
perspective - cannot but fail. In chapter four I used the 
changing terminology of the discourse of rac~/racism and 
anti-racism to illustrate this point: changing particular 
words which have acquired derogatory meaning does not 
remove racism from its niche as a linguistic resource. The 
urge to expunge racism in this way belongs firmly to the 
metaphysics of presence. to a belief in a strict one to 
one relation between word and meaning. signifier and 
signified - in short, to a commitment to the unified sign 
that Derrida shows to be an illusion. 
Logocentrism works to persuade us that if we could only 
hit on the 'right' term or formulation, we could achieve 
the ideal of a racism-free language. But as I indicate 
above, this could only be possible if the identity between 
signifier and signified were fixed and complete. Derrida's 
approach to language sees it instead in a perpetual state 
of dissemination. Meaning is neither fixed nor complete; 
on the contrary. it flits across endless chains of 
signifiers, always pointing away from itself, and cannot 
finally be 'pinned down' in a way that would allow certain 
meanings to be removed from our common vocabulary by the 
simple act of changing one word for another. Why then 
bother about language at all? If the logic of 
deconstruction leads to the abandonment of the search for 
a 'pure' J non-racist language. is there any point in the 
process of substitution alluded to above where race 
terminology is modified, and certain new terms adopted. 
only to be replaced in turn themselves some time later? 
Within deconstruction, the idea of a once for all switch 
in meaning. in the manner of a gestalt shift, is a 
fantasy. but this is not to say that the process ~f cha~ge 
is without significance. To prefigure a later dlScusSlon 
of ethics {section 5.3ii. below),it could be argued that 
the decision to engage in the kind of linguistic analysis 
that questions the assumptions behind particular prefe~red 
conceptual hierarchies is itself a form of moral-practlcal 
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engagement. Otherwise, we could just accept the 
impossibility of arriving at an 'untainted' form of words, 
and relax! 
The fact that Saussure is not able to 'escape' from the 
conceptual ordering of logocentrism is both demonstrable 
and unsurprising, in Derrida's terms. The evidence of his 
inscription in the prevailing metaphysics is seen in the 
relation between parole and langue found in Saussure's 
work, which follows the logocentric privileging of voice 
or speech over writing.11 Logocentrism, in this sense, is 
also phonocentrism. 
The down-grading of writing at the expense of speech or 
the voice has a long history. Though the use of the word 
'history' is not intended to suggest an originating moment 
when phonocentrism was 'born', Derrida traces this 
phenomenon back as far as Plato, whose work he examines in 
considerable detail. In Of Grammatology and elsewhere, 
Derrida considers the relation between speech and writing; 
in particular, he questions the systematic denigration of 
writing in philosophical works which are themselves, of 
course, written texts. Rorty sums up the situation as 
follows: "'Given that philosophy is a kind of writing, why 
does this suggestion meet with such resistance?' This 
becomes in his [Derrida's] work, the slightly more 
particular question, 'What must philosophers who object to 
this characterization think writing is, that they should 
find the notion that this is what they are doing so 
offensive?'" (Rorty, quoted by Culler, 1983:89). 
One of the objects of philosophy has been to designate and 
understand the fundamental categories of meaning. Derrida 
suggests that the matrix for this historical process has 
been "the determination of Being as presence in all senses 
of the word" (Derrida, 1978:110). The logocentric ideal 
would be the direct contemplation of thought itself but if 
that cannot be, if, that is, thought is always mediated -
by innate ideas, a priori categories, or by language -
then logocentrism demands that language be as transparent 
as possible. And the form in which this transpa~e~cy can 
be achieved is held to be speech, for speech tradltlonally 
belongs to presence. 
For Plato, truth inheres in the 'silent dialogue of the 
soul with itself'. The internal monologue offers an 
instant where the self is truly present to itself, where 
"truth is still pure self-immediacy; it has not yet been 
contaminated by the risk of alienation or confusion" 
(Kearney, 1986:117). Dialogue ~s the model that ~ext ~ost 
closely approximates to the ldeal of full ,and lmmedlate 
self-presence. The example of the conversatlon, where two 
parties are able to hear and ~iscuss each o~hers' 
utterances, provides the speaker wlth the opportunlty to 
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clarify the meaning of what has been said and to correct 
any misinterpretations or ambiguities as they arise. In 
dialogue, words carry a particular meaning and express 
what the s~eaker 'had in mind'; these words convey meaning 
to the llstener who can, in principle at least, come to 
understand the speaker's full and exact intention. 
The ability to simultaneously hear and understand oneself 
speak12 puts speech 1n a special relationship with 
mean; ng: "The ; nward Voi ce puts the utterance and its 
r~ce~tion ri~ht up against each other, absolutely adjacent 
wlth,n a s1ngle consciousness; no medium, not even an 
interval of air divides them" (Harland, 1987:126). Writing 
introduces a level of mediation that allows, indeed 
forces, this intimate bond to be dissolved. Writing, 
conceived as the physical or graphic representation of 
speech, falls into all the traps that voice, in the 
logocentric world, avoids. Typically, it takes the form of 
"physical marks that are divorced from the thought that 
may have produced them. It characteristically functions in 
the absence of a speaker, gives uncertain access to a 
thought, and can even appear as wholly anonymous, cut off 
from any speaker or author" (Culler, 1983:100). 
Writing challenges the spoken word's claim to full, 
self-identical meaning, and raises the unwelcome 
possibility of meaning cut loose from the speaker's or 
author's intention. A written text continues to signify 
whatever the author subsequently thinks about the matterj 
it can be read at any temporal or geographical distance 
from the authorial 'source'; even the death of the author 
cannot end the process. In her Introduction to Oerrida's 
Dissemination, Johnson writes, "This inclusion of death, 
distance and difference is thought to be a corruption of 
the self-presence of meaning, to open meaning up to all 
forms of adulteration which immediacy would have 
prevented" (Derrida, 1981). Meaning can, in this sense, 
become alienated from itself with the result that, thus 
divorced from the controlling presence of the original 
intention, it becomes, in principle at least, plural. 
So far from being the inert, technical representation of 
speech, writing has the power to undermine speech; it 
poses a threat to the unity of meaning that logocentrism 
would maintain. In this view, writing is considered a 
parasitic form of language use, a derivative or secondary 
form dependent on the 'meaning-fulness' of speech. 
Writing, then, belongs to absence. Derrida however 
challenges this equation and argues that presence is 
already always inhabited by difference. Writing assumes 
the absence of both the author and the object of the text 
but speech, too, involves the possibility of.absen~e: 
"it requires an asymmetry, a difference, between lntentlon 
and intuition, just as writing does" (Hoy, 1978:81). 
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This asymmetry arise from the fact that to have meaning a 
spoken sentence must in principle be understandable in the 
absence of the particular intention or perception that 
prompted it; otherwise it could not be understood by 
someone who does not share that original experience. The 
sentence 'I see Jane' continues to signify whether or not 
anyone else hearing it has seen or knows the person 
concerned. It "has to be understandable by someone who 
does not have that particular perceptual presence. The 
intention of speaking is only accountable in terms of the 
possibility of this absence, not in terms of the intuition 
alone, for this presence would never give rise to the need 
to speak" (Hoy, 1978:81). Derrida turns the assumed 
priority of speech over writing on its head and claims 
that writing, far from being dependent on speech, is the 
necessary or enabling condition of speech. Speech and 
writing, in this unusual sense, both fall within a kind of 
general writing or larche-writing' .13 
iii) Language, logocentrism and meaning. 
Derrida uses Saussure's theory of difference to launch his 
critique of logocentrism and the metaphysics of presence, 
although he then goes on to show how Saussure himself 
remains within that very tradition - demonstrated in part 
through the way in which he privileges speech over writing 
(Norris, 1991 :26-32); in Derrida's analysis, as discussed 
above, phonocentrism is closely allied to logocentrism. 
His extension of the ideas of Saussure and his challenge 
to established metaphysics is captured in an observation 
by Moi which is worth quoting in full: for Derrida, 
"language is structured as an endless deferral of meaning, 
and any search for an essential, absolutely stable meaning 
must therefore be considered metaphysical. There is no 
final element, no fundamental unit, no transcendental 
signified that is meaningful in itself and thus escapes 
the ceaseless interplay of linguistic deferral and 
difference. The free play of signifiers will never yield a 
final, unified meaning that in turn might ground and 
explain all the others" (Moi, 1985:9). In the rest of 
this section, I will try to unpack some of the ideas 
contained in Moi's comment quoted above by looking at 
Derrida's use of a number of 'key' terms.14 
The characteristic use made by Derrida of the terms 
'centre' and 'presence' derive from his analysis of the 
logocentrism that he sees supporting the Western 
metaphysical tradition. Logocentrism, as the earlier 
discussion indicated, demands fixed meanings held in place 
by some extra-systemic guarantor - a centre around which 
meaning turns, a guiding principle that points either back 
to an origin or forward to an absolute end; Derrida does 
not specify that it must be one rather than the other, and 
lists a number of terms as candidates for this position 
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(1978, in Lodge, 1988:110). The factor uniting them is, he 
s~gges~s, that each has been used to designate an 
"1nvarlable presence" (ibid:110); all, that is to say, 
represent "extra-systemic entities, points of reference or 
c~ntres of a~thority w~ich escape from that play of 
dlfference WhlCh, followlng Saussure, Derrida believes to 
be the sole source of meaning" (Hawthorn, 1992:140). 
Hawthorn's comment underlines the importance of 
'difference' and, indeed, differance, to Derrida's thory 
of language and meaning. Saussure moved linguistics in a 
new direction in breaking with the traditional view of 
language as reflecting either external reality or internal 
mental processes and theorising language instead as a 
system of differences with no fixed terms. Eagleton 
(1983:127-132) succinctly summarises Saussure's position, 
and then outlines Derrida's challenge to it, his attempt 
to crack open the unity of the sign - the link between 
signifier and signified - exposing meaning as an effect of 
the continuous movement of the signifier. 
Briefly, the argument runs as follows: a signifier has 
meaning only in relation to other signifiers within a 
language system; its identity is a matter of what it is 
not, that is, its difference from other possible and 
actual signifiers. So far. we are following Saussure. But 
whereas the concept of synchrony committed Saussure to a 
view of language as a closed system of unified signs, 
Derrida argues that language is an altogether messier 
affair where the status of the signified itself is called 
into question. Far from there being a neatly symmetrical 
relationship between a given signifier and its signified, 
rather, the signified "is really the product of a complex 
interaction of signifiers, which has no obvious end-point" 
(Eagleton, 1983: 127). 
Meaning, then, does not inhere in the signified. The 
signified does not exist as an 'in-itself'; it is merely a 
form of short-hand, a way of giving meaning to a 
potentially limitless chain of signifiers, each one 
referring endlessly away from itself. To illustrate this 
point, one could use the example of looking up a word in a 
dictionary. The dictionary offers a 'definition' - but 
only in the form of more words, anyone of which could in 
turn be looked up in the same or other dictionaries, and 
so on. The concept or signified itself is not made 
manifest in any other way than through language, which is 
where it remains. In this way, Derrida rethinks the 
traditional concept of signification itself, such that 
"signification does not present or represent some original 
presence; the very notion of presence is itself an 
effect produced by signification" (Kearney, 1986:116). 
Accepting Derrida's Vlew of language involves trying to 
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let go of some of the more deep-rooted principles of 
logocentrism concerned with fixed, full and absolute 
meaning, though this ;s not to say that the idea of 
establishing any meaning 1n a given situation is lost. 
Derrida argues that meaning is context bound but as 
cont~x~ itself is in principle infinite it cannot'provide 
a .llmlt to the possibilities of meaning. His position on 
thlS is c~ear: "This is my starting point: no meaning can 
be determlned out of context, but no context permits 
saturation" ( Oerrida, quoted by Culler, 1983:81). 
On this understanding, meaning is never stable or settled 
for all time, as "signifying is nothing more or less than 
signifiers in motion" (Harland, 1987:135). Language 
operates in the mode of dissemination, a term Derrida uses 
to suggest the way language (necessarily) always 'spills 
over' any attempt to curtail the play of signification. 
It is "an endless shifting from sign to sign which can 
never be terminated or fixed by reducing the signifying 
process to some transcendental starting-point or 
end-point" (Kearney, 1986:116). 
The impossibility of meeting the logocentric ideal of 
complete self-identical or self-present meaning is 
explored further by Oerrida through the notion of 
differance, a neologism which draws on two French verbs -
'to differ~ and 'to defer' for its sense, while 
remaining poised between both of them. The dependence of 
language on 'difference' was amply demonstrated by 
Saussure; but there is another dimension to the process of 
signification, an element of 'deferring' or postponement 
that is unaviodable. The sign, as one element in a system 
of differences, silently draws attention to the absence of 
everything from which it has been differentiated, a 
phenemomenon Derrida refers to as 'spacing' (1976:68ff). 
At the same time, it is a feature of the sign that it must 
remain different from itself, in the sense that it cannot 
literally bring to presence that which it signifies; as 
Young observes, "a sign for something must imply that 
thing's absence (just as a copy must be different from an 
original in order to be a copy. or a repetition can never 
be an exact repetition, otherwise it would be the thing 
itself). Representation never re-presents, but always 
defers the presence of the signified" (Young, 1981:15). 
The inability of the sign ever to 'catch up' with the 
thing it signifies, the necessary lag or slippage in 
language that prevents the sign form coinciding with 
itself in "a moment of perfect, remainderless grasp" 
(Norris, 1987:15) - it is these ideas that the element of 
'deferral' in differance suggests. 
iv) Deconstructive reading. 
Derrida's analysis of language gives rlse to a view of the 
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nature of meaning that is at odds with our 'common sense' 
understanding of the world. Meaning no longer belongs to 
our words and concepts in the way we, influenced as we are 
by the prevai~ing logocentrism of Western thinking, have 
been led to belleve. Following Derrida, meaning is pursued 
through engagement with text, which in turn draws 
attention to modes of reading. This points us, in part, to 
the domain of literary criticism which will be explored in 
chapter six, where I examine various approaches to reading 
and textual criticism. My purpose here ;s to explain the 
kind of approach to reading that is promoted when 
Derrida's understanding of language is applied to texts. 
Logocentrism, in Derrida's analysis, is characterised by a 
search for origins, foundations or "first principles" 
which, as Eagleton observes, are "commonly defined by what 
they exclude" (1983:132). Thus, as we have observed, 
logocentrism tends to structure discourse around a "loaded 
system of binary distinctions" (Norris, 1987:34); Norris 
identifies three such distinctions - or oppositions, as 
they more properly appear namely, presence/absence, 
speech/writing, origin/supplement, and we might add others 
to this basic list: nature/culture, male/female, and 
white/black. I described these as 'oppositions' because in 
each case a hierarchy is maintained, with one term in the 
pairing occupying a privileged position in relation to the 
other;15 one term is defined as the key concept against 
which the other is negatively defined. 
Derrida proposes to disrupt the fixed order governing 
logocentric theories of language, consciousness and 
subjectivity in which "signs have an already fixed meaning 
recognized by the self-consciousness of the rational 
speaking subject" (Weedon, 1987:25), through a process of 
close or deconstructive reading which aims initially to 
reverse, and ultimately to Ire-inscribe' these 
hierarchical oppositions. This, in Derrida's analysis, 
opens the way to a new 'science' of language 
grammatology and a new practice for reading which 
focusses minutely on 'the text' .16 Indeed in a certain 
sense, for Derrida, the text is all we have; as he 
d k "7'7' d asserts, in a much-quote remar J n y a pas e 
hors-texte".17 
How then to characterise a deconstructive reading? It is 
perhaps easier to state with a degree of certainty what 
deconstruction or a deconstructive reading is not, than 
what it actually is though even a move of this kind 
risks merely reinscribing us in the very system of 
oppositions that Derrida posits running through and 
shaping our 'everyday' thinking. 18 At the least, however, 
it could be said that "deconstruction does not elucidate 
texts in the traditional sense of attempting to gra~p a 
unifying content or theme" (Culler, 1983:109). The obJect 
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of a deconstructive reading is not to come up with 'the 
mean~ng'. of ,a given text; the possibility of univocal 
meanlng 1S reJected by an analysis of language that denies 
an end to the movement of signifiers ;n the signification 
process. The ,inherent instability of signs points away 
f~om ,any, f1nal closure of meaning in favour of 
dlssemlnatlon, or an endless 'overspilling' of meaning. 
This is not to say that deconstruction endorses an 
approach to the text where 'anything goes' - as some 
critics have assumed, and some adherents apparently 
hoped. 19 Deconstruction suggests that the 'free play' of 
meaning differs significantly from complete arbitrariness 
or wilful nihilism. and is inextricably linked to the 
text. Close reading~ if the term is to have any currency 
at all, must imply an attention to the words on the page, 
the form and content of the text. We do not have to follow 
the path of the New Critics20 and elevate the text to 
transcendental status to allow for the possibility of 
meaning. This reference to the New Critics points us again 
towards the general sphere of literary criticism, which is 
where the impact of deconstruction has perhaps been most 
k e e n 1 y f e 1 t , 2 1 and wh i c h rna y, inc 0 n s eq u en c e , fur n i sh us 
with a clearer picture of the role, strategy and effect of 
deconstructive reading. 
To return to the idea of deconstructive reading, Con Davis 
and Schliefer offer the following formulation: "A 
deconstructive critique examines and tests the assumptions 
supporting intellectual insight in order to interrogate 
the 'self-evident' truths on which they are based. It 
tests the legitimacy of the contextual 'bounds' that 
understanding both presents and requires. Rather than 
seeking a way of understanding, a way of incorporating new 
phenomena into coherent existing or modified models, 
deconstructive critique seeks to uncover the unexamined 
axioms that give rise to those models and their 
boundaries" (1991:152). 
5.3 Beyond the hermeneutics of tradition. 
In this section, I wish to continue the process outlined 
at the end of the Introduction to this chapter, and 
examine aspects common to the hermeneutics of both Gadamer 
and Derrida, highlighting the ways in which the latter's 
understanding complements but then - more particularly -
goes beyond the former's. To this end, the discussion will 
focus on the three features of hermeneutic understanding 
identified in the earlier exploration of Gadamer's ideas, 
namely i) the role of t~adition; ii) t~e place of,~~hic~ 
or moral knowledge 1n understandlng; and 111) 
'linguisticality' (Sprach7ichkeit) as the basic mode of 
human existence" (Dallmayr and McCarthy, 1977:287). 
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i) The inevitable involvement in tradition. 
The role and, importance of tradition in Gadamer's thinking 
has been dlscussed at some length in the preceding 
chapter, so I will only make brief reference here in order 
to emphasise the centrality of the concept of tradition to 
his account of understanding. For Gadamer, understanding 
is always partial and finite, an act of interpretation 
that, takes place from within~ and is governed by, the 
partlcular perspective of the interpreter. The interpreter 
lS never able to approach the object of understanding in 
an attitude entirely free from preconception, because the 
ability to appreciate the object as an object already 
presupposes some prlor orientation towards that object, 
some context in which to situate it. And the conceptual 
framework, the orienting perspective, is derived from the 
individual's involvement in a particular cultural or 
social/historical matrix or tradition. 
Understanding is dialogic and is achieved, ln Gadamer's 
phrase, through a 'fusion of horizons' in which the 
interpreter's own point of view, informed by a particular 
set of prejudices (in the special sense in which Gadamer 
uses this word), meets and engages with that of the 
dialogue partner. Involvement in tradition is then the 
necessary precondition for any act of understanding, but 
at the same time the limiting condition on that 
understanding; our viewpoint must always remain 
restricted, circumscribed by the very tradition that 
generated it. 
One of the problems associated with Gadamer's 
hermeneutics, as the earlier discussion suggested, was the 
apparent absence of considerations of power and dominance 
in the process of achieving understanding. Power relations 
include the possibility of exploiting language's capacity 
to suppress as well as illuminate. Gadamer draws on the 
concept of a7etheia to discuss the relationship of 
disclosure and concealment that characterises the search 
for understanding. Derrida's position is that language 
itself has this double nature. And further, he suggests 
that any text carries within it the potential for its own 
deconstruct ion: "One can say a pri ori that in every 
proposition or in every system of semiotic research ... 
metaphysical presuppositions coexist with critical ,moti~s. 
And this by the simple fact that up to a certaln pOlnt 
they inhabit the same language" (Derrida, 1987:36). 
with Gadamer the idea of inevitable 
a tradition, but draws different Derrida shares involvement in 
conclusions about 
also led to promote 
Gadamer, he argues 
language, and that 
the nature of that involvement; he is 
different strategies for action. Like 
that there is no position outside 
language itself is never neutral; it 
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has always been thoroughly 'worked over' by the structure 
or ~et~ork of existing concepts which appear, to use 
Derr1da s term (1976), as 'traces' within it. 
The deconstructive critic is obliged to use the language 
that is available to her and to use the practice of 
deconstruction to "transform concepts, to displace them, 
to turn them against their presuppositions to reinscribe 
them in other chains, and little by littl~ to modify the 
terrain of our work and thereby produce new 
configurations" (Derrida, 1987:24). But in the meantime -
and of course, for Derrida, this process of producing "new 
configurations" is potentially endless, as each new 
formation will in turn be open to the same treatment that 
produced it the language we use is 'tainted', and can 
never be otherwise. Deconstruction offers no metalanguage 
or metacritique, but remains heavily implicated in the 
very system it challenges. And it is perhaps this element 
of challenge or permanent questioning that marks 
deconstruction from the more conservative hermeneutics of 
Gadamer. 
For Derrida, tradition (as in 'the Western metaphysical 
tradition') is conceived as a set or sequence of 
conceptual hierarchies, held in place by a kind of 
violence. 22 This suggests one possible site for 
intervention in the race and social work debate - at least 
to the extent that this debate is framed in terms of the 
engagement with otherness. It points towards a different 
relationship with otherness from that presupposed by 
Gadamer's hermeneutics, where the recognition of otherness 
involves making an ethical commitment to the 'object of 
understanding'. The hermeneutics of tradition asks only 
that we engage open-mindedly and even-handedly with the 
Other in order to reach agreement about the matter at 
hand. Derrida's analysis shifts the terms on which this 
engagement takes place such that, within logocentrism, the 
hierarchical ordering of concepts dictates that otherness 
is construed as an absence, a loss or lack, as the 
repository for that which the Self is not. The Other is 
not a neutral term, but already carries with it a freight 
of meaning; it already occupies a position of inferiority, 
secondariness, supplementarity, 1n relation to the 
superior term, the Self. 
Logocentrism encourages a way of thinking that sees the 
world in terms of 'either ... or', and decides unequivocally 
which is the preferred side of the divide in any given 
case. Derrida is not suggesting that we can unilaterally 
break with this habit of thought, as the earlier 
discussion made clear; rather, his approach urges caution 
or scepticism when faced with any such 'o~vi~us' or 
'commonsense' pairing as 'self / other', and a w1ll1ngness 
to investigate the assumptions which sustain that 
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division. ,Derrida takes up the idea of the supplement - a 
term .app'~ed by Rousseau to writing to explore the 
rel~tlonshlp between speech and writing - and uses the 
l~glC o~ supp1ementarity to explore the oppositional 
hlerarchles of logocentrism. 
Young (1981:17-18) offers the following account of 
supplementarity, drawing on Oerrida's example from 
Rou~se~u: "The supplement is both a surplus, 'a plenitude 
enrlchlng another plenitude, the fullest measure of 
presence', but also adds 'only to replace'. It adds to 
speech. but also displaces it as a substitute. Derrida's 
analysis explores the strange logic involved here. An 
inside/outside opposition (speech/writing) has to 
introduce a third term (the supplement) in order to 
produce a sense of the very thing that the supplement 
defers (presence). Yet the supplement is not in fact a 
third term at a11 J since it partakes of and transgresses 
both sides of the 'opposition' .... Its effect is to undo 
the closure of the 'logocentric' oppositions of texts".23 
While the practice of deconstruction involves an attempt 
at "disorganizing the entire inherited order" (Derrida J 
1987:42) of concepts, he never suggests that this can be 
done from anywhere other than a position firmly rooted in 
the very order it challenges. "This double procedure of 
systematically employing the concepts or premises one is 
undermining puts the critic in a position not of skeptical 
detachment but of unwarrantable involvement" (Culler, 
1983:87-88) . 
The presumption in favour of the authority of tradition 
gives way. with Derrida J to a relentless questioning of 
the bases on which that authority is claimed. The 
tradition, and the conceptual apparatus that supports it, 
is viewed with suspicion. and interrogated to elicit not 
only the meanings it asserts but also those that it denies 
or suppresses. I have already remarked on the process of 
reversal and reinscription that Derrida employs to 
striking effect, unpacking or dismantling the cardinal 
oppositions of a given text "to the point where opposition 
itself - the very ground of dialectical reason - gives way 
to a process where opposites merge ;n a constant 
undecidable exchange of attributes" (Norris, 1987:35). 
What I wish to discuss here is perhaps best described as 
the 'strategy' that the use of such a process calls 
forth. 
It is difficult to write about deconstructive practice in 
the abstract, as it were, without reducing it to mere 
formulas mechanical processes that can be engaged to 
produce 'certain (and in some ways, rather predictable) 
textual effects. 24 However J I shall .p~o~eed in th~ hope 
that an awareness of this danger mlnlmlses the rlsk of 
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falling too far into it. Thus, in what follows, the focus 
will be on strategy, as I indicated, in particular the way 
Derrida approaches the task of close reading. 
Such a reading involves the attempt to seek out "that 
obscure yet inescapable logic by which the text 
deconstructs its own most rooted assumptions" (Norris, 
1987:37) and proceeds, in typically contrary or subversive 
style, by approaching the text 'from the margins'. Culler 
places his comments on marginality in the context of a 
broader discussion of "grafts and graft", describing an 
operation "which takes a minor, unknown text and grafts it 
onto the main body of the tradition, or else takes an 
apparently marginal element of a text, such a footnote, 
and transplants it to a vital spot" (1983:139-140). So two 
modes are distinguished: marginality can operate either at 
the level of choice of text or at the level of the 
construction of the chosen text itself - the details of 
metaphor and other rhetorical figures, footnotes, passing 
comments and so on. 
The focus on the marginal produces the recurring double 
movement that has been identified in deconstructive 
practice. It not only reverses the previous order of 
centrality/marginality, but calls into question the very 
grounds of the opposition between centre and margin, 
essential and inessential, inside and outside that 
previous readings have maintained. The elevation of the 
marginal is in itself only a passing - though essential -
stage and is not intended simply to establish the old 
periphery as a new centre. Rather, it is an attempt to 
subvert the hierarchy of centre/margin, by rethinking the 
terms of the opposition. What, after all, is a centre if 
it can be displaced to the margins in this way? The 
potential relevance of this emphasis on the marginal has 
not been lost on feminist critics, who have taken the 
opportunity to exploit their position on the edges of 
academia and the 'lit crit' establishment. 25 And it seems 
to me, in relation to the concerns of this thesis, that 
this approach offers something both to black critics and 
readers of 'black' texts, a point I will return to in the 
next chapter. 
ii) The ethical moment in understanding. 
The ethical nature of hermeneutic enquiry is captured by 
Gadamer in the idea of phronesis; it is through the 
exercise of phronesis, or moral-practical knowledge, that 
the critic is able to engage with the Other and achieve 
understanding. This, in brief, is the position explored,in 
much greater detail in c~apter four. ,So the suggest1~n 
that hermeneutics has an eth1cal moment 1S well-founded 1n 
relation to what I have called hermeneutics' 'traditional' 
mode. The question to pursue here, then, is whether or not 
deconstruction has an equivalent ethical moment. 
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A cr;~;c;sm frequently levelled against deconstruction is 
t~at 1tS c~ara~ter~st;c concern with text and textuality, 
w1th the 1ntrlcac1es of language and tricks of rhetoric 
removes the critic/reader from any serious engagement with 
the 'real world' and all its problems. While Derrida's own 
work remains ~nalytically extremely rigorous, he 
nonetheless hapP1ly exploits the ambiguities or 'play' of 
language26 and pushes conventional ideas about the 
organisation of text to the limit.27 And it is this 
playful, creative aspect of his work that has become 
associated with certain American literary critics - for 
example, Hartman and Hillis Miller - who exemplify what 
Norris has called the "dizzy, exuberant side" of 
deconstruction (Norris, 1991:91). 
Consideration of the 'ludic' dimension of deconstruction 
may lead one to ask whether there is, after all, anything 
to this form of criticism. Once we have admired the 
interpretive pyrotechnics of its more skilled proponents, 
are we left with anything other than "a form of sterile 
showing-off that finally alienates people" (Salusinszky, 
1987:166)? One answer might be that while the ludic 
version of deconstruction is undoubtedly flamboyant and 
most conscious of itself as performance, as an approach to 
the (literary) text, it challenges the traditional 
boundary between 'creative' and 'critical' writing and 
celebrates "an open-ended free play of style and 
speculative thought, untrammelled by 'rules' of any kind" 
(Norris, 1991:91). But it has also provided ammunition for 
those like, for example, Edward Said28 - who feel that 
textual analYSis should not become divorced from wider 
social practices. 
So the question remains: does deconstruction have any 
bearing on matters of ethical or political significance? 
In an interesting series of interviews, Salusinszky (1987) 
questioned a number of established literary critics about 
the possible social function of criticism. In relation 
specifically to deconstruction, one of the most 
illuminating contributions comes from Barbara Johnson. 
Johnson responds to a comment that suggests that 
deconstructive criticism does not imply any form of 
political engagement unlike, for example, Marxist 
criticism. 29 And her reply, though it is not programmatic, 
clearly locates deconstruction 'in the world', in an 
attitude of political engagement: "There's no political 
program, but I think there's a political attitude, which 
is to exami ne authori ty ; n 1 anguage, and the 
pronouncements of any self~co~stituted ~uthority f~r what 
it is repressing or what lt 15 not saY1ng" (Salus1nszky, 
1987:167). From this point of view, th~ political sco~e of 
deconstruction is enormous and, lndeed, potent1ally 
endless. In Otobiographies, Derrida shows how this 
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attitude. of questioning has implications for 
undertandlng of established political 'facts' (in 
case, the American Declaration of Independence).3o 
our 
this 
Hillis Miller takes up the charge of political and ethical 
detachment that has been levelled against deconstruction. 
In the sense that "there is a political facet to 
everything one does in the university" (Salusinszky, 
1987:213), he clearly believes that involvement in such an 
insti~ution renders his own activities political, but he 
questlons the assumption that there is a direct political 
effect or intervention in the act of reading, teaching or 
criticising particular texts. He argues that any effect is 
likely, rather, to be indirect, and therefore harder to 
identify. So he turns instead to "what is more direct, and 
has more to do with one person face to face with another: 
namely, ethics" (Salusinszky, 1987:213).31 
There is, I would argue, no necessary ethical correlate 
for the questioning attitude implied by deconstruction. It 
would not be too far-fetched to suggest that 
deconstructive criticism in its ludic variation could be 
seen as positively amoral in its restless play through 
endless chains of signifiers, where play seems to be an 
end in itself. But this is not to say that deconstruction 
must lack any ethical direction. 32 Observation of social 
inequalities and repressions, with a consequent 
unwillingness to accept the status quo, may provide the 
jumping-off point for the type of enquiry that 
deconstruction promotes one that offers a quizzical 
perspective on the everyday assumptions, including the 
moral/ethical principles, by which we order our lives. 
Johnson, again, offers an apposite comment: "one of the 
things that is essential ... is to put in question exactly 
where it is you're standing, to be doing the activity 
you're doing: what are the boundaries you are assuming for 
your activity, what are those boundaries safeguarding and 
what are they opening?" (Salusinszky, 1987:158) 
Deconstructive criticism need not entail a retreat from 
the world or an avoidance of ethical issues, as Derrida's 
own work on racism confirms.33 Racism, as a site where 
politics and ethics collide, offers an interesting 
test-bed for deconstruction, and it will be part of the 
task of the remaining three chapters of this thesis to 
show how this form of criticism can contribute to an 
understanding of the workings of racism and the challenges 
of anti-racism through a study of selected texts. 
iii) Linguisticality. 
In Truth and Method, Gadamer expresses in unequivocal 
terms his belief in the central role of language in 
organising human understanding: "Language is not just one 
of man's possessions in the world, but on it depends the 
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fact that man has a world at all" (1975:401). 
Understanding always takes place from within a tradition 
which provides the language, the whole conceptual 
apparatus within which individual experience is framed, 
and a set of guiding 'prejudices' or orientations towards 
'the world'. Gadamer does not propose that tradition is a 
hermetically sealed entity, nor that it is monolithic. 
Hermeneutic understanding is the result of successful 
mediation between two different points of view about a 
matter at hand, mediation which takes the form of a 
conversation between the parties concerned to reach an 
agreement about the particular subject. Understanding, as 
Gadamer expresses it, is dialogiC. 
Given the centrality of metaphors of speech and VOlce ln 
Gadamer's work, the emphasis on dialogue and conversation, 
the choice of translation as the preferred model for the 
process of understanding, the approving references to 
Plato and his dialogic style of argument - can it be 
concluded that Derrida's critique of phonocentrism applies 
equally to Gadamer's work as to the others he explicitly 
challenges? After all, Gadamer seems to have adopted the 
phonocentric bias that prioritises speech at the expense 
of writing, and to have done so in a work explicitly 
concerned with problems of textual meaning. 
Hoy's approach is to maintain that the positions espoused 
by Gadamer and Derrida are more closely involved than this 
possible criticism of Gadamerian hermeneutics would imply; 
he suggests "that Gadamer's and Derrida's views supplement 
each other because both thinkers are engaged in the same 
critical attack on metaphysical assumptions about truth, 
method, and absolute self-certainty" (Hoy, 1978:79). I 
would accept Hoy's claim that Gadamer's and Oerrida's 
views supplement each other but would adopt a different 
position from which to explore the relation between the 
hermeneutics of tradition and deconstruction. 
For Hoy, Derrida's thinking is more radical than 
Gadamer's, but not necessarily incompatible with it. He 
takes Derrida's re-interpretation of the relationship 
between speech and writing to provide a way of saving the 
idea of dialogue with a written text: "Hearing and reading 
are no longer so disanalogous, for hearing is also a kind 
of reading - an interpretation of the universality of the 
proposition in terms of the concreteness of the situation" 
(ibid :82). 
But rather than trying to 'fit' Derrida's insights into a 
Gadamerian framework, I would suggest that these two 
approaches be considered complementary, or "s~pplementar~" 
to one another, in the sense that Derrlda uses thlS 
term.34 They occupy a particular relation to one another 
that is perhaps most closely analogous to that of content 
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and form in literary criticism: Gadamer's hermeneutics is 
concerned with what a text means, and deconstruction with 
explicating how a text means. 35 But, to put it crudely, 
form requires content just as much as content requires 
form. An attempt to deconstruct the pairing of 
form/content would show the indissoluble link between the 
two terms, and the essential undecidability into which 
they collapse. Neither approach is complete in itself, but 
hermeneutic understanding of the type sought by Gadamer 
can be illuminated by the critical approach to language 
adopted by Derrida, and vice versa. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NOTES 
1. Hillis Miller (1977) provides an example of 
deconstructive criticism which includes an analysis of the 
metaphor of links in a chain. 
2. See Hoy (1978) on the relationship between Gadamer's 
and Derrida's thinking; though in this connection also 
see Norris (1985:chapter one) for a discussion which' links 
Derrida with Habermas in preference to Gadamer. 
3. These two strands are presented as separate for the 
purpose of exposition but, as will become clearer, they 
are deeply intertwined. Where necessary, I have risked 
repetition for the sake of clarity. 
4. Levi-Strauss's work is discussed ln Derrida 
(1976:101ff); see also Leitch (1983:chapter two). 
5. Though, according to Hawthorn (1992:175), this is not a 
wholly accurate representation of Saussure who, he claims, 
did not dismiss the historical. 
6. Within this strand, the works of Cixous, Irigary and 
Kristeva figure prominently; these three authors are 
discussed by Moi (1985:95-173) who provides a clear 
introduction to their different approaches. 
7. This approach is strongly associated with Foucault; for 
a sympathetic account of his work, see Sheridan (1980). 
Foucault's understanding of the relations between 
discourse, knowledge and power has influenced contemporary 
literary criticism and theory. For example, see Belsey 
(1983:399-410) or Weedon (1987). Weedon adopts a 
Foucauldian approach on the grounds that a 'politically 
aware' poststructuralism "must pay full attention to the 
social and institutional context of textuality in order to 
address the power relations of everyday life" (1987:25). 
The assumption here, one that I do not share, is that 
poststructuralism can only be politically radical in 
Foucauldian vein. Derrida's deconstruction is sidelined, 
as lacking in political effectiveness. But other analyses, 
which I shall explore elsewhere in this chapter, suggest 
that a Derridean perspective need not be politically 
disengaged. 
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8. Min~f~l, as one must be, that the temptation to search 
for orlglns, foundations, transcendental moments is all 
part.o~ the logocentrism that Derrida identifies with this 
tradltlon. 
9. I discuss the notion of differance in the next section, 
so at this stage use the term without further expansion. 
10. Though it need not be. Political correctness can 
become oppressive in its own way, by attempting to stifle 
certain uses of language in favour of other more 
lacceptable' ones leaving open the question of who 
defines this accptability. 
11. See Derrida (1976:27-73). 
12. In French, the construction s'entendre parler carrles 
both meanings or connotations. 
13. The idea of larche-writing' (archi-ecriture) is 
discussed by Derrida in Of Grammatology (1976:60ff), and 
also in an essay on Freud's Note on the mystic writing 
pad (1978:196-231). Through an exploration of the 
metaphors of writing in Freud's work, Derrida presents a 
view of the unconscious mind as constituted, in a special 
sense, by writing. Norris summarises this position as 
follows; "As Derrida shows, the entire Freudian topology 
of unconscious meaning depends on such notions as 'trace', 
'spaci ng' , 'di fference' and others whose pl ace can be 
found only within a graphic system of representation" 
(1991 :123). It is in this context that Derrida uses the 
idea of 'arche-writing', a writing 'in' the brain that, as 
the condition of all linguistic systems, precedes any and 
all speech as well as physical writing. 
14. I am uncomfortably aware, of course, that the very 
designation of certain terms as 'key' is itself 
suspicious, smacking of the very logocentrism that Derrida 
sets out to challenge. The difficulty of examining words 
in this way is also discussed by Norris (1987:15-16). 
Derrida's own habit is to use 'essential' terms, but at 
the same time to put them 'under erasure' (sous rature) , 
to indicate their provisional and tentative status, 
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. The idea of 
using, while simultaneously suspending the meaning of, 
particular terms in this way is borrowed by Derrida from 
Heidegger; see Spivak's commentary on this in Derrida 
(1976:xiv-xviii). 
15. See Derrida (1987:41). 
16. It is interesting to note that, in some hways , 
Derrida's return to 'the text' is reminiscent of t e New 
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Critics~ commitment to the written 'work', the autotelic 
art obJect. Johnson comments on this point in Salusinszky 
(1~8~:157-8). Further reference will be made to the New 
CrltlCs bot~ ,b~low and in chapter six. Briefly, though, 
the New Crltlclsm emerged in the 1940s and 1950s and is 
e~emplified in the work of Cleanth Brooks a~d W.K. 
Wlmsatt; they, and others within the New Critical 
approach, were in part responding to the writings of T.S. 
Eliot and I.A. Richards (see Belsey, 1980:15-20). 
17. Though it is here that the difference between 
Derrida's textual ism and that of the New Critics is 
perhaps most sharply demonstrated. Derrida's assertion 
that there is nothing outside text depends on a particular 
Vlew of text which is very much at odds with the idea of 
the self-contained, autonomous work of art sustained by 
the New Critics. Derrida's 'text' is intensely political, 
so IIf i7 n'y a pas de hors-texte' can be asserted on the 
grounds that the realitites with which politics 1S 
concerned, and forms in which they are manipulated, are 
inseparable from discursive structures and systems of 
signification, or what Derrida calls 'the general text'" 
(Cu 11 e r, 1983: 157) . 
18. Indeed, the unavoidable involvement in that 
metaphysical tradition is one of Derrida's strongest 
themes: there is no meta-language, no recourse to concepts 
that have not already been 'worked over' or 'tainted' with 
metaphysical presuppositions. 
19. This is what Norris calls deconstruction "on the wild 
side" (1991 :92), by which he means an approach where the 
emphasis on the ludic element of deconstruction is pursued 
at the expense of the rigour that characterised certainly 
the earlier of Derrida's own work which depended for its 
force on scrupulous attention to the detail of the text 
being studied. 
20. See notes 16 and 17 above, and also section 6.2ii) in 
the following chapter. 
21. The pairing of philosophy and literature is one that 
deconstruction has engaged with most thoroughly. 
Deconstruction challenges the self-assessment and 
self-authorised statues of both philosophy and literature 
proposing instead an understanding in terms of a general 
textuality. 
22. Hierarchies seem to somehow be superimposed on one 
another, with the male/female hierarchy apparently the 
most fundamental as evidenced by the pervading 
phallocentrism of Western cultur~. The influence ,of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis on feminlst poststruct~rallst 
criticism can be seen in the development of the ldea of 
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phallocentrism into "phallogocentrism'" this is discussed 
in Culler (1983:165-177)J Kearney (1986:122) and Hawthorn (1992:129-30). 
23. The idea of supplementarity, 
supplement J is discussed at length 
II, chapters 2-4), particularly with 
of Rousseau. For a commentary on 
particular 'theme' see. for example, 
and Norris (1987:97ff). 
or the logic of the 
by Derrida (1976:Part 
reference to the work 
Derrida's use of this 
Culler (1983:102-106) 
24. 'Predictable' 
criticism, according 
the same. Texts can 
potential for their 
critic is sufficiently 
(1977). 
In the sense that deconstructive 
to its detractors, always comes out 
always be shown to possess the 
own deconstruction if only the 
inventive; see, for example, Abrams 
25. See Culler (1983:43-64) and Mo; (1985). 
26. Both Derrida and also Gadamer draw extensively on the 
idea of play. For Derr;da, the play of language or meaning 
is unstoppable. and is associated in his writings with the 
'concepts' of differance and dissemination. Play, if I can 
put it this way, is then a recurring 'motif' ;n Derr;da's 
'work'. and is thus not readily isolated from the general 
fabric of his texts; but see. for example, Derrida (1978 
and 1987:39-49). 
Play is presented by Gadamer as "the clue to ontological 
explanation" (1979:91) and Truth and Method gives detailed 
consideration to this important concept (see, for example, 
pp91ff); also see Bernstein (1983:120ff). 
27. See, for example, G7as. Living On: Border Lines, and 
The Double Session, whiCh are all discussed by Norris 
(1987:46-64). 
28. Said. himself, owing more to Foucault's analysis of 
power and discourse or discursive formations (see 
Salusinszky, 1987:123ff). 
29. Though see Ryan (1984) 
possible "articualtion" 
deconstruction. 
30. See Norris (1987:194ff). 
for a 
between 
discussion 
Marxism 
of the 
and 
31. The echo of Gadamerian hermeneutics 1n this expression 
seems, to me, striking. 
32. See Buker (1991 :236-244). 
33. See Derrida (1986a and 1986b). 
34. See note 23 above. 
35 See Birch (1989:5ff). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
METHOD AND APPROACH: LANGUAGE, PHILOSOPHY AND READING 
6.1 Introduction. 
In this thesis, I have been advancing a particular view of 
racism, one which treats it as a linguistic or cultural 
resource. At the end of chapter three. I suggested that 
adoption of this view had implications for an 
understanding of the race and social work debate, and in 
the course of that and the following two chapters started 
to tease out the philosophical implications of the 
linguistic resource position for anti-racist social work. 
I took hermeneutic philosophy as the framework for this 
discussion, examining both the hermeneutics of tradition 
associated with Gadamer and the deconstructive approach 
that has been pursued by Derrida, and suggested that 
together these two approaches could provide a basis for 
re-thinking the terms of the race and social work debate. 
Hermeneutics identifies a linguistically based tradition 
into which we are 'thrown'J and which provides the network 
of prejudices and assumptions that each of us uses to 
orientate ourselves in the world. This network operates 
almost at the level of 'background noise'; it is largely 
unthought and unreflective, structuring our perceptions of 
ourselves and others. Social work turns on the involvement 
of a Self (a social worker, for example) with an Other 
(the client). But if the Other is always already 
represented within the governing tradition, then to make 
sense of multi-racial or anti-racist social work practice 
or indeed any relationship with 'difference', however 
conceived - we need a way of conceptual ising the encounter 
with otherness. And this, I have suggested, can be drawn 
from hermeneutics. 
Moving on from philosophical considerations, I would 
suggest that the cultural or linguistic resource position 
also has implications in terms of methodological strategy, 
which it will be the business of this chapter to explore. 
I start with the assumption that part of the process of 
engaging with racism involves being able to identify it 
and understand its function(s). The proposition that 
racism operates as a linguistic resource points towards a 
study of language-in-use (as opposed to linguistics) as a 
way in to this process of engagement. This in turn directs 
us towards the study of examples of language-in-use, or 
texts, which means that we will need a strategy for 
reading. 
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Both Gadamer'S hermeneutics of tradition and Derrida's 
deconstr~ctiv~ method problematise the act of interpreting 
text. Hlstorlcally, hermeneutics originated in the search 
for appropriate principles and methods for biblical 
interpreta~ion, and a central concern with the study of 
text remalns a characteristic feature of Gadamer's work. 
The interest in text is two-fold: each text 'speaks' to us 
from the tradition within which it was produced and thus, 
at one one level, each engagement with the text is also an 
opportunity to engage with a tradition that may be a long 
distance from our own, temporally or culturally. 
But at the same time, the act of interpretation or 
understanding is self-reflective, and the encounter with 
the text in turn throws light on the interpreter's own 
historically- and culturally-constitued frameworks of 
understanding. In relation to Gadamer's work, Dicenso 
writes: "Hermeneutics refers both to acts of textual 
exegesis per se and to an inquiry into the interpretive 
nature of human self-understanding and modes of being. The 
former activity provides a means of revealing the latter. 
Because we are cultural and historical beings who exist 
within linguistically formed worlds, the interpretation of 
texts can disclose modes of being-in-the-world" 
(1990:80-81). 
Deconstruction, as chapter five suggested, is inextricably 
involved with the study of text, though the focus of that 
study is somewhat different from Gadamer's. The textual 
analysis associated with Derridean deconstruction is 
concerned with the rhetorical strategies adopted by, or 
incorporated within, particular pieces of writing; to 
repeat a point made earlier, it deals with how a text 
means. So while hermeneutic understanding depends, in 
broad terms, on textual analysis, the process of analysis 
as well as the idea of text 1 itself is open to a range of 
understandings. Drawing on explicitly literary critical 
sources, the next two sec.t ions look at at di fferent ways 
of conceptual ising reading itself, moving on, in the final 
section of this chapter, to consider the practical 
implications of applying a text-based strategy to 
answering the questions posed earlier in relation to 
social work and race. 
6.2 Reading theories. 
The question of a strategy or method for engaging with 
text - for reading - now arises. Literary criticism is, 
broadly, the discipline in which r~ading as an activity is 
discussed and practised, so thlS can offer a useful 
additional source to draw on in conjunction with the 
consideration of philosophical hermeneutics. So, below, ,I 
present a brief, and highly selective, account of the maln 
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branches of reading theory within literary criticism. 
Approaches to reading vary ln terms of the importance 
~ranted by each to the role of the author, the text 
ltself, o~ the reader in defining or producing meaning. 
The followlng account looks at each of these approaches in 
turn and t~en goes on to consider a fourth approach that 
draws on a dlfferent, less determinate, view of meaning. 
i) Author-oriented reading. 
This involves a search for the (univocal) meaning of the 
text which accurately represents the author's intention 
when producing that text. The work of Hirsch provides an 
example of this type of reading, where meaning is held to 
be directly related to authorial intention. If Gadamer's 
work lS, in part, a response to Schleiermacher's claim 
that "the hermeneut i ca 1 task consi sts in worki ng 
through the language of the text to the thoughts of the 
author, which are both the source of meaning and the goal 
of understanding" (Dicenso, 1990:84), then Hirsch's 
contribution can be seen as an attempt to take the debate 
about textual interpretation full-circle, with a return to 
authorial intention as the guarantor of meaning. Gadamer's 
position can be stated unequivocally: "Not occasionally 
only, but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its 
author" (Gadamer,1979:264), and it is this lack of fixity 
of meaning that Hirsch challenges. 
Eagleton suggests that Hirsch followed Husserl in his 
approach to meaning: "It was a kind of 'ideal' object, in 
the sense that it could be expressed in a number of 
different ways but still remain the same" (Eagleton, 
1983:67). Hirsch allows that a literary work may be 
understood differently by different people and at 
different times, but ascribes these differences to the 
changi ng 'si gni fi cance' of the work, rather than its 
'meaning' which remains both unchanging and objectively 
knowable. "Significances vary throughout history, whereas 
meanings remain constant: authors put in meanings whereas 
readers assign significances" (Eagleton, 1983:67). 
Hirsch attacks what he calls the theory of "cultural 
perspectivism" (Hirsch, 1976:258) - that is, the belief 
that meaning varies with the standpoint of the reader or 
interpreter as based on fallacious premises and 
therefore argues, against the implications of this view, 
that the meaning of a text can be objectively knowable. 
"Textual meaning is not like an elephant or a tree; it is 
not something out there to be approached from different 
points of view. It is not there for the critic in any 
sense until he has construed it" (Hirsch, 1976:259). He 
contends that, prior to adopting any critical a~proach at 
all a critic must first come to some understandlng of the 
marks on the paper before him. And that process of 
constructing meaning depends on a unified, precritical 
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approach without which the critic, of whatever persuaS10n, 
would be unable to understand the text at all 
Hirsch supports this position by analogy with visual 
perception. As an example, he considers the case of two 
people looking at a particular building from different 
vantage points and argues that although the perspectives 
are undoubtedly different, they are nonetheless just that 
- perspectives, partial views of the same building. No one 
view provides the 'whole picture', but each separate view 
refers to the same object. He compares the way visual 
perception 'works' to create a whole image, an object that 
we 'know's from incomplete, partial (perspectival) 
information with the way binocular vision "completes and 
corrects monocular perspective effects" (Hirsch, 
1976:261). We 'know' a whole object, despite only 
physically seeing one view of it. Different perspectives 
indeed exist; but only in relation to the existing 
original object which remains 'the same' and which is 
knowable to all observers. He concludes, "Anyone who takes 
the perspectivist metaphor seriously 1S forced by the 
empirical facts of visual perception to reverse his 
original inference, and conclude that a diversity of 
perspectives does not necessarily compel a diversity of 
understood meanings" (Hirsch, 1976:262). 
Hirsch suggests a way of 'saving' perspectival relativism 
by appeal to the individual meaning categories through 
which each of us 'creates' the object under consideration, 
but then shows how a "paradox of perspectivism" in fact 
points back to meaning residing in the intention or 
consciousness of the author: "As a construction from a 
mute text, meaning has existence only in consciousness. 
Apart from the categories through which it is construed, 
meaning can have no existence at all .... [I]nterpretive 
perspectivism argues for the constitutive nature of 
c u 1 t u r a 1 cat ego r ; e s . I nit s de e pes t s i g n i f i can c e , 
therefore J perspectivism implies that verbal meaning 
exists only by virtue of the perspective which gives it 
existence. And this compels the conclusion that verbal 
meaning can exist from only one perspective" - namely, the 
author's (Hirsch, 1976:262). 
Problems arise with this view of reading at every level: 
how is the reader to know whether she has discovered the 
'true' meaning of a given text, or merely framed an 
understanding that has personal significance? What sign 
denotes an authoritative reading? The problem of trying to 
define what is or was going on inside somebody else's head 
(as distinct from what they say about what is going on) 
has plagued all branches ,of the huma~ities and soc~al 
sciences. 2 Even assuming ,t were poss1ble to estab11sh 
'the intention' guiding the author's creation (and is it 
necessarily the case that each work of literature had only 
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one guiding intention; multiple or conflicting intentions 
could govern a particular piece of behaviour?), how would 
this be made manifest in the text? 
But perhaps the most fundamental problem with 
author-oriented criticism is that it depends on a 
particular and, at the very least, questionable view of 
language. Dicenso sums this up: "In order for the text to 
possess a single determinable meaning that corresponds to 
the intentions of the author, language would have to be a 
pliant tool that is imprinted by the author's mental 
processes. It would have to fixedly retain that impression 
and unambiguously present it to the reader" (Dicenso, 
1990:89). It is this view of language as the direct 
embodiment of the speaker's or author's consciousness, 
fully controlled and determined by that person, and 
therefore, so to speak. 'closed' to further discussion, 
that hermeneutics challenges. 
ii) Close reading: 'New Criticism' and the text. 
The institution of literary criticism in Britain - what 
Easthope calls "Englit" (1991:134ff) - has been dominated 
for the last fifty years by a form of textual analysis 
known as 'New Criticism'. The key points of this criticism 
are summarised succinctly by Weedon: New Criticism is 
marked by "its appeal to fixed moral and political values, 
the critic as the arbiter of these values and literature 
as a privileged mode of access to truth through its 
evocation of 'life'" (Weedon, 1987:139). This view of 
literature as providing unique access to true knowledge 
about human life, the 'human condition', assumes that 
"literature is not 'just' different from other uses of 
language, it is ontologically different" (Birch, 1989:59). 
New Criticism, then, operated a clear categorisation of 
text into 'the literary', which it was valuable to study, 
and the 'non-literary', which could be disregarded. 
Inclusion in the canon of acceptable 'Literature' would 
entail meeting a particular set of aesthetic ideals based 
on specifically literary values and qualities. 
The study of 'literature' - which within New Criticism was 
often even more finely tuned to the study of poetry as the 
perfect example of literary form if conducted by 
suitably trained and sensitive critics, could shed light 
on "fixed universal meanings which enable us to understand 
the 'truth' of human nature, which is itself fixed" 
(Weedon, 1987:139). If only certain texts could.q~alify 
for consideration as 'literature', then the ablllty to 
recognise such texts, and to make the requisite value 
judgements, depended in turn on a particular sensibility 
on the part of the critic whose role would be to expound 
on the meaning of the text for the benefit of the 
'ordinary' reader. So the critic was elevated above the 
common herd of ordinary readers: "Literature is perceived 
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as ~pecial, the language used in literature is considered 
speclal, and the people invOlved in producing literature 
(a~d, literary ,criticism) are considered special ... 
CrltlCs who thlnk along these lines create a priesthood' 
they become guardians of 'poetic truth' and of th~ 
meanings they determine for the texts they study" (Birch, 
1989:63). 
Eagleton, in a very un-New Critical way, locates the 
emergence of this form of textual analysis in a particular 
historical and social context, where an appeal to timeless 
and universal values provided a much sought after moral 
certainty and set of 'anchorage points' for an 
intellectual community facing the aftermath of the first 
Great War.3 New Criticism offered access to objective 
truths about the human condition, access which could be 
derived from assiduous study of a concrete artefact, the 
work of 'literature'. 
Attempts to search out an original, intended meaning for a 
text through historical, biographical or sociological 
studies of the author and his milieu (and with New 
Criticism, the authors of 'great literature' were, with a 
few honourable exceptions, male) were rejected by New 
Critics. Meaning was neither the property of the author 
nor the reader but the text, though the author's claim to 
inclusion 1n the canon rested on his or her ability to 
portray experience as at once uniquely individual and 
uni versa 11 y human: It 'Good 1 i terature' represents the 
expression of individuals who are able to control their 
experiences, compared with the offerings of other people 
who wander aimlessly in a world of uncontrolled 
experiences, pulp novels, mass advertising, and 
celebrations of the mediocre" (Birch, 1989:61). New 
Criticism was nothing if not normative4 
The text itself) the formal features from which it was 
constructed, provided the critic with all he6 needed. "The 
theory of organic unity - 'text-in-itself-relevance' -
does not permit speculation or discussion of anything 
other than the meani ng 'i nherent ' in the text" 
(Birch,1989:86). This led to a form of criticism based on 
'close reading' where strict attention was paid to the 
stylistic and rhetorical details of the text, and all 
matters 'external I to the text - the discursive frameworks 
within which it was created or produced and, at different 
times, read - could all be 'bracketed out'. 
But while New Criticism championed the critical primacy of 
the text against the challenges of author-oriented 
criticism ~ndJ later, reader-response theories of meaning, 
it nonetheless maintained that the proper job of the 
critic was the search for the work's single, true meaning. 
Thus, as Belsey notes, "the continued assumption that 
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meaning is ~ingle, and,the continued quest for a guarantee 
of ~his slngle meanlng results in a conviction that the 
meanlng of any text is timeless universal and 
transhistorical" (Belsey, 1980:18). ' 
iii) Reader-response theories. 
These theories move the responsibility for defining 
meaning away from the author or the text, and ascribe it 
to the reader. In some of its manifestations, however, 
reader theory does not break completely with the search 
for authorial intention, and the procedures it adopts, in 
the end, do not differentiate it very clearly from this 
latter type of reading. 
Slatoff recognised that "texts cannot determine across 
history and for all readers how they are to be read" 
(Belsey, 1980:30), and that the formal properties of a 
work, pace the New Critics, did not hold the key to the 
work's true meaning. The reader (or critic) actually had a 
certain amount of flexibility to create his or her own 
meanings. But Slatoff did not pursue this line of 
reasoning into a full-blooded acceptance of textual 
indeterminacy. Rather, he argued that most readers will in 
fact draw a particular range of meanings from a text 
through following a practice of 'good reading'. Such a 
strategy generates "a 'sympathy' or 'empathy' with what 
finally turns out to have been the intention of the 
'implied author', the 'human presence' in the work" 
(Belsey, 1980:30). Thus, the 'implied author' - who does 
not seem all that far removed from the actual, physical 
author from whom the text derives its meaning and value -
is brought in to curtail the otherwise limitless possible 
readings of a given text. 
Fish, too, takes up the question of authorial intention, 
complementing it with a discussion of the "optimal" or 
"intended" reader, "the reader whose education, opinion, 
concerns, linguistic competences, and so on make him 
capable of having the experiences the author wished to 
provide" (Fish, 1980:320). He understands the search for 
the author's purpose in terms of the experiences of the 
reader, and the effects the text has on him (sic): "as the 
succession of acts readers perform in the continuing 
assumption that they are dealing with intentional beings. 
In this view, discerning an intention is no more or less 
than understanding, and understanding includes (is 
constituted by) all the activities which make up what I 
call the structure of the reader's experience" (Fish, 
ibid:320) . 
So meaning, at least within Fish's framework, becomes a 
product of the experiences of the readers of a particular 
text. It is not a once and for all event, but a process of 
anticipation and retrospective ordering of the experiences 
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provided by the unfolding of the text in the act of 
reading. Meaning, therefore, is fluid and multiple. In 
proposing this view of reading and the creation of 
meaning, Fish is explicit about the assumptions he is 
challenging, namely "the assumption that there is a sense, 
that it is embedded or encoded in the text, and that it 
can be taken in at a single glance" (Fish, ibid:319). He 
argues against both author-oriented and formalist theories 
claiming that the search for intention and the ability to 
define as salient certain features of a text are dependent 
on a prior interpretive commitment. The critic or reader 
is not involved in trying to unearth something, 'meaning', 
which is immanently 'there' in the textj rather, 
"[e}verything in the text - its grammar, meaning formal 
units is a product of interpretation, in no sense 
'factually' given" (Eagleton, 1983:85). 
At one level, Fish's view of "reader-power" (Belsey, 
1980:31) seems to make a decisive break with both the 
author-oriented form of criticism and the formalism of New 
Criticism in offering the reader a role in the creation of 
meaning (in partnership, almost, with the author). But 
for Belsey, Fish's position fails to sustain its potential 
as "a possible basis for a genuinely radical and 
productive critical practice" (ibid:33). For, depite his 
acknowledgement of the centrality of the reader in the 
process of meaning production, Fish does not conclude from 
this that each reader's response may be different, giving 
rise to a range of readings of the same text. The search 
is on again for the work's 'real' meaning, and this is 
attained through the exercise of "literary competence" by 
the "informed reader" in the context of his (sic) 
membership of an "interpretive community".6 
Eagleton makes the point (1983:87-89) that the choice of 
interpretive community is not an entirely free one, and 
that these communities do not necessarily co-exist in an 
environment of peaceful, pluralist debate. Interpretive 
strategies are neither neutral nor innocent. Certain ways 
of reading are sanctioned, for example within academic 
institutions, while others are not given the same social 
licence. There is a degree of flexibility in choosing 
interpretive strategies, but the ones that carry weight 
(academically, socially, within the circles of c~ltural 
criticism) "relate to dominant forms of valuatlon and 
interpretaion in a society as a whole" (Eagleton, 
1983:88). 
6.3 Beyond determinate meaning. 
Recent literary criticism 
hermeneutics, particularly 
though it is interest i ng 
has been much influenced by 
in its 'radical' version-
to note that the one explicit 
146 
att~mpt to apply the techniques of literary criticism to 
soclal work 'reading', Social Work as Art (England 1986) 
relies entirely on the critical strictures of Le~vis and 
Eliot, at the expense of more contemporary approaches.7 
And what these contemporary approaches share lS a 
rejection of the empiricist preoccupation with fixed 
determinate meaning and, in consequence an interest i~ 
the text as discursively produced. ' 
Gadamer's preferred model for the process of engaging with 
a text or other object of understanding is the 
conversation. Understanding, in his analysis, is dialogic. 
In a certain sense then, to fall back into the 
phonocentric idiom, the text 'speaks for itself'. But this 
does not mean that Gadamer grants the text complete 
autonomy in the determination of meaning; as the 
discussion in section 6.2 suggested, the source of meaning 
in a work has been variously located - with the author, 
interpreter/reader, or with the text itself; for Gadamer, 
the interpreter and the text are partners in the process 
of creating meaning, which is always culturally and 
historically specific, and thus never achieves closure. 
This suggests that a text may not be entirely 
transparent,and that 'meaning' is not 'contained' within 
it, like a nut in a nut-shell, awaiting the critic's 
attempts to prise it loose in its entirety. Literary 
critical methods have a role to play in the process of 
close reading8, but attention is no longer directed 
towards finding a work's single and unchanging meaning. 
Post-New Critical readings share an acknowledgement of the 
irreducibly interpretive nature of understanding, denying 
any essential or foundational meaning to texts, literary 
or otherwise. Indeed, some forms of post-structuralist 
criticism would collapse or at least interrogate the 
distinction between literary and non-literary altogether, 
as an arbitrary (and non-neutral) categorisation. Derrida 
takes the problem of understanding into a new phase and 
adopts an approach to text that analyses how, rather than 
simply what, it means. The text is foregrounded again, but 
with an emphasis on the language, the signifying practices 
it adopts. 
Deconstruction has affected literary theory and criticism 
at a number of levels starting, at the most basic, with 
literature's understanding of itself as an autonomous and 
privileged discourse; this, in turn, is part of the 
fundamental reappraisal of a number of critical concepts 
that Culler suggests (1983:180ff), constitutes one of the , . . . 
four "modes of relevance" of deconstructlon V7S a V7S 
literature and literary criticism. He identifies the other 
ways in which deconstruction engages with the general 
discipline of literature "as a source of themes, as an 
example of reading strategies, and as a repository of 
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suggestions about the nature and goals of critical 
inqu~rylt (1983:180-181) and explicates each point in some 
det~1l. In addition, of course J a number of texts exist (aslde from Oerrida's own) which provide either an 
exposition of his arguments and approach to texts,9 or 
examples of deconstruction 'in action' as it were in the 
form of critical analyses of specific (literary) ~orks.10 
From these, and resisting the urge to formulate an 
all-purpose definition that would finally 'net down' 
deconstruction, certain tentative conclusions may be 
drawn: 
Deconstruction proceeds by drawing attention to the detail 
of texts, the language used, the rhetoric deployed to 
achieve particular ends; it investigates the hierarchical 
oppositions which govern a (any) text, and through this 
investigation shows how logocentric meaning is maintained. 
And it is maintained at the expense of the suppression of 
the 'inferior' term of the governing hierarchy or 
hierarchies. Deconstructive practice, then, typically 
involves a double movement: in the first place the 
hierarchical opposition is reversed, allowing the 
previously suppressed term a priority or superiority. But 
this is not taken to be an end in itself. as the 
conceptual system that generated - and still contains -
the opposition, remains. 
Derri da therefore suggests "a ki nd of genera 1 strategy of 
deconstruction ... to avoid both simply neutralizing the 
binary oppositions of metaphysics and simply residing 
within the closed field of those oppositions, thereby 
confirming it" (Derrida,1987:41), 50 that the moment of 
reversal is followed by an attempt to 'reinscribe' the 
opposition in a different order of textual signification, 
to subvert the distinctions on which the opposition is 
grounded to show that the two terms, far from being 
mutually exclusive, are inextricably linked and mutually 
dependent. 
Culler expresses this stage in the critic's or reader's 
activity as follows: "The question for the critic is 
whether the second term, treated as a negative, marginal, 
and supplementary version of the first, does not prove to 
be the condition of possibility of the first. Along with 
the logic that asserts the preeminence of the first te\m, 
is there a contrary logic, covertly at work but emerglng 
at some crucial moment or figure in the text, which 
identifies the second term as the enabling condition of 
the first?fl (1983:213). The implication of this "contrary 
logic" is to collapse the boundaries that have held the 
opposition in place, recognising instead the element ,of 
undecideability always present in language,11 and allowlng 
for the "irruptive emergence of a new 'concept', a concept 
that can no longer be, and never could beJ included in the 
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previous regime" (Derrida, 1987:42).12 
This 1S not to say that the distinctions maintained in 
these hierarchies are not 'real' or that they can just be 
removed with a grand rhetorical flourish. On the contrary, 
they exert a very 'real' force and would provide an 
uncompromising linguistic/conceptual straightjacket - if 
it were not for language's unstoppable urge towards 
dissemination. What Derrida is proposing, is that some of 
the mos~ powerful governing principles of Western thought 
can beg1n to be re-thought through this double process of 
reversal and reinscription. The force of deconstruction 
lies in its capacity to minutely scrutinise the concepts 
that we otherwise take for granted, the ones that 
structure our everyday thinking but remain at the 
unthought 1 evel of 'common sense'. "What is requi red", 
writes Norris (1987:16), "is a kind of internal 
distancing, an effort at defamiliarization which prevents 
those concepts from settling down into routine habits of 
thought". 
A new kind of close reading is common to post-New Critical 
theories of reading, one which draws attention to how the 
text is articulated, and the ways in which how a text does 
something is related to what it does. 13 In all cases, 
attention is focussed on how the text is articulated, with 
deconstructive reading taking particular interest in 
"aporias" or internal contradictions which inevitably 
inhabit the text. The emphasis, then, of post-New Critical 
reading is on the interplay between various elements in 
the production of meaning: the reader, as a culturally and 
historically specific individual, brings a framework of 
assumptions, values and interpretive strategies to bear on 
the text; but the text is no longer the ideal object of 
traditional 'lit.crit.' - it is "a product rather than a 
process a product of the process of text production" 
(Fairclough, 1989:24), and both its production and its 
reception take place in an actual, 'real' world, "a world 
that is culturally, socially and institutionally 
determi ned j that 1 s messy, noi sy, and fu 11 of 
disturbances, surprises, and instabilities" (Birch, 
1989:2). Understanding a text becomes a matter of 
interpretation, and this "interpretive turn" (Hiley et al, 
1991) takes us back to the concerns of hermeneutics. 
The relevance of the "interpretive turn" to an 
understanding of racism and anti-racism may perhaps be 
illustrated by analogy again with feminist approaches to 
textual criticism which have sought to highlight the 
discursive frameworks and practices within which different 
texts and different readings of those texts are situated. 
Feminists have challenged the idea of the literary c~non 
for representing patriarchal (and commonly, also wh1~e, 
middle/upper class) values as universal, thereby excludlng 
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from serious consideration the texts and reading 
strategies of those who 'fall short' of these 'ideals' 
and have endorsed instead a range of different approache~ 
to textual analysis J 14 the most relevant of which - for my 
purposes - make use of the "relationship between language, 
power and the political consequences of how 'we' 
constitute subjects and objects and allocate value and 
status to them through discourse" (Bohman et al., 
1991 : 9) . 
Weedon (1987), Moi (1985) and Belsey (1980) all endorse a 
critical practice using close reading that depends on a 
post-Saussurean understanding of language as a socially 
structured system of differences. 15 Language does not 
refl ect rea 1 i ty but creates it, and creates it in 
historically and politically specific forms. "There is no 
concept which is not embroiled in an open-ended play of 
signification, shot through with the traces and fragments 
of other ideas. It is just that, out of this play of 
signifiers, certain meanings are elevated by social 
ideologies to a privileged position, or made the centres 
around which other meanings are forced to turn" (Eagleton J 
1983:131). Thus feminist critics have defined a task for 
themselves: "speaking from their marginalized positions on 
the outskirts of the academic establishments, they strive 
to make explicit the politics of the so-called 'neutral' 
or 'objective' works of their colleagues, as well as to 
act as cultural critics in the widest sense of the word" 
(Moi, 1985:87). 
The relationship between the literary and literary 
critical 'centre' and 'margins' is also reshaped or 
redefined by the emergence of black literary theory and 
practice. Two strands can be seen at work: at the 
practical level, the application of existing literary 
critical techniques (for example J Marxist, structuralist J 
feminist, psychoanalytic, post-structuralist) to works by 
black authors16 not hitherto considered part of the 
Western canon; and in broader theoretical terms, a 
rethinking by black authors and critics of the 
relationship between black literatures and 
European/American, white literatures. 17 
Black writing, whether specifically 'literary' or 
otherwise, 1S of course not a new phenomenon. 18 What 
perhaps 1S new, however J is the challenge that such 
writing can offer to the hegemony of the 'englit' 
establishment with its closely defined canon of 'great 
works' and, beyond that, to broader social~ polit~cal a~d 
cultural relations. Black writing is not un1form e1ther 1n 
its choice of approach or theoretical technique or in its 
conclusions. But Gates suggests that there might be one 
point of agreement among these diverse productions: "one 
important benefit of the development of subtle and 
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searching modes of 'reading' is that these can indeed be 
brought to bear upon relationships that extend far beyond 
the ,confined ~oundaries of a text" (Gates, 1986a:17). 
Read1ng, then, 1S not a neutral activity to be carried out 
in ~ocial or political isolation. Both feminist and black 
readlngs and writings recognise and indeed highlight the 
e~bedde~ness of any text or act of reading in a broader 
dlscurslve framework. 
6.4 Social work as text: towards a critical practice. 
In this section, I will look at the proposition that 
social work provides a 'text' that can, in some sense, be 
'read'. At the most literal level, it is the texts of 
social work that define what social work is about: a 
library of books exists to tell social workers about the 
law, psychology, social policy and intervention techniques 
that structure and guide their practice. Research is 
written up for publication in academic journals, and a 
more or less well-informed debate about the whole 
enterprise of social work is carried out in the 'trade 
press' and wider public news media. Social workers 
themselves spend a considerable amount of time producing 
text ln the form of case files, reports, letters, 
assessments. We can read social work writing in all its 
forms and there is certainly no shortage of written 
material on which to concentrate. In this thesis, I am 
concentrating on a limited sub-set of the potential spread 
of materials that could be analysed, having chosen to 
focus on published work - and more particularly still, on 
published work that explicitly addresses the lssues of 
anti- or non-racist social work. 
But there is also perhaps a more metaphorical sense in 
which social work operates as a 'text', as a range of 
signifying practices that are open to analysis and 
criticism. This is an understanding that 
post-structuralist approaches to language have fostered, 
and leads, ln the case of Oerrida's work, to a focus 
beyond the individual works of social work literature, and 
towards an appreciation of a general 'textuality'.19 So in 
this sense, the activity of social work can be textualized 
and thence, subsequently, 'read'. Leitch expresses this 
notion of textuality as follows, "Since language serves as 
ground of existence, the world emerges as infinite Text. 
Everything gets textualized. All contexts, whether 
political, economic, social, psychological, historical.or 
theological, become intertexts; that is, outslde 
influences and forces undergo textualization. Instead of 
literature we have textuality; in place of tradition, 
intertextuality. Authors die so that readers can com~ ~nto 
prominence. In any case, all selves, whether of cr~tlcs, 
poets, or readers, appear as language constructlons -
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texts. What are texts? Strings of differential traces. 
Sequences of float i ng si gn i fi ers. . .. Si tes for the 
freeplay, of grammar, rhetoric, and (illusory) reference" (quoted 1n Kearney, 1986:123). 
But the deconstructive turn is not the only possible 
respon~e to the assertion that "language serves as ground 
of eX1stence". The move away from a narrow definition of 
the text as a self-contained, self-validating artefact 
invites the consideration of any given work within a 
broader discursive framework, which is itself amenable to 
inquiry. Discourse thus becomes a proper focus of 
investigation, and discourse analysis - of one sort or 
another an appropriate methodological tool.20 So while 
Rojek, Peacock and Collins also propose a "linguistically 
grounded" model of social work (1988:137), they use this 
as the basis for a different methodological approach owing 
more, particularly, to Foucault than to the philosophical 
sources that I have explored. 21 
This thesis, however, remains within a broadly hermeneutic 
framework which puts interpretation of text at the centre 
of its view of philosophical activity. Gadamer takes the 
idea of dialogue with the text as a model for 
understanding. Derrida, and the form of deconstruction 
associated with his own analyses, depends explicitly on 
close reading of selected texts to elicit a meaning, a 
reading which is often at variance with, or subversive of, 
the ostensible meaning of the passage under discussion. 
And it is through reading that we can begin to articulate 
the implications of the linguistic resource position, by 
showing how social work writing either leaves key 
questions unanswered or 'self-deconstructs' by 
presupposing the very concepts of language-practice which 
it seeks to disown. 
So to return, finally, to the implications of this 
analysis of reading theory for the race and social work 
debate. The cultural or linguistic resource position 
offers a basis for understanding how racism operates, and 
hence what moves to challenge racism - anti-racism - might 
involve. Adopting the linguistic resource position means 
taking language seriously, so coming to terms with racism 
will require a strategy for reading - whatever else may be 
involved. It also means understanding our cultural 
"thrownness" philosophically through an appreciation of 
hermeneutics. 
A possible way forward now emerges: criti~a' an~lysis,of 
social work texts, highlighting the1r d1scurslve 
structures and strategies, may clarify the assumptions and 
values that (perhaps unwittingly) support th~m. In 
addition, such an analysis will have the potentlal for 
hermeneutic reflexivity; that is to say that the analyst 
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or critic herself will, in the course of engaging with the 
otherness of the text, be obliged to reflect on her own 
interpretive framework, values and assumptions and those 
of the broader tradition within which she is situated. 
Hermeneutic analysis is not one-dimensional, remaining 
aloof while directing critical attention onto the Other. 
Rather, the analyst, reader or critic is heavily and 
unavoidably implicated in the process of establishing 
meaning and risks (or, in the case of deconstruction, 
invites) the disruption of existing prejudices and 
cultural hierarchies. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
NOTES 
1. See Birch (1989:13-14) and Fairclough (1989:24), for 
example. 
2. See, for example, Winch (1958 and 1987), Ryan (1973), 
Hande 1 (1 982) . 
3. Eagleton's extended discussion of the "rise of English" 
(1983:17-53), places New Criticism firmly within a 
particular social and historical context. 
4. See Moi (1985:46-47) and Birch (1989:60ff) on the 
normative or prescriptive qualities of New Criticism. 
5. I use this pronoun deliberately; Weedon (1987) and Moi 
(1985) draw attention to the patriarchal nature of New 
Criticism. 
6. Both "1 i terary competence" and the idea of the 
"informed reader" are used by Fish (1980) and discussed by 
Belsey (1980:33-34). Fish develops the notion of 
interpretive communities in Interpreting the Variorum 
(reprinted in Lodge (ed.), 1988:311-329) to accommodate 
two "facts of reading" that he had observed, namely, "(1) 
The same reader will perform differently when reading two 
'different' (the word is in quotation marks because its 
status is precisely what is at issue) texts; and (2) 
different readers will perform similarly when reading the 
'same' (in quotes for the same reason) text" (Fish, 
1980:325). 
He suggests that people learn, and come to share, 
interpretive strategies for dealing with texts, "for 
constituting their properties and assigning their 
intentions" (ibid:327), and acquisition of these 
strategies precedes any act of reading. In order to 'read' 
at all, the reader must already have internalised a set of 
strategies, a framework within which to place the 
subsequent activities. 
7. For an interesting discussion of England's 
contribution, see Billington (1990). 
8. Manlove (1989) provides a useful structure or set of 
'pointers' to guide a critical reading of a text. 
9. I have referred to a number of critical commentaries in 
the course of this and the previous chapter, including 
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Culler (1983), Leitch (1983), Harland (1987) Norris (1987 
and 1991); in addition, see Ellis (1989). ' 
10. See, for example Johnson's analysis of works by Balzac 
and Barthes (Johnson, 1980:162-174) or Hillis Miller's 
discussion of Wordsworth (1981:244-265). 
11. As Descombes puts it J "The metaphysi cal tongue is 
double; its words may always be shown to have two 
irreducible meanings (although not indeed 'opposed'). It 
is ~l:o deceptive, for it dissimulates its duplicity by 
retaln1ng only one meaning, the 'right meaning' thereby 
claiming that the good ison1y good, that the tr~e is all 
true, and that meaning 1S full of meaning, etc." ( 1 980 : 140) . 
12. This again 
occasioned by 
rai sed in the 
(1983:85-86). 
hints at the potential for political change 
deconstructive analysis, a point that was 
main text of chapter five. See also Culler 
13. One of the things meant by "discourse analysis" 1S 
akin to this type of reading. 
14. There 1S no clear agreement among feminists as to 
what, if anything, should replace both the canon as 
traditionally conceived and the existing 
academically-sanctioned forms of literary criticism, and a 
range of feminist criticisms now exist; see Moi (1985) for 
a summary of the variety of approaches that have emerged. 
15. Though 
Weedon, for 
while Moi 
framework. 
there are differences between their positions; 
example, leans towards a Foucau1dian analysis, 
works within a more overtly deconstructive 
16. See, for example, the articles that form the 
"Practice" section of Gates (ed.), 1990:175ff. 
17. Theoretical dimensions are explored in Gates (ed), 
1990:27-172). 
18. See Gates (1985) for a discussion of the history of 
black writing and its role as "a complex 'certificate of 
humanity'" (1985:12). 
19. See also Warnke's comment on Gadamer: "Understanding 
remains primarily a historically situated understanding of 
the possible validity of texts or such 'tex~-ana10gues' as 
actions, practices and social norms" (1987:1X). 
20. See Birch (1989), Fairclough (1989); and, specifically 
in connection with racist discourse, van Dijk (1987, 1991, 
1992 and 1993) and Cohen (1992). 
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21. A Foucauldian analysis could consider the idea that 
"social work discourse is a form of power which is both a 
resource for social work practice and a limitation upon 
it" (Rojek et al, 1988:118), an idea that could, no doubt, 
inform the social work and race debate and provide a 
different corrective to the problem of power associated 
with the Gadamerian hermeneutics. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
A CLOSE READING OF ANTI-RACIST SOCIAL WORK 
7.1 Introduction. 
The philosophical and methodological implications of the 
ling~ist~c resource position have been explored in some 
detall ln the preceding chapters. Chapters four and five 
considered, in general terms, the possible contribution of 
hermeneutics to the race and social work debate while 
chapter six, again in general terms, considered how 
reading theory might be incorporated into an approach that 
could engage with and challenge racism. The purpose of the 
next two chapters is to move from the general to the 
specific, and to see what can be learned from an attempt 
to bring a hermeneutic analysis to bear on particular 
social work texts. My choice of texts arises from the 
literature review with which this thesis began. I 
suggested at that poi nt that two themes, 'anti -raci sm' and 
'black perspectives', currently dominated the discussion 
of race issues in social work. So it is to these themes 
that I now return, starting in this chapter with a 
critical analysis of Dominelli 's Anti-Racist Social Work: 
A Challenge for White Practitioners and Educators. Chapter 
eight will take up the 'black perspectives' theme, through 
a discussion of Ahmad's Black Perspectives in Social Work. 
Although these two named texts are discussed and treated 
seperately, it will become apparent that the themes are 
not conceptually so clearcut, and at many points in fact 
overlap. 
In chapter two, I took a first look at Dominelli 's text 
Anti-Racist Social Work; my commentary drew attention to 
the strategies and actions endorsed by the author in 
pursuit of something called "anti-racist social work", and 
I suggested that problems might be encountered if 
Dominelli's prescriptions were adopted. In what follows, 
I draw on another level of criticism - the textual - where 
inconsistencies in the argument or gaps in the logic of 
the author's position may be revealed. My intention is to 
rework and expand my earlier exposition of Anti-Racist 
Social Work by placing my comments about it .i~to a 
dialogue with hermeneutics, to see whether any prellmlnary 
decision can be reached about an appropriate framework for 
discussion of anti-racist practice. 
7.2 Language and racism. 
Hermeneutics emphasises the 'situatedness' of any act of 
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understanding in a particular and hl'storl'call 'f' l' "t' , , y speCl lC lngulsl lC tradltlon. This tradition, however flawed it 
maY,b~ (for example, by racism, as the linguistic resource 
~os~tlon suggests), furnishes the concepts with which we 
thl nk the worl d'. One coroll ary of thi sis that the 
~ttempt to ~omehow escape language, to take a verbal leap 
lnto a raclsm-free place cannot succeed' so a different 
approach to anti-racism must be sought - one which 
acknowledge~ ou~ unavoidable embeddedness in a particular 
cultural, hlstorlcal, political, and linguistic matrix and 
takes this as a given, something to be worked with. This 
i~ not to say that, as our language is intimately bound up 
wlth the structures and processes of racism we are unable 
to critically appraise it or make seri~us attempts to 
change the ways in which we use it. The argument at this 
stage is, rather, that we cannot ever wholly escape 
language and invent, or somehow otherwise happen across, a 
'pure' language that lS for all times free of racist 
implication. 
As an example of this point, one could look briefly at the 
changing vocabulary of race/racism and anti-racism, at the 
processes whereby certain expressions fallout of favour, 
and new, more 'acceptable' ones are drafted in to the 
public arena. Observable shifts in language have included: 
Negro -> coloured -> black; West Indian -> Afro-Caribbean 
-> African Caribbean; immigrant or alien -> ethnic 
minority -> minority ethnic. In each of these 
progresslons, the last-named term is the one currently 
held to be the most 'correct'. These moves can be 
understood as attempts to find a language 'uncontaminated' 
by racism. 
In an otherwise not altogether complimentary essay on the 
language of poststructuralism, Lurie (1991 :289) succinctly 
sums up the curious way in which new terminology is 
endlessly subverted, such that the 'break' from old to new 
is never complete: "Innovations in language are always 
interesting metaphorically. When the words used for 
familiar things change, or new words are introduced, they 
are usually not composed of nonsense syllables, but 
borrowed or adapted from stock. Assuming new roles, they 
drag their old meanings along behind them like flickering 
shadows". As each new term gets drawn into everyday usage, 
its critical edge is blunted and it is 'sucked into' old 
practices. So the escape is never quite successful, though 
to say this is not to advocate an end to attem~ts,to 
modify and refine our language - contexts and ~xlstlng 
practices change too;1 the mista~e would ~e to thl~k tha~ 
we will ultimately reach an ldeal or uncont~mlnated 
end-state, when such a thing cannot be achleved ln 
language. 
I return to Domi nell i 's book for exampl es to ill ustrate 
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this point because it is axiomatic that she has made every 
~ffort to produce a ~ext.that, so to speak, practices what 
lt pre~ches, th~t lS, lt strives self-consciously not to 
fall ~nto raclst modes of thought and linguistic 
expresslon. So, if the language of such a text can be 
found to have the same opacity or ambiguity that is found 
in other w~rks ~hat D~min~lli herself defines as failing 
to meet antl~ra~lst crl~erla, then perhaps this indicates 
that . ~he dlfflculty ln conceptual ising and hence 
practlclng 'anti-racism' cannot be resolved simply by 
opposing it to something called 'racism'. 
On pages 85 to 87 of Anti-Racist Social Work, Dominell; 
offers some examples of statements from white social 
workers;2 each one is then explained in terms of the 
racism she identifies in it. But two problems arise with 
this exercise: some of the statements look like ones 
Dominell; herself makes elsewhere in the book, suggesting 
that statements cannot usefully be abstracted from 
context; and further, some of the examples she cites as 
racist could be construed differently, again if we assume 
a different context. These two points together emphasise 
the importance of context in determining meaning and may 
make the charge of racism harder to justify. 
Thus, on page 85, this statement appears: "Black clients 
come to the office with so many conflicting demands. What 
do they really want?" Dominelli defines this as racist 
because, "[wJhite people assume black people don't know 
what they want" (p87). But on page 100, she herself 
asserts: "White social workers should beware of promoting 
black people's right to self-determination in the absence 
of support from other black individuals and organisations 
in clarifying their objectives ... " The argument here is 
that a black family may be requesting a particular service 
(e.g. reception into care) because they have "internalised 
racist values pathologising black families" (p100). So on 
the one hand, it can be racist to assume that the client 
does not know what he or she wants (with the implication 
that the white social worker is adopting a position of 
superiority and presuming to know herself what the client 
really wants), while on the other hand, it can equally be 
racist to assume that the client does know what she or he 
wants when certain kinds of services are being requested. 
The idea that black clients' demands conflict is only 
surprising or problematic if one has assumed that 
essentially all black people are the same, an assumption 
that could reasonably be construed as racist. But 
recognising that the demands of an individual client may 
not be entirely consistent, and that a further level of 
conflict may be experienced by black people who are pla~ed 
in contradictory positions by racism, seems to me to Shlft 
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th~ empha~is of the statement attributed to the anonymous 
w~lte soclal worker, bringing it more into line with the 
Vlews exp~essed by Dominelli elsewhere: "The wishes of the 
~lack cl~ent [must be] established openly, rather than 
lnterpretlng whatever they say in terms that white social 
workers want to hear" (p11?) . So whi 1 e a raci st inter~retation of the original stat~ment can easily be 
sustalned, the words themselves can be understood 
differently, depending on the assumptions with which one 
starts. 
The next statement I consider is number 4: 
(i) "When black clients get angry, I feel so helpless." (p8S) 
And the racism Dominelli identifies in it: 
(ii) "The statement blames the victims for their plight." (p8?) 
As things stand at present on the anti-racist front, I'm 
not sure I see the connection that Dominelli is making. 
Feeling helpless may be a legitimate initial reaction to 
anger which the social worker recognises is justified in 
view of the failures of the social services system to 
respond adequately to black client groups. The social 
worker here is not saying that black clients' anger is out 
of place, nor that black clients make her feel helpless, 
which could be seen as 'blaming the victim'; it would 
surely be more arrogant, and indeed racist, for the social 
worker to try and deal with the clients' anger by assuming 
that she had all the answers at her disposal. 3 If the 
social work system ;s not meeting black people's rightful 
demands, then this situation can and will only change 
slowly. While adopting a position of helplessness may be 
overly pessimistic and become an excuse for inaction, 
recognition of one's individual limitations may be the 
necessary spur to a white person to engage in the kind of 
collective action advocated with some force by Dominelli. 
No.6(i) "I'm not racist, I just think each ethnic group is 
different and should keep itself to itself. Black social 
workers should deal with black clients." (p8S) 
And the reply: 
6(ii) "Black people are held responsible for racism and 
for doing something about it. It suggests there is no role 
for white people in deconstructing racism." (p8?) 
No. 20(i) f1Black people who show an interest in their 
affairs don't want us to deal with their problems." (p86) 
Dominelli 's diagnosis: 
20(ii) "The responsibility for eliminating racism is 
placed upon black people." (p88) 
Taking these two pairs of statements together, a different 
light can be shed on the 'racist' remarks by drawing on 
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comments, made elsewhere by Domine11i. In number 6(i), the 
worker 1S apparently trying to avoid identifying herself 
as racist, thus opting out of involvement in measures to 
d7velop ant~-racist practice, a position that Domine11; r~g~t1y cast1gates. But she is found saying something very 
s1m1lar to the second part of that statement herself _ 
~hough obvio~sly ~rom a ,very different perspective: 
Ideally, unt1l wh1te soc1al workers become anti-racist 
and anti-sexist, they should not intervene in the lives of 
black women" (p107). And her general position on the role 
of white social workers working with black clients is to 
advise the least possible direct involvement, kept at the 
level of referral to other more appropriate (black) 
agencies. 
She also makes a strong case for the establishment and 
support of autonomous black groups which should have the 
right to define their own situations and needs, and would 
empower individuals to force change in a reluctant system. 
Again, this position could be seen to be at odds with the 
racist interpretation placed on statement 20(i). 
My point here, to emphasise this once again, is not to 
suggest that the statements recorded by Dominel'i are 
neutral or innocent of racism. But, as a hermeneutic 
approach suggests, language itself is open to a range of 
interpretations, where meaning is largely fixed by 
context. A deconstructive analysis would propose, further, 
that the ideologies and practices that Dominelli refers to 
shape and endlessly co-opt the language we use to describe 
them. So the oppositional metaphors and images of 
"eradication" and "transformation" that Dominelli 
repeatedly deploys throughout the text suffer from the 
fact that it may be much harder - indeed impossible - to 
'escape' from racist language in the first place. 
7.3 Structuralism or hermeneutics? 
Dominelli 's book is a powerful and crusading attack (and I 
choose the word carefully) on the whole edifice of white 
social work the bureaucracy, the legal framework, the 
practice found at all levels, the educat~on a~~ tra~n~ng. 
No aspect of social work escapes Dom1nelll 5 crlt1cal 
gaze, and in the main, her attack is well ta~getted. The 
ADSSjCRE report of 1978 indicates that soclal work has 
long recognised its failure to respond adequately to the 
needs and demands of ethnic minority groups, but the 
question of how to act on thi~ rec~~nition has remained 
unsatisfactorily answered. Domlne111 s book attempts to 
change this situation, by exhorting social workers to ~ake 
action, to join with others in the struggle,aga~nst 
racism, and to change the structures and organlsatlons 
that permit racism to continue. 
161 
At the moral and emotional level, it would be hard to 
argue against Dominel'i - and indeed, I would not wish to 
challenge her claim as to the urgency and necessity of 
moves to challenge racism. My difference with Dominelli 1S 
rather at the level of frameworks, philosophical or 
theoretical. Dominelli's emphasis is on structures mine 
is on language, and how we use language to understa~d, to 
shape and change our world. 
Dominelli's analysis commits the white would-be 
anti-racist to opposing and eradicating racism both within 
social work and thence, the wider society. But where do we 
stand while we involve ourselves in this fight? If, as a 
hermeneutic approach indicates, it is impossible to stand 
outside our own frames of reference, which include both 
language and practice, how then are we to proceed? I would 
suggest that the strengths and the limitations of 
Dominelli's position become more apparent when it is 
considered in relation to the two other view points 
associated with Gadamer and Derrida which have been 
examined in this thesis. In what follows, I will put my 
reading of Dominel'i into a three-way 'conversation' with 
hermeneutics in both its traditional and more radical 
forms and explore three dimensions of her work in greater 
detail. These dimensions are i) rhetorical style, ii) 
power, iii) dialectics or process. In each case. I look at 
the way hermeneutics can contribute to an understanding of 
the development of anti-racist approaches in social work. 
i) Rhetorical style. 
In Dominelli's analysis, anti-racist practice demands a 
degree of self-awareness, and self-awareness cannot be 
easily won. What is at issue is our very way of thinking 
about ourselves and about others - and the language we 
have available to structure our thoughts and relationships 
;s critical. Hermeneutics, in both its forms, emphasises 
and explores the language-dependent nature of our 
understanding - what has been called the "linguisticality" 
of human existence. Dominelli's structuralism, while 
robustly anti-metaphysical, commits her to an approach to, 
and use of, language that differs markedly from either 
Gadamer or Derrida. 
Within the hermeneutics of tradition, problems of meaning 
and understanding are explored through the process of 
conversation or dialogue. This kind of approach is not 
didactic: neither party to a conversation has a monopoly 
on 'rightness', and both may learn from.the exchange. 
Dominelli's style of argument by exhortatlon presents a 
sharp contrast to the more open, to-and-fro. play of 
Gadamerian enquiry: she asserts, rather than ~lscusses; 
she demands, rather than negotiates. Language 1S treated 
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as an essentially transparent medium for the expression of 
certain truths. Words have a direct one to one 
relationShip. to 'things in the world', ab~ut which there 
can be n~ d,~pute. Thus Dominelli can maintain a position 
where raC1sm 1~ wrong, anti-racism is right, and we have a 
moral .obligat1on to fight the one and support the other; 
there 1S no acceptable alternative. 
This puts Dominelli in an apparently unassailable 
position, for challenging her call to join the anti-racist 
fight in whatever terms (for example by taking issue with 
her definition of and assumptions about 'anti-racism') 
looks suspiciously like closet racism. But as I have tried 
to indicate in the preceding chapters, the question of 
language use and rhetorical style is not trivial, and my 
engagement with her text at this level is intended to 
acknowledge the seriousness of her concerns. I do not 
disagree with the overall project, then, but take issue 
with how it has been conceived and described. 
Odd comments that Dominelli makes suggest that she does 
attach some importance to the use of language, but she 
does not pursue this line of thinking, leaving it almost 
as a parenthetical aside. Language is not, by and large, 
interesting in itself - it is not, to borrow from her own 
arsenal of oPPositional images, the main site where the 
battle against racism is to be fought. She indicates that 
there are problems associated with certain patterns of 
language use, but only hints at the difficulty that may be 
associated with changing these patterns. 
Dominel'i, then, offers an interesting, if problematic, 
view of language, acknowledging its importance as an 
"aspect of the oppression process" (p77). She announces 
that language is "riddled with racism" (p6), and gives an 
example of language thus infected/spread through with 
racism: "When white people ... speak of Britain, they 
usually mean white, 'English' Britain. Becoming aware of 
the implicit racism in the word makes white anti-racists 
hesitant in using it. But, as yet, we have neither 
reclaimed the word by divesting it of the racist 
ideologies and practices embedded within it, nor have we 
developed an alternative to it" (p6). 
The question then arises, can a word, in and of itself, be 
'racist', or must this judgement rather be made about the 
context in which the word (any word) is used? Are I1 r acist 
ideologies and practices embedded within [the.word]H li~e 
so many currants in a cake, with the.assumpt~o~ tha~, 1f 
we could only find the right devlce. to r,ddle ~ur 
language with, the right sieve through WhlCh ~e could s~ft 
it the racism could be shaken out in dlscrete unlts 
le~ving nice 'clean' words behin~? Dominelli's 
oppositional imagery seems to depend for lts force on the 
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belief that racism can somehow be "eradicated" from 
language. and, by implication, also from social relations. 
But I thlnk that there are enough examples in her own text 
to show that such a belief cannot be sustained - or at 
least, that the process of eradication may be less of a 
once and for all shift than the text often seems to 
suggest. Language is inherently more ambiguous than this. 
But ambiguity has no place in Dominelli 's anti-racist 
scheme. On reading Anti-Racist Socia7 Work, one cannot 
help noticing that she has adopted a very particular 
rhetorical style. She talks of "transformation", 
"eradication" and "elimination" in relation to racism and 
racist attitudes, and the recurrent imagery is of 
opposi ti on. An idea that I wi 11 return to is that 
Dominelli's text operates within a logocentric economy of 
difference. Hers is a world of 'either/or', a world of 
clear alternatives: on the one hand there is 'racism' and 
on the other 'anti-racism', and one must overwhelm the 
other. When Dominelli entitles one chapter "Deconstructing 
racism ... " (p71), she has in mind a very different set of 
activities from those that a Derridean usage of the term 
"deconstruction" would imply. 
A deconstructive or close reading, adopting the tactic 
Derrida refers to as reading "from the margins" (1982), 
would allow remarks of this kind a new significance; as 
Weedon has written in another context, "Once language is 
understood in terms of competing discourses, competing 
ways of giving meaning to the world, which imply 
differences in the organization of social power, then 
language becomes an important site of political struggle" 
(Weedon, 1987:24). In earlier chapters, I have drawn 
attention to the practice of deconstructive close reading 
which can be applied to any text or social situation or 
relationship as 'text-analogue'. The process of trying to 
give a close reading allows certain expressions, 
linguistic 'tics' or stylistic habits to assume a (perhaps 
only temporary) prominence the author did not necessarily 
intend. This emphasis on language can be used both to 
illuminate the text that Dominelli has written and, beyond 
that, the social work practice to which the text refers. 
I have suggested above that Dominelli 's text is tightly 
bound by the logic of logocentrism, and offer three 
examples here to illustrate this point in the context of 
this discussion of rhetorical style. In the first example, 
I consider the deployment of what I have elsewhere likened 
to 'thought reform' slogans; in the second, I turn again 
to her analysis of reported statements by white social 
workers which she uses to expose the alleged raClsm 
behind much social work thought (pp85ff). The final 
example deals with her treatment of contradiction. 
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The slo~ans I refer to appear as chapter headings or 
sub-headlng~ th~oug~out the book and include, in chapter 
one, .th~ tltle Raclsm perme~tes social work ideology and 
practlce, and the sub-headlng (p29) "Racism exacerbates 
and e~tend~ sc:>cial control in social work"; chapter two 
~rocla1ms, 1n l~S title that "Social work training is 
1mbued wlth raclsm", while chapter five maintains, in the 
form of a sub-headi ng, that "Endorsi ng an equa 1 
opportunities policy requires the commitment of additional 
resources". These slogans are not out of place in a text 
that is conspicuously declamatory, and reinforce the 
unequivocal nature of the task that Dominelli has assigned 
to social workers - to oppose, overthrow or otherwise 
extirpate racism from the institution of social work and 
from the wider social system. 
Argument by slogan reduces the complexity of the problem 
under discussion at a stroke and suggests that solutions 
to what have hitherto been seen as intractable problems 
can be conjured up if the correct form of words is 
invoked. In fact, though, as soon as Dominelli 's own 
slogans are put to the test, difficulties become apparent. 
Take, for instance, the statement "Autonomous black 
organisations must be respected by white anti-racist 
educators and practitioners" (p56) which heads a section 
of chapter five - what is this to mean in practice? Are 
all autonomous black organisations to be treated with the 
same respect, regardless of their aims and aspirations? 
who decides whether sufficient respect has been shown to 
particular organisations? What should the white 
anti-racist educator or practitioner do in a situation 
where members of one group denigrate or denounce another. 
Factional infighting is not unknown in radical politics, 
but Dominelli's blanket prescription offers little 
guidance to white social workers when confronted with 
disagreement or even antipathy between black groups.4 
In the same vein, one could consider the claim made by 
Dominelli in the final section of chapter six: 
"Anti-racist social work practice is good practice". At 
first glance, this seems an acceptable, even 
uncontentious, assertion. Racism is, after all, bad and 
anti-racism good, so therefore practice that is 
anti-racist must almost by definition - also be good. 
But closer investigation suggests that statements of this 
kind are altogether less clear than they appear. 
"Anti-racist practice is good practice" assumes, first of 
all, that something called 'anti-racist' practice can be 
defined and identified - an assumption I have already 
called into question; further it appears to assume that 
'good' practice is similarly easy to spot and agree on.s 
In Oerridean terms, statements of the form 'A,is ~' belong 
firmly to the logocentric order, where mean1ng 1S fixed, 
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an~ held 1n place. by powerful hierarchical mechanisms 
w~1ch k7ep a~ternat1ve understandings at bay. By contrast 
wlth Dom~nel~l 's ~pproach, ~ deconstructive reading of the 
slogan Antl-r~clst pract1ce ... " would immediately want 
to ~u~ the ma1n terms 'under erasure', to indicate their 
prov1s1onal status, and open up for discussion the 
understanding on which such definitional statements are 
made. Reading deconstructively, one could find in this 
slogan not an all-purpose statement of the truth about 
social work, but rather an indication or suggestion that a 
certain line of enquiry could usefully be pursued. It 
expresses the hope that both 'anti-racism' and 'social 
work' can be re-defined in accommodation with each other -
though working out what that might actually mean in 
practice will be a lengthy task. 
Attention to stylistic detail of this kind invites 
investigation of a second feature of Dominelli 's text: her 
use of statements made by social workers in a 
"brainstorming" session as a tool for the exploration of 
racism. These statements (pp8S-8?) are treated as 
significant by Domine11;, as they "reveal both the 
subtlety and variety of ways in which racism expresses 
itself in the actions and attitudes of social workers" 
(p8S). Drawing on ideas of logocentrism and phonocentrism, 
which I have discussed particularly in the context of 
Derrida's work6 a deconstructive reading might question 
the relation between the expressed words and the meaning 
Dominelli derives from each of her examples. 
Phonocentrism, in elevating speech at the expense of 
writing, claims for speech a closer, less equivocal, 
relation to meaning. As Derrida suggests, speech ;s taken 
to be the closest we can get to the self-identical meaning 
that logocentrism dictates; it provides a moment of 
coincidence between articulation and intention, a moment 
where meaning is fully present. But, as Derrida also 
strongly suggests, this search for pure self-presence is a 
fantasy, and even the experience of speech lacks the full 
immediacy claimed for it. 7 So reliance on the (reported) 
speech of a group of social workers to demonstrate the 
racist attitudes and actions of the speakers is, again, 
perhaps less straightforward that Dominelli 's own account 
would suggest. Either she is claiming that racism somehow 
inheres in those particular combinations of words or that 
it lurks, ;n a way yet to be defined, 'behind' the ~ords 
used, in the intentjons of the spea~ers. E1ther 
interpretation poses problems for Dominel', and, from a 
deconstructive point of view, both look equally 
untenable. 
To conclude this discussion of logocentrism in relation to 
Anti~Racist Social Work, I would like briefly to consider 
the treatment of contradiction. I have already suggested 
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that Oomi nell i '~ t7xt is framed in' ei ther/or' terms whi ch 
are c~ar~cterlstlc of logocentric discourse - and 
co~tra~lct10n has no real place within such a framework. 
Th1S 15 ~eflected in, or has implications for, her 
understand1ng of social work as a social activity. There 
is ~o room for ambiguity or debate; we must "cut the 
Gord7an knot of social work as a complex and contradictory 
form of social control" (p35). The search for a 
transcendental Signified is re-joined: social work must be 
one thing or another; it cannot be both and it cannot 
contain these two contradictory impulses. s From this 
position, Dominelli has no choice but to "oppose", 
"transform" , "el i mi nate" J in her attempt to move from one 
definition or state of social work (racist and 
controlling) to the preferred alternative (anti-racist and 
caring). 
In not only acknowledging, but actively embracing 
contradiction, Derrida occupies a position at some remove 
from both Dominelli and Gadamer.9 "Deconstruction points 
to those blind-spots of argument where a text generates 
aberrant meanings or chains of disruptive implication that 
work to undermine its manifest 'logical' sense" (Norris, 
1987:163). A deconstructive reading looks specifically for 
points of contradiction, for gaps in the 'logic' of the 
text, and finds in these the starting points for further 
enquiry. Having abandoned the search for univocal meaning, 
deconstruction exploits the multiple possibilities 
'within' the text and explores the contradictory pairings 
around which that particular text is organised. From 
within this understanding of language and text, then, 
contradiction is unavoidable and Domine11i 's desire to 
finally 'pin social work down' by attempting to remove or 
resolve its inherent contradictions 1S but one more 
manifestation of logocentric thinking. 
ii) Power. 
The dimension of power 1n Dominelli 's work is explored 
here initially in the context of the "egalitarian 
relationships" that she urges white social workers to form 
with black clients. I have suggested earlier that social 
work, in the currently accepted usage, involves the social 
worker's 'use of self', and that this, in part, 
distinguishes it from other forms of social and political 
activity. Dominelli herself acknowledges the importance of 
this concept, but her main concerns are elsewhere, at the 
level of large-scale political or organisational change. 
Individuals have a role to play in the process of change, 
of course but her interest in the individual himself is 
limited. Dominelli's understanding of 'use of self' is 
concentrated on the need for the individual to examine and 
understand his own racism in order to minimise the racist 
effects or implications ~f social work intervention. This 
process of "conscientization" is to be achieved through 
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the medium of anti~ra~ism awareness training, which she 
examines in some detall 1n her third chapter. 
In a~vocating the use of anti-racism awareness training to 
prov~de the framework within which the individual can 
exam1ne her own assumptions and beliefs relating to 'race' 
and her un~ers~anding of situations that involve attempts 
at communlcat1on across cultural, racial or ethnic 
boundaries, Dominelli strays away from orthodox 
structuralism and moves more towards a position that is 
recognisably hermeneutic. While it would be stretching a 
point to claim that this is what Dominelli intended (and 
anyway, such a claim about her intentions would be 
irrelevant as well as unprovable, from a hermeneutic 
perspective), interesting parallels with Gadamer's 
understanding of the role of prejudice and, in particular, 
the possibility of distinguishing between legtimate and 
illegitimate prejudices, can be drawn. 
Understanding, in Gadamer's analysis, is achieved through 
a process of dialogue motivated by a sense of 
moral-practical engagement or phronesis. As part of this 
process, the individual is invited to put her prejudices 
into play, and to test them thoroughly against those of 
the other participant in the conversation. If, within a 
hermeneutics of tradition, racist attitudes can be 
construed as an example of an illegitimate prejudice, 
using this term in the special sense of 'prejudgement' or 
general orientation favoured by Gadamer, then it is in 
principle possible that the act of engaging in an 
authentic dialogue will allow the individual to discard 
such damaging views, and 'move on'. 
But having offered an understanding of anti-racism 
awareness training in terms of the exploration of 
unexamined prejudices, this account is subject to the same 
criticisms that applied to Gadamer's explanation of the 
role of prejudice in general and the possibility of 
identifying and then changing illegitimate prejudices in 
particular. These criticisms were rehearsed in some detail 
in Chapter Five, and concerned the difficulty of knowing 
when, in practice, one should be persuaded by the force or 
logic of the Other's position to incorporate it into one's 
own world-view and when one should give up trying to learn 
from the Other's (possibly ill-founded) prejudices. 
Two other aspects of the social work relationship given 
prominence in the literature - the ability to lis~en a~d 
to empathise - are dealt with very briefly by Domln~ll', 
She believes that social workers need to learn to llsten 
to their black clients and black or anti-racist 
colleagues: "White social workers need to make.humility 
part of their willingness to listen to black cllents and 
learn to treat seriously their views of a situation" 
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(p79; and see also p117), and seems to believe that some 
genui~e lear~ing or understanding can come from such an 
exerClse. Agaln, I would suggest that on first impression, 
the re~ark quoted above seems to 'fit' comfortably into a 
Gadamerlan framework, and appears to endorse a dialogic 
approach to the pursuit of understanding between social 
worker and client. 
Howe~er, while this may prove to be a fruitful approach if 
consldered as a regulative ideal, it 1S not without 
pr~b1ems. ,What does Dominelli envisage happening, when 
whlte soclal workers show their "willingness to listen" 
and "treat seriously" their clients' views of a situation? 
Will white social workers simply 'take into account' the 
clients' expressed wishes or explanations when coming to a 
decision - with the option of course remaining that they 
take these points into account, find them unconvincing or 
erroneous, and come to the 'same' decision that they would 
have reached before? Or is Dominelli asking for a firmer 
commitment from the social workers, to not only listen, 
but then to abide by the decisions, judgements or accounts 
provided by their clients? And, if the latter, then would 
all clients, no matter how distressed, disorientated or 
dangerous be treated in the same way? Again, while finding 
in Domi nell i 's account much that is thought-provoki ng and 
positive, the practical application of her prescriptive 
statements and from the perspective of Gadamerian 
hermeneutics, understanding is only achieved through 
application suggests an altogether more complicated 
situation, one which cannot be 'transformed' by fiat. 
It is not clear, then whether the kind of understanding 
that Dominelli advocates can be distinguished from mere 
acqulescence to the views of the Other.10 One distinction 
though can be emphatically made: the understanding that 
she seeks is to be sharply distinguished from empathy, a 
concept that she dismisses. Her comments are exceedingly 
brief (see pp33 and 45), but it would seem that it is to 
be equated with having a shared experience - but at such a 
basic level that the term seems virtually devoid of 
content. So can the idea of 'empathy' amount to anything 
useful? 
Gadamer's hermeneutics presents a very particular view of 
social interaction, one which is apparently more benign 
than that envisaged by either Dominelli or Derrida. The 
model for understanding in the hermeneutics of tradition 
is the conversation (Gadamer, 1979:330ff). And the 
possibility of a 'genuine' conversation must rest on the 
presumption if only for the duration of the particular 
interchange of equality between the participants. In 
keeping with Dominelli's own acknowledgement of the 
importance of listening, and an emphasis drawn from the 
hermeneutics of tradition on the importance of language 
169 
and dialogu:, I have offe~ed an alternative understanding 
of empathy. empathy lnvolves seeing the Other as 
"~onversible . with" ~Whan), as an equal partner in 
dlalogue. ThlS may agaln seem a very limited usage, but I 
w~uld suggest that such an understanding could provide the 
flrst. ste~ ~owards th7 establishment of the "egalitarian 
relatlonshlps that antl-racist social work promises. 
But can such an attitude of respect for, or humility 
towards the other partner's contribution be assumed? As 
the earlier discussion of Gadamer's position has already 
indicated, the dimension of power seems curiously absent 
from the text of Truth and Method, and Gadamer's writing 
seems to exist 'out of time' - an odd contradiction for a 
writer whose preoccupations are with the inescapable 
influence of tradition and the essential historicity of 
all attempts at understanding. By 'out of time' I mean 
that Gadamer does not satisfactorily address the 
particular problems of trying to engage in genuine 
dialogue in a stratified society, a point critically 
examined by Habermas, among others.11 
Hermeneutics may well offer an approach to understanding 
that appeals very directly to social work as it is 
presently conceived, and beyond that to Western, 
bourgeois-liberal pluralism; but what is to stop the free 
dialogue envisaged by Gadamer from degenerating into a 
one-way transmission from the powerful to the powerless? 
Good faith and moral commitment on the part of the 
participants are necessary but not sufficient conditions 
for ensuring equality of opportunity in a systematically 
unequal interchange. 
Both Dominelli and Derrida recognise power as a central 
feature of social relations. For Dominelli, power is a 
crucial element within patriarchal capitalist society, and 
racism is held in place through the exercise of particular 
power relations which favour the white-British majority 
population: "in my view all white individuals in Britain 
exercise some power over black individuals by virtue of 
their being white people in a predominately white society. 
Even in one-to-one interactions between black and white, 
that power balance hangs in the air by an invisible cord, 
and shifts in favour of the white person" (p8D). 
She talks of the need to "reverse" the hierarchical power 
relations between black and white, and of "[e]qualis;ng 
power differentials" between them (p125). By formi~g 
"anti-racist collectivities" white people can change thelr 
practice and make moves towards overcoming racism. And 
with typical rhetorical punch, she states that, 
"[a]nti-racist social work has got to intr~d~ce change at 
both personal and institutional levels. In~lvldual conduct 
in interpersonal relations and the allocatlon of power and 
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resources ;n society have got to be transformed if racism 
is to be eliminated" (p162). 
Power in Derrida's deconstruction is present ;n the 
concept of hie~archized sets of conceptual opposites, 
where one term 1S accorded superiority and the other term 
denigrated, or, kept in a, position of inferiority: 
male/female, wh1te/black, rat10nal/emotiona1, fact/value, 
nature/culture to suggest some of our society's 
characteristic pairings. Within the context of social work 
practice we can elaborate typical binary oppositions -
worker/client, theory/practice, care/control, and so on -
and note a similar dynamic, ;n the sense that the 
'left-hand' term or concept is elevated at the cost of 
down-grading or suppressing the 'right-hand side of the 
pair. Deconstruction involves a recognition of these 
oppositions or hierarchies, and a moment of reversal where 
the hierarchy at issue is displaced and the 'underneath' 
term accorded precedence. The move beyond that initial 
reversal ;s more problematic, and does not presuppose any 
privileged end-point. 
One of the more powerful ideas in this book is that of 
reversing power relationships, for example through the 
"apprenticeship model", where social workers would be 
required, as part of their training, to work in placements 
with black supervisors. Domine'l; argues that white and 
black students would benefit from this arrangement, though 
in different ways. The black student would have a valuable 
role model, and the white student would have the 
experience of working with a black person in a position of 
authority and seniority, perhaps for the first time. In 
terms of the oppositions that are contained in the concept 
of racism white/black, power/dependence, 
superior/inferior Dominelli has identified an area of 
practice where a reversal of power relations could be 
initiated. 
But she expects a lot to follow from a procedural change 
of this kind - more, perhaps, than it can deliver in the 
form she proposes. Again, a switch or 'transformation' is 
being offered as a solution to an entrenched situation, 
leaving as many problems as she attempts to alleviate. In 
the discussion of Harding's work in chapter two, I drew 
attention to the drawbacks associated with what could be 
called an "equal opportunities" position (1986:58ff), and 
made the point that simply increasing the number of st~ff 
from a particular ethnic group does not ~e~n that eq~a'1ty 
of opportunity has been achieved. In a Slm1lar way~ ,t c~n 
be argued that appointing a number of.b~ack superv1sors ~s 
a necessary, but not sufficient, cond1tlon for the pursult 
of equal opportunities. 
Neither does such a move necessarily have, in itself, the 
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p~wer to b~ing ~bout th~ end,e~visaged by Dominelli. Who 
wll1 be ap~ol~ted. If Dom1nell1 1S not gOing to argue that 
blackness 1S,lts7lf,the defining criterion of suitability, then how w1ll sU1table' candidates be selected? Are all 
bla~k ~eople, anti-racist in the sense favoured by 
Dom1nell1? Is,t not possible that some black people will 
have made ~ persona~ accommodation with the status quo, 
such that wh,le they m1ght personally abhor racism they do 
not se~ ~hemselves a~ directly personally affected by it _ 
a pos1t1on that m1ght in turn affect their ability to 
impart 'anti-racism' to their white students? Who would 
decide whether a black supervisor was challenging a white 
student's racism in an 'appropriate' way? 
At a more philosophical level, the apprenticeship model 
fails to address other important points. From a Gadamerian 
perspective, an opportunity to engage in authentic 
dialogue and test one's prejudices against those of an 
Other presents the individual with a space for 
self-reflection and possible self-criticism which allows 
that individual to become more gebi7det. Seeing the 
apprenticeship model in these terms would situate it more 
precisely in the process of understanding, as a means 
rather than an end in itself. What Dominelli is proposing, 
in Gadamerian terms, is to displace attention toward the 
dialogue of social work, away from the conversation 
between worker and client, and towards that between the 
worker and her supervisor. One is no substitute for the 
other; both are needed for the genu,ne pursuit of 
understanding. 
It could also be said that Dominelli shows a curious faith 
in the power of hierarchy: in itself, reversing black and 
white positions does not obviate the 'original' problem. 
At the most basic level, one could ask whether a white 
person who had difficulty working with black clients would 
find it any easier to engage with a black supervisor. 
Dominelli might answer by saying that it was never meant 
to be easy! The experience could well be both difficult 
and painful, but this would not be a reason to forego it. 
The apprenticeship model seems to assume that this new 
relationship between black supervisor and white student 
will provide a context for change; the act of reversing 
the white/black hierarchy will promote certain desirable 
changes in attitude and behaviour on the part of the 
student. A deconstructive view of this model suggests, yet 
again, that the hoped-for 'transformation' ma~ be,harder 
to achieve than this simple act of reversal ,mpl,es. To 
deconstruct an opposition involves more than a moment of 
reversal, which in itself leaves the broader con~ep~ual 
field or economy of difference unchanged. And ,t ,s a 
sense of that move 'beyond ... that is missing from 
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Dominelli's account. Without it, there 1S a risk of 
remaining stuck with mere rehearsal of the same, stale 
antinomies. 
iii) Dialectics. 
Within Dominelli 's text, certain antagonistic pairings can 
be recognised; white/black or racist/anti-racist are 
probably the most obvious but other oppositions include 
professional/client, care/control, and others could 
doubtless be formulated. A critical difference between 
DOminelli's and Derrida's analysis of power lies in the 
activity that follows from recognition of these 
hierarchical pairs. Dominelli 's position is clear-cut and 
involves a rhetoric of battle and transformation. In the 
previous section I emphasised the point that 
deconstructing a conceptual opposition involves more than 
just switching the order of priority of the terms of the 
pairing and leaving it at that. A deconstructive position 
is altogether more subtle, and needs to be considered in 
relation to the third dimension I identified: dialectics. 
In this section, I continue the three-way conversation 
between my reading of Dominelli's text and positions 
derived from the hermeneutics of tradition and the more 
radical, deconstructive wing of hermeneutics. In 
considering the concept of dialectics. the relationship 
between the three positions shifts; Gadamer and Derrida 
can be placed together in terms of the centrality they 
each give to dialectics, leaving Dominelli occupying 
somewhat different ground. 
For Gadamer, again using conversation as the model for 
hermeneutic understanding, dialectics is at the heart of 
the process. The interplay between interlocutor and text 
or between the partners in a 'genuine' dialogue is 
characterised by the "strange art of the dialectic" 
(1979:330). Gadamer expresses this as follows: 
"Dialectic as the art of asking questions, proves itself 
only beca~se the person who knows how to ask questions is 
able to persist in his questioning. which involves being 
able to preserve his orientation towards openness. The ~rt 
of questioning is that of being able to go on asklng 
questions, l.e. the art of thinking. It ~s called 
'dialectic' for it is the art of conductlng a real conversat;o~" (1979:330). In terms of the oppositions that 
are contained ;n the concept of racism - white/black, 
power/dependence, superior/inferior Dominelli's text 
identifies an area of practice where a reversal of power 
relations could be initiated. 
The point of engaging in dialogue is not, for Gada~er, to 
allow one partner to bludgeon the,other into,accept1ng t~e 
opposing opinion, or simply to f,nd faults 1n the other s 
173 
argument for the sake of 'point-scoring'. Rather, each 
partner is engaged 1n an attempt to bring out the truth of 
the matter und~r discussion, and in the course of the 
process each w~ll be drawn.b~ the logic, the development 
of the conversatlon to a posltlon some distance from where 
she started: "To reach an understanding with one's partner 
in a dialogue is not merely a matter of total 
self-expression and the successful assertion of one's own 
point of view, but a transformation into a communion in 
which we do not remain what we were." (1975:341) , 
I have said in my earlier exposition of hermeneutics that 
Gadamer's commitment to dialectics does not presume any 
teleological certainty; there is no absolute truth to end 
the conversations of humankind, but an endless series of 
opportunities for dialogue - and the more open or truly 
gebildet the individual, the greater the range of 
situations that will be recognised as opportunities for 
learning. Understanding does not come to an end in a final 
moment of transcendent clarity, but remains part of a 
potentially endless process. 
Derrida's approach to dialectics is also rigorously 
un-teleological in that his analyses presume neither 
absolute beginnings nor any certain end-points to be 
reached. His investigations push the concept of dialectics 
to the limit, showing the way any text is prevented from 
achieving what its arguments ostensibly promote. In 
examining the Phaedrus, for example, Derrida finds that 
the language of the text, the rhetorical devices employed 
by Plato undermine the logic that the text purports to 
display.12 And the procedure that Derrida adopts to bring 
out these hidden or suppressed aspects of the text 
involves more than a simple reversal of the conceptual 
opposites that order it. "More than this, it involves the 
dismantling of all those binary distinctions that organize 
Plato's text, to the very point where opposition itself -
the very ground of dialectical reason - gives way to a 
process where opposites merge in a constant undecidable 
exchange of attributes" (Norris, 1987:35). 
Tied up with this, perhaps, are ideas of opposi~ion and 
appropriation. Gadamer's dialectics lnvolves 
appropriation, Derrida's a form of restless opposition. 
Dominelli too takes up an oppositional stance, but lac~s 
the dialectical movement that gives the hermeneut1c 
analyses their power. Neither Gadamer nor Derrida know 
beforehand where their conversations or textual 
investigations will lead, because t~e p~th has,not yet 
been mapped out. A genuine conversatlon 1S not JUs~ ~he 
rehearsal of each party's 'set piece', but a llv1ng 
exchange of views which has the pow~r to ~hange both 
participants. A deconstructive readlng l~ e~uallY 
unpredictable, producing only more text that wlll ltself 
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be amenable to further analysis. 
One effect of Dominelli 's text is simply to invoke a new 
hierarchy - of anti-racism/racism. From the perspective of 
deconstruction, her analysis remains within the terms of 
the old conceptual order as it involves a gesture of 
reversal without a further move towards reinscription, as 
if this first gesture is sufficient in itself. 
Deconstruction is not about the replacement of one set of 
political or ideological building blocks with a new, more 
politically correct set. And the process of challenging 
racism, where it operates at the level of a linguistic 
resource, is just that a process. Dominelli opposes 
racism, and wants to replace it with anti-racism and, 
eventually, with 'non-racism', as if the contours of these 
new states are readily to hand. But neither anti-racist 
social work, nor anti-racist anything else, are available 
to be 'slotted in', when racism has been taken out of the 
system. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
NOTES 
1 . Kuhn . (1962 and 1977~ coi ned the term Ifparadi gm shi ft" 
to descr1be the way 1n which patterns of ideas change 
across time, although the dynamics of this - how it 
actually happens - is, not surprisingly, contested. 
2. All references in this chapter are to Dominelli (1988), 
unless otherwise specified. 
3. It is interesting to note, in passing, tht Dominell; 
refers to black people as "victims" twice in this section, 
in comments identifying the racism of statements number 4 
and 16. This usage stands out, contrasting as it does with 
one of the main themes of the book - black people as 
powerful and autonomous agents 1n the fight against 
racism. 
4. This seems to raise similar problems to those 
encountered in Gadamerian hermeneutics: how does one 
decide between two conflicting traditions or aspects of 
one overall tradition? And, further. how can one know when 
to stop trying to learn from a particular (possibly 
flawed) tradition or prejudice? 
5. It gets us no further forward to appeal to 'social work 
values' to provide the basic components of "good 
practice". As the continuing discussion of suitable 
candidates for the role of 'social work values' indicates 
see Timms (1983) and Horne (1987), for example-
agreement at this level has not been achieved. From a 
deconstructive point of view, an appeal framed in these 
terms can be taken as an attempt to define social work as 
a transcendental signified, an attempt that the endless 
disseminating play of meaning continues to foil. By 
contrast, Clarke adopts an approach that recognises the 
"diverse and fragmentary nature 1l of social work (1993:1). 
6. See chapter five above for discussion of and further 
references to both logocentrism and phonocentrism. 
7. ibid. 
8. Using 'contain' in the sense both of "comprise" and 
"keep within limits i ', "hold back", and "control" (all 
definitions taken from the Longman Concise Eng7ish 
Dictionary, 1985 Edition.) 
~. Within the hermeneutics of tradition, contradiction is 
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acknowledged but, through the dialogic process that 
produces understanding, is always open to further 
discussion. As has already been observed, the most 
fruitful opportunities for learning come from an 
engagement with 'difference'. So from this perspective, 
the experience of contradiction is potentially productive 
it can highlight a particular aspect of one's own 
tradition or world-view as problematic and invite 
reconsideration of the assumptions supporting it. 
Contradiction does not necessarily have to be resolved, 
though the assumption in Gadamer's work that understanding 
entails agreement, seems to make this the preferred 
outcome. 
10. Though Dominelli 's position at least has the novelty 
of requiring the traditionally more powerful dialogue 
partner to acquiesce in the views of the traditionally 
inferior partner, it nonetheless exhibits the same problem 
as Gadamer'g account of the dialogic nature of 
understanding: namely, how to decide when 'true' 
understanding has been achieved? 
11. See discussion of and further references to the 
Gadamer/Habermas debate in chapter four above. 
12. The analysis of The Phaedrus can be found 1n 
Dissemination (Derrida, 1972), where a discussion of the 
Greek word pharmakon is used to illustrate "a process 
where opposites merge in a constant undecidable exchange 
of attributes" (Norris, 1987:35). The more general 
question of undecidability is also broached in Derrida 
(1976). For further commentary on this issue, see Culler 
(1983:142-146) and Norris (1987:37ff). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
READING AHMAD'S BLACK PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIAL WORK: AN 
ENCOUNTER WITH DIFFERENCE 
8.1 Introduction. 
In this chapter, I return to a text that addresses the 
emergence of black perspectives in social work: Ahmad's 
book can be taken as an example of a text written from 
such a perspective, and one whose subject matter is 
directly concerned with the application or involvement of 
a black viewpoint in social work (Ahmad, 1990).1 This work 
1S further of interest because it illustrates the 
hermeneutic problem in at least three ways. In the first 
place, as a text which a white social worker can and 
should read, it does itself present a challenging exercise 
in hermeneutic understanding. Second, Ahmad's approach in 
some respects exemplifies the branch of hermeneutics which 
I associate with Gadamer. Third, it exhibits a certain 
incompleteness which can be analysed by reference to the 
other branch of hermeneutics, the one I associate with 
deconstruction and the work of Derrida. 
In what follows, I shall explore each of these three 
points in more detail. In sections 8.2 and 8.3, I review 
my own responses to the book, and try to show why the 
questions raised by my own reading of the text have to be 
placed within a hermeneutic context. In section 8.4, I 
focus again on the content of the book, though to avoid 
undue repetition of the material of chapter two, this will 
necessarily be a much briefer exposition, drawing out 
certain points which, I suggest, link it to a Gadamerian 
perspective; from this perspective, I propose that Ahmad's 
observations can be interpreted as a realisation of the 
"fusion of horizons". Finally, in the last section, I 
raise further questions about what I have identified as 
the book's 'incompleteness', and suggest that a more 
Derridean approach can make sense of this. 
8.2 Reading Ahmad. 
By one set of standards and conventions this book fails: 
it is clumsily written, poorly edited and copy-edited ~if 
indeed it was proof-read at all), and uses ~ referenc1ng 
'system' that is near to useless. The text ra1ses a number 
of problems - of semantics, grammar and syntax. Ahmad has 
an odd habit of lapsing into inverted co~mas appar~ntly 
randomly through the text which, together w1th her fa1lure 
to provide adequate references to material drawn from 
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other authors, make~ it difficult for the reader to know 
whether she 1S q~ot1ng ver~atim from an external source, 
paraphrasi~g or s1mply drawlng attention to an unusual or 
controvers1al usage. There are a number of examples where 
none o~ these ,explanations seems to apply, leaving the 
reader 1n someth1ng of a textual wilderness. 
In the following section, I present examples of the kind 
of textual oddities and difficulties I have identified. 
Although taken in isolation each one may seem fairly 
trivial, the effect on the (this?) reader is cumulative, 
and unsettling. The examples are placed in six groups: 
a. The first, and possibly least controversial, group 
contains typographical or copy-editing errors which may 
well have nothing to do with the actual author of the 
text, but which are, nonetheless, made significant by 
their very abundance. The kinds of error I include here 
are: 
talking about "the five points above" when six are 
listed (p7S); 
the use of single subjects with plural verbs and vice 
versa, e.g. "assessment practice which ... do not relate 
to thei r rea 1 needs" and" inadequate resou rces ... has 
such debilitating effects" ( p8 and p.20 respectively); 
basic mis-spelling, for example: "advise" where 
'advice' is meant (p16) , "occurances" (p?), "dependant" 
(p61), together with other misprints like "cleints" (p47) 
and "being" for 'begin' (p6); 
uncorrected expressions, for example: "overemphasis on 
of Black men's sexism" (p17), "most highest" (p25), and 
"the statutory and 1 egal framework" (p31), "for e. g." 
(p53, pS4 and elsewhere). 
b. Inappropriate and inconsistent use of capital letters. 
Odd words or phrases suddenly appear with initial capital 
letters, where normally no such distinction would be 
expected; for exampl e, "Cari ng Professi on of soci al work" 
is found on page 29, whereas throughout the rest of the 
text allusions to the social work profession are not thus 
high;ighted (examples ad lib ); the "Welfare of the Child" 
and "Black Children" are capitalised for no apparent 
reason on page 89; on a later page we have "childminders" 
but "Day Care providers" (p90), and it is no clearer why 
"Affirmative practice" is capitalised (PP75 and 76) ,w~en 
"anti-racist practice" (p74) and the "ethnically sens1tlve 
approach" (p76) remain stubbornly lower case. 
c. Apparently random use of inverted commas (' ') and 
quotation marks (" ... It). 
I raised this problem earlier in this chapter, and start 
to illustrate the point here with two examples from the 
text. Ahmad's discussion of Solomon's work on empowerment 
(p34) uses a mixture of" "and' ... ' and seems to treat 
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them as interchangeable. On page 51 there is an 0 tb k 
. t d h' urea of 1nver e commas - w 1ch mayor may not indicate d 
. d' tl d wor s be1ng 1rec y quote from another text, as no reference 
is given - follow~d hal;way down the same page by a global 
reference .to V1 ckery s paper How to Provi de Soc i a 7 
Services w7th Task-Centred Methods which 1S 1n turn 
attached to a very general remark to do with the 
assessment of the nature of the 'problem' (my inverted 
commas!) in social work. A degree of confusion results 
from this aspect of Ahmad's unusual style, further 
instances of which are sprinkled through the text, and are 
discussed below. 
On a number of occasions, passages or words are placed in 
inverted commas and followed by a superscript number 
denoting reference to a work listed at the end of the 
chapter (examples can be found on virtually any page). 
Initially, I assumed that these passages were meant to 
indicate that words had been quoted from the work named at 
the end of the chapter. But two difficulties arise with 
this: if the words contained within the inverted commas 
are verbatim quotes, what is the point of using quotation 
marks as well? And if the inverted commas do not signify 
direct quotation, why does Ahmad make such extravagant use 
of them? It 1S common usage to identify an unusual 
expression or an original coinage by placing it ln 
quotat ion marks/ inverted commas, but very 
straightforward, widely accepted expressions are 
distinguished by Ahmad in this way; for example, on pages 
46-47 this passage appears: 
Liberal social work approach, ln effect, is a safe 
approach. On the surface, it can make safe assumptions 
"that the interests of the client and the worker are 
compatible", but can mask its "importance of power in 
shaping worker-client relations"44 behind its 
bureaucratic structures, which provide "a rather safe 
and secure context out of which the definition of 
professional and professional roles ... can be clearly 
described."45 So, why shake the structures? Why lose 
'earned right' to hold 'privileged status'? Why 'risk' 
management 'intimidation', 'nullification', 
'isolation l 'defamation' or even 'expulsion'? 
I have omitted'quotation marks of my own in this case, for 
clarity. 
Do the words 1n inverted commas refer back to passages in 
one or both of the books already mentioned (Ahmad's 
references 44 and 45), or perhaps simply to paraphrases of 
these other authors' words? If this is the case, why are 
they not, in turn, placed in quotation m~rks or provided 
with superscript numbers? Alternatively, 1f the words are 
~hmad's own, why do they require this treatment? Does she 
intend to imply that the 'risk' of unfavourable management 
response is not genuine, that there is in fact only an 
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imagined risk of negative repercussions against the social 
worker? Are the listed consequences of 
1 management displea~ure a so ,imagined or overstated? Is Ahmad 
presentlng real soclal workers' fears anonymously? With no 
clues forthcoming from Ahmad herself, the reader ~ust make 
up ~is ,or her own mind - possibly by providing a more 
imaglnatlve response than I have managed! 
The same problems recur in other passages in the book for 
example, in the section entitled "Empowerment in Group 
Work Approach" (pp61-3), the paragraph "Example 3" (p67) 
and "Case study 11" (p68). And I include one last exampl~ 
here that manages to combine the spurious use of inverted 
commas with unnecessary capital letters: on page 52 Ahmad 
refers to "the notorious occurances [sic] of ~Racial 
Harassment' in the area". 
An adjacent problem concerns the superscript references 
and what they actually refer to. In chapter 2, Ahmad 
provides a list of "empowering characteristics" of the 
unitary approach in social work. Item 6 reads as follows: 
6. Intervention, whether at client level and/or agency 
1 evel , "demands consi derabl e knowl edge of the vari ous 
systems affecting individuals and the families in the 
community", "collecting information", "contacting 
various elements of the client, target and action 
systems" in order to collating [sic] "data".96 
Again, I have hoped to minimise confusion by avoiding the 
use of quotation marks around the preceding passage, which 
can be found on p56. 
On checking this reference (see p72), the reader is 
presented with a puzzle for at number 96 it says "ibid nos 
91 and 93"; reference 91 is merci full y strai ghtforward in 
that it points the reader to a specific text - by Currie 
and Parrott though there is no indication which of 
Ahmad's quotes are taken from this work as opposed to 
number 93. But turning to reference 93 only leads the 
reader further into the mire: "93. R.J.Evans - Unitary 
Models of Practice and the Social Work Team - ibid no. 
87". And no.8? turns out to be an entirely separate text, 
with no obvious connection with R.J.Evans' beyond the 
shared use of the word "unitary" in their respective 
titles! Which, if any of the three texts listed provided 
the inspiration for Ahmad's 'quotations' recorded above? 
d. This fourth group contains examples of f~miliar wo~ds 
used in unexpected contexts: on page 2, soclal work w~th 
black families is described as "enigmatic due to ltS 
concern, anxiety and paranoia". M~ under~tanding ,of 
Ahmad's position suggests that she flnds ~oclal work wlth 
black families as presently practlsed ~erfectly 
understandable and unmysterious; the problem ls,rath~r 
that this practice is unacceptable. Elsewhere, we flnd, ln 
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a comment about the promot i on of a commun it' 1 h th t "th' Y SOCl a work ~pproadc , ' "a( 13 1 S a~vocacy has not been wi thout 
lnexpe lence, p ,emphasls added), And, unfortunately on 
the ,ve~y flrst page of the book, Ahmad talks abo t 
"perlodlcal ,phenomenon" which has nothing to do w~tha 
popular soclal work weekly magazines, but is rather 
intende~ to r~fer to the recurrent features of the debate 
about the dlfferent experiences and needs of Black and 
Minority Ethnic families living in Britain". 
e. In ~his group~ I have noted some examples of words that 
are elther tYPlng errors or new coinages by Ahmad; given 
the overall ~tate of,the text, there is little to help the 
reader declde WhlCh explanation to adopt. Examples 
include: "accredation" (p2), "well intentional" (p12) 
"epistyle" (p16), and "immuned" (p18). ' 
f. The last group consists of examples of text that I 
would describe as 'understandable but odd'. By this I mean 
that a first reading may not prove particularly 
transparent, but that meaning can be found if one 
persists. Three examples are offered to illustrate this 
point: 
"Assessment of Mrs. J. and her family's housing need would 
not be totally left unchallenged to the procedures of 
Housing Department." (p19) 
" ... despite the increasing commitment to make social work 
profession ethnically sensitive and responsive to Black 
clients, there are still certain oppressive forces that 
disallow transferance [sic] of racial awareness to 
recognising oppreSSlve practices, that disaccord the 
rhetoric of commitment from social work action against 
racist procedures." 
"There 1S now considerable evidence of Black communities 
adversely effected [sic] by mortality ... and ill health 
specific to Black people." (p61) 
My criticisms of Ahmad's text at this level have been 
given in some detail, and are clearly extensive. However, 
I have not 'exhausted' the text by conducting this kind of 
examination of it· and in the next section I shall present 
some ideas on both the experience or process of , reading 
such a piece of writing, and the approach to soc1al work 
that Ahmad is promoting. 
8.3 Reading Ahmad agaln - a white perspective. 
My experience 
confronted 
'a 1 i en ' and 
of reading this book, and finding myself 
perhaps unexpectedly with something 
disturbing, can be used as an example of the 
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attempt to ~chieve hermeneutic understanding through an 
encounte~ w~th o~herness. Having read through B7ack 
Perspect 1 ves 1 n SOC1 a 7 Work for the fi rst time m . . t' 1 
, , , y lnl la 
reactlon was v~ry,negatlve. I was puzzled and disappointed 
by ~he pecUd~lalrlty of a text that was not written in any 
patols or la ect I recognised, but was nonetheless 
c~early not 'st~ndard English'. The language was a curious 
mlxture of ordln~ry te~m~ and constructions together with 
many that were hlghly ldlosyncratic, as detailed earlier. 
~nd t~is unusual mel~nge was further complicated by the 
lncluslon. of what plalnly m~st have been straightforward 
typographlcal errors. All ln all, a most unsatisfactory 
read. 
But I then found myself in something of a dilemma: how to 
assess such a book? Could I dismiss it as an irritating 
episode, a small amount of time wasted in my long-running 
studies, or did I have to think seriously about how to 
address this material, treat seriously its contribution to 
the development of anti-racist social work practice? 
Should I try and find out the circumstances under which it 
was written and/or produced? Would I react differently if 
I learned that the text was, for example, written 
originally in another language and than translated into 
what was supposed to be mainstream English by the author? 
Or, that the author had adopted a dialect/non-standard 
form of English with which I was not familiar hitherto? 
Clearly, different language forms can be deliberately used 
in unexpected contexts, with the aim of surprising the 
'standard reader' into re-viewing his initial assumptions 
concerning the type of text and its content. But I have no 
way of knowing whether this was the case here. In short, 
and knowing this book to have a black author, the question 
I found myself formulating became: is my reaction racist? 
In previous chapters, I have tried to indicate how a 
hermeneutic approach can usefully be brought to bear on 
questions of understanding in social work. Within a 
Gadamerian approach, priority is given to the role of 
tradition in shaping our relations with the 'outside 
world', and in providing a framework of "prejudices" that 
orientate our understanding. From a hermeneutic 
perspective, then, I should certainly be wary of being 
overtly critical of a book written from and about a black 
perspective or black perspectives, as I am conscious that 
my position as a member of the white middle class provides 
me with a particular vantage point and frame of re~erence 
from which to make judgements about textual materlal. My 
point of view is further differentiated by membership of 
an academic community which provides both the context 
within which this particular piece of work has been 
produced and at least some of the values and standards 
around which my own writing and reading have been 
organised. 
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So in order to u~derstand this text, an approach drawn 
from the hermeneut~cs of tradition suggests that I will 
have to start a dlalogue with it, and this will involve 
trying ,to put my own prejudices into play, testing and 
evaluatlng them as part of the process of negotiating with 
the text. And some of the prejudices in action here will 
concern 'proper' use of language, the format of 'academic' 
versus 'popular' texts and the definitions of these and 
other categories of writing. 
I posed the question earlier whether my initial reaction 
to Ahmad's book was racist, but did not try at that point 
to answer it, partly because I do not think that there is 
a straightforward answer to give. However, starting to 
formulate such questions is a necessary corrective to the 
attitude that has long prevailed, namely that if you don't 
ask the question, no-one can accuse you of racism. The 
white person's fear of being (however unwittingly) racist, 
or of being put in a position where such a charge can even 
be levelled, can be paralysing. 2 But, having said this, if 
I allow my opportunity to engage with this text to 'slip 
away' - that is, if I do not try to honestly confront the 
puzzles, areas of difficulty or apparent confusion in the 
text - and hide behind a fear of appearing racist, then I 
have learned nothing from this encounter. I have, in 
Gadamer's terms, lost the opportunity to become more 
gebildet, and have closed off an avenue for exploring both 
my own tradition and the new world of the text before 
me. 3 
So what follows is my attempt to take a risk, and start a 
dialogue with Ahmad's text. I do so on the understanding, 
drawn from Gadamerian hermeneutics, that to do so 
represents an opportunity for learning and for increasing 
my understanding of die Sache, the matter at hand - in 
this case, the articulation of a black perspective on 
social work. I will therefore now offer a closer 
consideration of what Ahmad actually says, mediated by the 
thoughts which I have presented in the first two sections 
of this chapter, and try to move towards a 'fusion of 
horizons' with her text. 
8.4 Social work from a black perspective: empowerment for 
all. 
Running through Ahmad's critique of social w~rk,as it is 
currently practiced, and her proposals for br~nglng,about 
a greater degree of "sensitivity ~nd ~onsldera~lon ~f 
cultural expectations" (p11) in routlne lnterventl~ns ln 
black families, is an appeal to a form of understandlng, a 
relationship between social worker and clie~t that calls 
to mind the dialogic model explored ln Gadamer's 
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hermeneut i cs . Thus, I wou 1 d suggest, the kind of 
understanding sought via a hermeneutic exchange can be 
'mapped on' to the approach Ahmad describes in chapter one 
for the adequate and accurate identification and 
assessment of the needs of black clients. The first case 
study (p9ff) charts various welfare agencies' involvement 
wit~ the B. family, and highlights the damage done when 
(wh1te) workers draw on a restricted and derogatory set of 
cultural stereotypes to 'inform' their assessments of 
black clients and then use these ill-founded assessments 
as the basis for action plans. 
Ahmad's discussion of the case, and her pointers toward 
improvements in practice involve the worker and client(s) 
in trying to arrive at an understanding of each other's 
position an understanding based on authentic dialogue 
rather than untested preconceptions. It is perhaps worth 
emphasising again that a position altogether free of 
preconceptions is, from a hermeneutic point of view, 
literally unthinkable. The point is not whether one has 
prejudices, but the extent to which the individual in 
pursuit of understanding will allow these prejudices to be 
tested. 
Going on, I would suggest that there are similarities 
between what Ahmad, in chapter two, calls empowerment and 
the kind of understanding sought by the hermeneutics of 
tradition: although not uS1ng this language, Ahmad 1S 
advocating, in part - at least, a dialogic model of 
understanding. There 1S a need for the social worker to 
see the other parties to the exchange as "conversible 
with ll (Whan) .. This theme runs through many of the case 
studies, where 'bad' social work 1S presented as the 
result of the social worker being unable or unwilling to 
engage in real dialogue, and hiding behind stereotypic 
'understanding' of the client (and, in some cases, other 
workers too). 
In case study 7 (p36ff), for example, each participant 
allows herself to engage fully with the 'conversation' 
that the social work intervention process has become. No 
viewpoint is ultimately privileged, though each person's 
particular (and necessarily partial) contribution is 
respected. The white social worker's view does certainly 
not get priority, though her access to specific pieces of 
specialised knowledge and information about social 
services' procedure is acknowledged. Neither is Ms. H., 
the nominal client, elevated to a point where her 
interpretation of events is unchallenged and 
unchallengeable - simply because she is black. 
Each participant has taken a risk - that her previous way 
of looking at the world, at colleagues, friends, and 
'professionals', may need to be revised. No-one is asked 
to abando~ her previous prejudices (even if such a thing 
wer~ poss1ble), but rather to put them into play with and 
ag~lnst t~ose. of the other participants. One result of 
th1S exerC1se 1S that each party in the process ends up on 
new ground; each has learned something about the world of 
the other and~ f~rther, can use this experience to inform 
her ways of th1nk1ng and making judgements in the future. 
If chapters one and two of Ahmad's book have indicated the 
need for, and direction of, change in the way social work 
is co~ducted, chapter three, "Resources for Change", 
eff~ct'vely. summarises and consolidates the changes 
envlsaged 1n the way the potential participants in the 
social work exchange see themselves and each other. The 
kind of 'good practice' that Ahmad advocates involves a 
greater emphasis on openness and accountability than 
currently obtains. She is concerned with making practice -
and decision-making processes which inform practice - more 
'transparent' and less private, which in turn has 
consequences for traditional ideas of confidentiality. 
Achieving Ahmad's ideal of 'good' social work clearly 
requires the cultivation of a different attitude towards 
practice right through the social services hierarchy, and 
an acceptance that SSD staff would be less able to appeal 
to confidentiality as a reason for avoiding scrutiny or 
monitoring of their work. 
There are implications in this change of attitude for 
recording (i .e. case files), and social work writing more 
broadly. Ahmad does not herself really deal with the 
question of social work writing per se; the subject only 
arises in the context of the discussion of the open file 
policy at the beginning of the book. But I think that the 
empowering practice endorsed by Ahmad could not leave 
traditional recording methods unchanged. The question of 
writing in general, and social work writing in particular 
has been a primary focus of this thesis, and here again, 
the implications of a hermeneutic approach can be seen. 
A more open, collaborative approach to practice, as 
outlined in Black Perspectives in Social Work, could 
support a similar approach to recording, perhaps involving 
direct discussion between worker and client, or worker and 
community group representative, to decide on relevant 
material for inclusion in the SSD file. An agreed form of 
words could then be recorded on the file and initialled by 
those concerned. Where agreement could not be reached, 
there could be provision for the differing views to be 
recorded, perhaps with some comment from each ~ar~y on w~y 
this occurred. I would not underestimate the.d'ff,cult~ ,n 
bringing about even this degree ~f ch~nge ,n SSD hab'~ 
after all, the idea of open f,les 's not greeted w,th 
universal enthusiasm, for a variety of reasons, and what I 
have sketched above would take the process of 'opening up' 
social services to scrutiny one step further on. 
Bu~ even without t~e organisational commitment to change, 
Whl~h such a POllCY would require, individuals taking 
thelr.cu~s from ~hmad can try to adopt a more positive and 
questlo~ln~ attltude to~ards black individuals and groups 
who~ wlthln a.hermeneutlc perspective, come to be seen as 
havl~g so~ethlng to offer white people. To repeat an 
earll~r POl nt, we can learn from the Other's understanding 
of d7e Sache, the assumption here being that the black 
person or group will have access to a different point of 
view, coming from a different tradition - or a different 
place in the. same tradition - and that this has something 
to teach us, lf we are willing to learn. 
Although a hermeneutic approach clearly offers an 
opportunity to achieve greater understanding of the Other, 
and thence, of ourselves as culturally and historically 
situated individuals, there is nonetheless the very real 
possibility of such an approach lapsing into conservative 
acqulescence in the status quo. This, in essence, repeats 
a familiar criticism of Gadamerian hermeneutics, a 
criticism associated with Habermas in particular. 
Dialogue, even as Gadamer understands it, retains the 
potential to become another means of control when it fails 
to recognise (as Gadamer is accused of doing) the 
inequalities of power between cultures. If members of an 
oppressing culture are unable to 'step outside' their 
initial prejudices or forejudgements, as Gadamer suggests, 
the danger remains that any adjustments will ultimately be 
self-serving; the 'tradition' will maintain its 
authority. 
Habermas' critique of Gadamer's version of hermeneutics 
has already been rehearsed, and his alternative proposals 
for a critical theory briefly sketched. 4 I have attached 
more weight to the critique of hermeneutics than the 
theory Habermas in turn derives from it, and have looked 
elsewhere for a way of thinking about text - using 'text' 
in the broadest sense - which maintains a critical and 
inquiring focus. In the final section, therefore, I return 
to some ideas based on the more radical interpretation of 
hermeneutics that I have associated with the work of 
Derrida. I shall try to show that the application of these 
ideas points to a certain 'incompleteness' in Ahmad's 
work, and that trying to make sense of them in a social 
work context could mean moving even further beyond the 
status quo than she has done. As the preceding discussions 
of deconstruction have indicated, it is impossible to 
specify from here as it were, what the end result of this 
further movement' should be - and equally impossible to 
give it a convenient label. But I shall suggest that this 
version of radical hermeneutics illuminates areas in which 
a latent conservatism might otherwise struggle - despite 
jialogue, and despite attempts to 'fuse horizons' - to 
naintain itself. 
8.5 Writing from the margins of social work: black 
perspectives and deconstruction. 
That certain ideas or ways of thinking have pre-eminence 
in different cultures at different times or that a 
hie~archy of. '~pis~emologically correct' con~ePts holds a 
dom1nant trad1t1on 1n place, is a commonplace observation. 
Yet, while a dominant tradition has the power to 
circumscribe and prefigure our ways of understanding, it 
does not function as a hermetically sealed capsule. This, 
after all, is the message of the "fusion of horizons" and 
the guarantee of the possibility of understanding between 
individuals and between ages. Hermeneutics suggests that a 
tradition is, to some extent at least, permeable, but 
initially accepts the conceptual framework around which it 
is organised: in Gadamer's account of understanding, the 
tradition 1S allowed an authority over us, by virtue of 
the idea of the anticipation of completeness (Gadamer, 
1979:261-2). 
Deconstruction also acknowledges our inevitable location 
within a tradition, but accords its conceptual hierarchy 
no such privileged status. On the contrary, the undoing or 
cracking open of our culturally protected hierarchies is 
the very stuff of deconstruction - though again it is 
worth emphasising that this is pursued neither in a 
nihilistic nor in a frivolous way. The deconstructive 
critic or analyst is firmly rooted in the discourses of 
her own tradition - indeed, she has no other language -
but adopts a strategy that calls into question every 
fundamental of that tradition. In the translator'S preface 
to Of Grammato7ogy, Spivak writes, "It is the strategy of 
using the only available language while not subscribing to 
its premises, or 'operat[ing] according to the vocabulary 
of the very thing that one delimits' (MP 18, SP 147)" 
(Derrida, 1976: pxviii). 
The point at issue here is the impossibility of 'escaping' 
language or of finding a prejudice-free place from which 
to apply one's critical lever. Thus, in the context that I 
am examining social work practice anti-racists, 
whether black or white, are bound to use the vocabulary 
and concepts that are presently available, knowing them to 
be implicated in the maintenance of (racist) hierarchies 
of domination and suppression. As Norris explains, "It is 
only possible to criticize existing institutions from 
within an inherited language, a discourse that will always 
have been worked over by traditional concepts and 
categories. What is required is a kind of internal 
distancing, an effort of defamiliarization which prevents 
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:oncepts from settling down into routine habits of 
" (Norris, 1987:16). 
perhaps the ca~e tha~ the skill black people employ 
der to surV1ve w1th dignity and a sense of 
rth, .and emp~oy daily in their negotiations with a 
. soc1ety, 1S exactly the sort of "internal 
1ng" that Norris highlights above: a way of 
g that constantly questions the received wisdom 
the roles and destinies of both blacks and whites 
lows the articulation of alternative frameworks i~ 
rm of the different 'black perspectives' curre~tlY 
tested out? However one answers this question the 
. , 
on rema1ns: even a black writer cannot occupy a 
~ged position in the sense of being somehow 
Ie' 1 anguage, though he may be abl e to use the 
:tive of being marginalised by the majority society 
'OW new light on an otherwise familiar scene. "Since 
:ruction attempts to view systems from the outside 
1 as the inside, it tries to keep alive the 
Ility that the eccentricity of women, poets, 
:s and madmen [and, we might add, ethnic minority 
I might yield truths about the system to which they 
lrginal - truths contradicting the consensus and not 
trable within a framework yet developed" (Culler, 
53-4) . 
~ from a black perspective in a white society de 
involves writing from the margins (Derrida, 1982) 
Jrings into focus a whole range of hitherto 
ranchised groups and minority voices. Such writing 
the power to subvert existing hierarchies; for 
9, in this case the hierarchies of centre/periphery, 
(practice, subject/object are challenged if the 
ionally marginal and down-rated voice of ethnic 
ty practitioners is elevated, placed 'centre stage', 
1ven the kind of hearing usually only accorded to 
of traditional (that is, white) academic 
rship. 
estions remain to be asked. What does this new voice 
hould it be voices?) say? What is it that white 
workers are hearing? What is it, finally, to write 
a black perspective? Ahmad herself explicitly 
ses this last point early in her book, starting with 
ar statement of her position: "This book is written 
Black perspective" (p3). She notes that while it is 
place to ask what a 'black perspective' is, the same 
on is not posed in relation to a 'white perspective' 
ite' is accepted as the norm against which the Other 
asured and defined. Ahmad continues, "Black writers 
o refrain from any demands made on them to produce a 
definition of Black perspective. For Black 
ctive 1S much more than a string of words. It is 
more of a statement of 'Wh i te norms'; The 
circumstances that shape a Black perspective stem from the 
experience of ~aci~m and powerlessness, both past and 
~resent. The motlva~1o~ that energises a Black perspective 
1S roote~ to t~e pr1nc1ple,of racial equality and justice. 
The art1culat1on tha~ v01ces,a Black perspective is part 
o~ a ~rocess that 1S comm1tted to replacing the white 
d1stort1on of Black reality with Black writings of Black 
experience" (p3). 
This passage bears closer consideration because it is 
here, I suggest, that the 'incompleteness' referred to 
earlier manifests itself. Disentangling the different 
strands of Ahmad's statement, the radical implications of 
her argument seem less clear-cut and we are left with a 
situation where, despite the apparently challenging 
rhetoric, the social work system can remain fundamentally 
unaffected even by the application of a 'black 
perspective'. A conservative tendency can be discerned in 
the way Ahmad formulates her position that undermines or 
at the least restricts the impetus for the much-needed 
change that is the ostensible 'message' of her text. This 
point is explored in more detail below. 
It is possible to argue that the passage quoted above, in 
which Ahmad makes her statement about black perspectives, 
incorporates three distinct threads: a) the idea that the 
black perspective is basically a 'negative' critique, 
appealing to the principles of racial equality and 
justice; b) the idea that the black perspective is an 
attack on, is defined in opposition to "White norms"; and 
c) the idea that the black perspective is an articulation 
of black experience. Three very different ideas are 
expressed here. One is that a black perspective consists 
of an appeal to principles - to norms - that white social 
workers would themselves acknowledge: equality and 
justice. The second is that it is white norms themselves 
which are at issue, and which must be resisted. And the 
third is that, irrespective of norms and principles, the 
black perspective is an articulation of black experience. 
To express these ideas somewhat differently: each position 
can be re-stated - without, I hope, oversimplifying the 
points being made - in terms of what Ahmad calls 'norms': 
thus, a) white 'norms' (such as equality and justice) are 
valid, but whites ignore or suspend them when d~aling with 
black people; b) white 'norms' are bas1cally not 
acceptable; and c) black experience has an authenticity 
that white 'norms' distort. I would argue that the 
'incompleteness' of Ahmad's work that I have referred to 
1S related to the fact that, analytically, she does not 
explore the differences between these positions. 
I have, at various points throughout this thesis, drawn on 
feminist writings to illuminate particular dynamics in 
what I .hav~ termed the ~ace and social work debate. And 
here ~ga1n, 1t s~ems appos1te to consider such writings in 
relat~on to th1S ~uggested.lack of analytical clarity in 
Ahmad ~ text, paY1ng ~art1c~lar attention to Harding's 
analys1s of androcentr1sm w1thin the institutions of 
7cience (19~6~ discussed in chapter two. Taking the three 
1deas or.pos1t1~ns ?rawn out of Ahmad's statement on black 
per~p~ct1ve~, 1t 1~ possible to frame a parallel set of 
pos1t1ons 1n relat10n to gender - in the paragraph above 
we can substitute 'male' for 'white' and 'female' for 
'black' throughout to see what these positions are - and 
these have provided a focus for extensive feminist debate. 
Many have argued, with respect to position a), that male 
'norms' oppress women precisely because they do not take 
account of the 'difference' that women represent. s It has 
also been argued, with respect to position c), that 
women's experience is always already embedded in male 
discourse, from which it should be the task of feminist 
analysis to free it. 'Articulation' is not enough.6 
Translating back into the language of race, similar 
arguments can be set out in terms of 'black' and 'white', 
which challenge the usefulness of the ideas expressed at 
a) and c), namely that white norms oppress black people 
precisely because they do not acknowledge the 'difference' 
that black people represent, and that black people's 
experience does not exist in a vacuum, it is already 
embedded in a dominant white discourse. We are left with 
position b) and the possibility, to put it no more 
strongly, that white 'norms' are not okay. The 'tradition' 
1S itself flawed and, in part perhaps, in need of 
revision. It 1S this possibility that Gadamerian 
hermeneutics fails to address adequately, and which 
accounts for the charge of latent conservatism in this 
case. 
In this context, there are two noticeable characteristics 
of Ahmad's book. One is that she writes almost exclusively 
about "work with black families". the other, and I would 
suggest related, feature is that she draws heavily on 
established (that is to say, white) social work norms. 
Indeed, in the paragraph immediately following the o~e 
already quoted from page 3, she says: "the.cont~nt.of th1S 
book is placed in the context of the bas1c pr1nc~ples of 
care, including some of the main principles of soc1al work 
and professional ethos and values"; and throug~out the 
book she is apparently quite sanguine about uS1ng such 
familiar concepts in an unexamined and unanalysed way.? 
A Derridean version of hermeneutics, I suggest, would 
interrogate precisely those concepts that Ahmad appears to 
take for granted and attempt to deconstruct the~ m~ch more 
systematically. There 1S, after all, no a pr7or7 reason 
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w~y a ,blac~ persP7ctive should have to limit itself to 
d1~CuSslng work wlth black families' drawing blindly on 
wh1~e, c~nc7Pts. Arguably, the expression 'work with black 
fam1l1es 1tself already presupposes a white framework. 
If, as Ahmad advocates, the black perspective is to be a 
"statement against White norms", then surely it has 
licence ~o ~ackle ,these norms head-on, and ask how far 
they are lmpllcated ln the control and oppression of black 
people. 
A deconstructive analysis, which went beyond the 
Gadamerian "fusion of horizons", would be one method of 
probing this essential thought. It could point the way to 
a black perspective on social work, rather than a black 
perspective on 'social work with black families' (via an 
articulation of black experience). Admittedly, this would 
mean continuing to use the familiar concepts - but they 
woul d be "under erasure", foll owi ng Derri da' s usage, 
pending the emergence of something more genuinely 
non-racist. 
I am aware that this idea may be open to misconstruction -
or rather, my motives in suggesting it may appear suspect: 
what I have written may be interpreted as a white person 
yet again telling black people how to go about 'solving' 
racism; or, to put it slightly differently, it may seem to 
offer to whites an opportunity to evade their own 
responsibilities by finding new ways for blacks to 
confront raClsm. My intention is to make neither of the 
above points, but to open up for debate the whole question 
of how 'we' produce, read and use text. This is not an 
exercise to get white people 'off the hook' - quite the 
reverse. What I am suggesting is a broadening of the range 
of texts that are considered suitable or relevant for 
study, where necessary by challenging the bases on which 
decisions as to 'suitability' or 'relevance' have been 
made by different 'authorities'. In addition, I am 
proposing an equivalent enlarging of the 'critical base', 
by which I mean those whose comments and analyses should 
be considered part of the critical process. 
In conclusion, then, I suggest that both traditional and 
the more radical versions of hermeneutics would give black 
writings serious consideration, though for different 
reasons and with different effect. For hermeneutics, any 
point of view different from one's own should be treated 
with respect, and should be interrogated judiciously to 
find out what can be learned from such contrasting 
thinking. We know that our own viewpoin~ can,only be 
partial and that the truth claims of compet1ng V1ews may 
prove ~ompelling. But understanding, in G~dam~r's t~rms, 
involves agreement; hermeneutic understan~1ng 1S aC~1eved 
through the fusion of horizons, the 1ncorporat10n or 
inte~r~tion of ~h~ apparently alien into the fabric of the 
enqu1rlng tradlt10n. To be sure, that tradition is itself 
changed by the encounter, but its hegemony 1S not 
necessarily threatened. 
Decon~t~ucti~n, on the other hand maintains a healthy 
scept1Clsm 1n the face of all claims to truth and insists 
on probing all such claims in an attempt to re-shape our 
conceptual map - though in ways as yet unpredictable. One 
aspect of the development of an anti-racist stance might 
therefore be the attempted deconstruction of the 
white/black hierarchy that racism holds in place. As 
Culler says, though in a different context, "Affirmations 
of equality will not disrupt the hierarchy. Only if it 
includes an inversion or reversal does deconstruction have 
a chance of dislocating the hierarchical structure" 
(1983:166). Elevating 'black' at the expense of 'white' 
would then be a necessary preliminary step in such a 
deconstructive process, signified, perhaps, by the 
promotion of writing from an overtly black perspective. 
This, it seems to me, is plausibly the stage that social 
work practice and training have currently reached. 
Documents such as the recent CCETSW publication One Small 
Step urge the articulation of black perspectives in all 
aspects of social work training and practice, and the 
active incorporation of these perspectives throughout the 
profession. While it may be premature to sound a note of 
caution after all just gaining acknowledgement of the 
importance of black perspectives in social work has not 
been easy, or even now, wholly successful - nevertheless, 
it is important to avoid simply swapping orthodoxies, such 
that 'black writing' is elevated to the point where it is 
effectively unchallengeable, and takes on the status of 
the (politically correct) new improved truth. The 
deconstructive 'reading', as I have suggested at several 
points 1n this study, typically involves a double 
movement, of which the reversal or inversion of the 
contested hierarchy is but one stage, and there remains 
"that essent i al feature of a deconstructi ve readi ng that 
consists, not merely in reversing or subverting some 
established hierarchical order, but in showing how its 
terms are indissociably entwined in a strictly undecidable 
exchange of values and priorities" (Norris, 1987:56). 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
NOTES 
1. All references in this chapter are to this work unless 
otherwise indicated. ' 
2. This point is recognised by Ahmad herself (p30). A 
Derridean analysis might question the ability of certain 
labels to be so powerful. Why is it so damaging to one's 
self-esteem or self-definition to be accused of racism, or 
to be labelled a 'racist'? 
3. This approach chimes with ideas found outside 
mainstream philosophical works, for example some recent 
texts in anthropology. Take, as one instance, a book by 
Marcus and Fischer, 1986: Anthropology as Cultural 
Critique. The title itself implies - something the rest of 
the book confirms that anthropology is not primarily 
about 'studying' other cultures from a Eurocentric 
perspective, pinning them down like dead butterflies, or 
tracing their social structures as one might draw a map of 
the underground. Instead, the significance of anthropology 
is found in the idea of an encounter between cultures 
which, rather than giving one an 'objective' knowledge of 
the other, leads to a reflexive analysis of both cultures 
and, in particular, the culture doing the 'studying'. 
This, it should be clear, is entirely in line with a 
Gadamerian Vlew. We who consider ourselves as 
'investigators' that is, we as members of our own 
culture become gebildet, and are challenged to explore 
our own tradition as well as the 'new' world before us. 
Properly conceived, the experience is one whereby we 
become investigators of our own culture at the same moment 
as we become investigators of an 'alien' culture - and in 
virtue of that very process. the "cultural critique" of 
the Marcus and Fischer title is a critique of ourselves, 
made possible (and only made possible, if we choose to 
accept the invitation) by an encounter with difference; 
and it leads, through phronesis, to an alternative way of 
seeing and an alternative way of doing. 
4. See the preceding discussion of the Gadamer/Habermas 
debate in chapter four above. 
5. See Harding (1986) for a discussion, and criticism, of 
feminist empiricism. 
6. This criticism has been levelled against what Harding 
(1986) calls the feminist standpoint position. 
7. Thus, Ahmad is able to use the expression "good social 
work practice" with ease; she gives no hint that there may 
be less than universal agreement about the criteria by 
which to judge 'good' practice, apparently assuming an 
already existing (and unchanging?) general accord. In this 
context, her position seems to mirror Dominelli 's, and 
similar concerns about her use of language can be 
expressed (see chapter seven for a fuller account of these 
concerns). 
9.1 Introduction. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS 
"No ~atter how grea~ the commitment to clarity, no matter 
how lntense the,deslre to c~mmunicate, when we are trying 
ourselves to dellneate and dlfferentiate the practices and 
objects which are crucial to understanding our own 
functioning and for which we as yet lack an adequate 
vocabulary, there will be difficulty" (Habermas, quoted by 
Spivak, 1988:x). 
It would perhaps be customary to conclude an exploration 
of the problems of race and racism in social work with a 
series of recommendations for change which would, if 
implemented, ensure that anti-racism replaced racism ~n 
the education, training and practice of social workers. 
The social work texts which I have analysed in this thesis 
typically adopt this course. However, for me to follow 
suit would directly contradict the view of racism that ~ 
have developed ln the preceding chapters. The problem is 
not amenable to the application of a once-for-all 
, so 1 ut i on ' . 
Having followed the discussion so far, even the idea of a 
'conclusion' may seem out of place, sitting somewhat 
uncomfortably with both the Gadamerian notion of the 
unending conversation that provides the intellectual and 
moral underpinning of understanding, and the 
deconstructive approach of Derrida which is also 
rigorously opposed to closure. Hermeneutics does not, in 
either form, offer the hope of a conclusion to the process 
of understanding. What it can perhaps offer is some ways 
of thinking about two broad areas of concern to what I 
have called the race and social work debate: the first of 
these involves our understanding of 'race' and the ways in 
which we construe issues of racism and anti-racism; the 
second involves strategy - the process of how we move on 
from where we are now,1 given that social work has yet to 
find a satisfactory modus operandi in relation to ethnic 
minority clients. The opening quotation (above) suggests 
the general orientation or attitude of this concluding 
chapter, although the position I wish to expand upon here 
is a long way from the model of communicative competence 
that Habermas would endorse. 
9.2 Construction of the 
'racism', 'anti-racism', 
reconsidered. 
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race 
and 
and social work problem: 
the 'black perspective' 
My contention has been that, so far, social work across 
ethnic, cultural and racial boundaries has been large1 
unsuccessful - at least from the perspective of many blac~ 
clients and black workers both within and without the 
formal social welfare system. The discussion in chapter 
one followed the changes - as documented in the social 
work literature - that practice, and understanding of the 
'prob1 em' , have gone through: the progressi on from 
assimilation to integration to cultural liberalism and 
pluralism has been recorded, as has the failure of 
'multiculturalism' to deal with the problem of endemic 
racism. Moves beyond multiculturalism have included the 
articulation of 'anti-racist' positions and the emergence 
of increasingly clearly framed demands for the 
incorporation of 'black perspectives' into all aspects of 
social work education, training and practice. This, I 
would argue, is the point that has been reached in the 
soci a1 work 1 i terature. 2 And it is at thi s poi nt that I 
have joined the debate, to try and understand what, in 
practice, follows from the attempt to adopt an anti-racist 
position and/or a black perspective on social work. 
Looking first at anti-racism: to define oneself or one's 
actions as 'anti-racist' suggests some prior understanding 
of the kind of entity 'racism' itself must be. The 
literature that I have examined seems to operate with a 
restricted understanding of this phenomenon and thus is 
led to propose forms of action that are, in my assessment, 
doomed to failure not because of ill-will or lack of 
commitment on the part of the anti-racist protagonists, 
but simply because they are being 'set up' to do something 
that cannot be achieved. My criticism of, for example, 
Domi ne 11 i ' s text i s not intended to excuse or condone 
racism, but rather to draw attention to the impossibility 
of the task of anti-racism as she conceives it. Opposing 
racism is not the same as removing racism, whether 
personal or institutional, and it is here, I have argued, 
that Oomi ne 11 i 's text breaks down. Exhortat ions 1 i ke hers 
can only work if the object of concern - in this case, 
racism - is under the conscious control of her readers. If 
it is not, then no act of will can dislodge it. 
Alternatively, if raClsm is viewed as a kind of poison or 
malfunction in the system of either the individu~l or 
social structure then different tactics may be requlred; 
but it should ~ti11 be possible to 'cure' the ailing 
system by the application of suitably strong 'medicine'.3 
At the level of a social system or organisation, this 
could perhaps take the form of direct intervention to 
affect its composition and management, through the 
Ivl 
implementation of equal opportunity policl'es B t ' 
h 'l d btl h' . u agaln, w 1 e ou ess aVl ng the potent i a 1 to' the 
't ' 1 mprove 
opportunl les open to people from ethnic minorit 
h f d ' f h Y groups, suc moves, oun er 1 t ey tr7at racism as an entity that ~an be s~rglcally rem~ved, as 1t were, leaving that system 
1 ntact 1 n a 11 part 1 cu 1 ars except that it 1 snow 
'not-racist' .4 
In this thesis, I ~rgue f~r a different understanding of 
racism, one that 1S der1ved from the philosophy of 
language, and presents racism as a cultural or linguistic 
resource rather than as a discrete item to be somehow 
slotted in to or removed from a system or individual at 
will. Such an understanding of racism, in turn, belongs 
with a reconceptualisation of the idea of race, and a move 
away from the reification of race. 
The use of race categories has such a long history that 
there is a tendency in our (Western) thinking to treat 
them as given, necessary and therefore unavoidable. 
Despite the lack of reputable scientific evidence for the 
existence of separate and immutable racial groupings, race 
remalns in use as a powerfully obvious organising 
principle. It is a culturally significant category and is 
therefore amenable to the same kind of treatment that 
hermeneutics applies to other such items. A hermeneutic 
approach acknowledges the presence of this category in our 
thinking, accepting that, while technically 'emptyl, we 
nonetheless use this term to mean something on our 
cultural map. We deploy the language of race as though it 
does indeed signify and as though we know what it 
means. 
Our commitment to race as an organising principle can be 
understood as an example of an unwarranted prejudice, 
using this term in the Gadamerian sense, and as such it is 
open to challenge. As I have indicated elsewhere, however, 
the conservative tendency of Gadamer's approach may 
mitigate the force of any such challenge and simply 
confirm the tradition in its tendency to operate within 
these particular racial parameters. But in spite of that, 
one could argue that, while the pernicious effects of 
racism are apparent in the lives of millions of people, 
the demands of phronesis oblige us to engage in ~ebate 
with this aspect of our own tradition. To avold ~he 
discussion or to simply change the subject to one that lS, 
in Rorty's terms, more "edifying" (1980: passim)~ ~uns 
counter to the demands of the hermeneutics of trad,t10n. 
Gadamer urges engagement with Otherness, whether the Other 
is encountered outside or as in this case, inside one's 
own tradition. To ignore' the chance to engage with an 
'alien' dimension of one's own tradition is, for ~adamer, 
to miss the opportunity to become increasingly geb17det. 
I -.IV 
In terms of a Derridean dynamic, the use of 
terminology is again unavoidable in that ideas of ~:~: 
structure an~ infi~trate many of'our basic contemporary 
conceptual hlerarchles. So any attempt to re-figure th 
. h . t· ese hlerarc les ~us. engage wlth race as a constitutive part 
of we~tern.thlnklng. R~c~ has a role in the maintenance of 
certaln. b~nary Op~osltlons, which can only be challenged 
from Wl thl n, as 1 t were, by usi ng the 1 anguage of race 
itself: The opposition 'white/black' can be opened up by 
reverslng the customary hierarchy and elevating 
'bl~c~ness' at th~ exp~nse of 'whiteness', and affirming a 
posltlve black ldentlty - as in the slogan of the early 
'seventies, "black is beautiful". But such a move only 
'succeeds' by employing the terms of the hierarchy, the 
race language, against itself. 
Gates writes of "the necessity of undermining the habit, 
in the West, of accounting for the Other's 'essence' in 
absolute terms, in terms that fix culturally defined 
differences into transcendent, 'natural' categories or 
essences. For, if we bel i eve that races exi st as thi ngs, 
as categories of being already 'there', we cannot escape 
the danger of generalizing about observed differences 
between human beings as if these differences were 
consistent and determined, a priori" (Gates, 1986:402). 
The influence of logocentrism can be seen at work in this 
apparent need for essential ising definitions of the kind 
Gates refers to. 
To turn now to consideration of the idea of a black 
perspective: Gadamerian hermeneutics proceeds on the 
assumption that it is possible to engage meaningfully with 
a representative from a different tradition; an encounter 
with difference offers the prospect of enhancing one's 
understanding both of the Other, and of one's own 
tradition. From this starting point, the idea of 
engagement with a black perspective can, it seems, be 
comfortably accommodated, as my discussion of Ahmad's case 
studies in chapter eight suggests. The ethical thrust of 
Gadamer's approach to problems of meaning and 
understanding seems to fit it very appropriately into the 
client-centred models of social work. 
In broader social work terms, the application of the 
hermeneutic approach would mean that white social workers, 
managers, teachers, treat seriously t~e understanding of 
their situation articulated by black cllents, students and 
colleagues and, in addition, use this inf~rmati~n as a 
basis for critical self-reflection. More easlly s~ld than 
done, to be sure, but suggestive of a general attltude to 
the Other that could be productive of greater m~t~al 
understanding. At the best, the hermeneutics of tradlt~on 
points towards the development of a "non-coerClve 
politics of .difference" (Code, 1991:303). But the 
criticism remalns that the hermeneut,·cs of tradition proceeds~ b~ a~commodation and incorporation of 
alternatlve v,ewpolnts, to maintain the status quo which 
f or the concerns of this thesl·s h ' 
, means a w ite-dominated 
consensus that continues to marginalise ethnic minority 
opinion. 
I~creasingly ~learly a~ticulated black critiques are being 
d'rec~ed agalnst soclal work education, training and 
practlce, as the current literature demonstrates. From the 
point of view ~f deconstructive analysis, the notion of 
'black perspectlves' has a lot of critical force 
challenging as it does the hegemonic views of whit~ 
academic and more broadly social opinion. Social work, in 
all its dimensions, is urged to adopt 'black 
perspectives'. But it is here that the idea of a 'black 
perspective' becomes altogether more complicated, and its 
status more problematic. My discussion of Ahmad's book, in 
chapter seven, suggests that a number of questions are 
raised by the appeal to black perspectives in social work: 
whose perspectives? whose social work? How radical a 
rethink of the social work enterprise does the black 
perspective literature suggest/entail? 
I would not attempt to minimise the importance of the 
development of black perspectives, nor suggest that the 
rights of black people to articulate their own analyses 
should be open to challenge. When any such gains or 
advances have been extremely hard-won, and remain 
vulnerable to attack, my position is not intended to 
criticise the existence or range of these commentaries and 
cri ti ques. However, the 1 ogi c of the argument I have 
pursued throughout is that text can, at best, only produce 
more text, without any definitive end-point being reached. 
Thus, engagement with a black perspective is a stage in a 
process, not an end in itself. Black perspectives do not, 
indeed cannot, provide the last word on the race and 
social work debate, and an opportunity will have been lost 
if they are allowed to simply solidify into the new 
orthodoxy. I suggest that what they do offer is a move 
towards the reversal of particular 'key' conceptual 
pairings - centre/margins, white/black, for example-
which in turn allows for the possibility (though not the neces~ity) of' reinscribing the opposition in a different 
order of textual signification. 
9.3 Moving on: a strategy for change. 
"Race is a text (an array of discursive practices), not an 
essence. It must be read with painstaking care and 
suspicion, not imbibed" (Gates, 1991:47). 
~uu 
The starting point for this discussion of strategy is the 
assertion common to both Gadamer's and Derrida's 
hermeneutics that ~e a~e always grounded within a 
particular social, h1stor1cal, political and cultural 
configuration a tradition, in Gadamer'S terms - which 
provides us with the language with which we think the 
world around us. Neither Gadamer nor Derrida offers any 
possibility of a prejudice-free place to stand whilst 
contemplating .one's own, or indeed any other, tradition. 
Gadamer's not1on of understanding cannot be divorced from 
the idea of involvement in a tradition. It is the 
tradition that provides the basic tools, the concepts with 
which we can think about ourselves and the Other and 
through which we can define the phenomena and events we 
encounter and the relations between them. The idea of 
unmediated perception 1S, 1n the end, literally 
meaningless. 
I have suggested that Gadamerian hermeneutics appeals to 
the moral-practical dimension of interaction with the 
Other, and as such offers a valuable point of contact with 
social work practice as currently conceptualised, 
particularly in relation to the client-centred approaches 
discussed earlier. In addition, I considered the 
centrality to hermeneutics of the dialogic nature of 
understanding, and its possible relevance to a process of 
self-criticism and developing self-knowledge: from a 
Gadamerian perspective, dialogue also provides opportunity 
for self-reflection. The encounter with the Other can be 
productive of self-criticism, in the manner envisaged by 
Marcus and Fischer (1986). 
One topic given prominence in the social work literature I 
examined was the social work encounter or relationship. 
This has been variously treated, being presented as a 
possible form of mystification by Dominelli, for example, 
but as a source of strength and a therapeutic resource by 
other authors. But however the relationship between social 
worker and client is conceived, it does, necessarily, 
involve an attempt at communication between at least two 
parties, who try to reach an understanding of the matter 
at hand the event or situation that has brought the particip~nts into contact - usually but not ~ecessarily 
the 'problem' presented by the client. In th1S co~tex~, 
the value of the conversational model of enqu1ry 1S 
apparent. The ethical and dialogic dimensions of 
understanding can come together to allow the development 
of relationships that are based on "tru~t, r~spect and 
caring" (Code, 1991 :108). Such relationsh1ps ~lll ~ot be 
easy to establish, on either side, but s~meth1ng wlll be 
learned in the attempt to make them a real1ty. 
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For deconstruction, the fact of cultural embedd d . 
. bl . th . t ' e ness 1 s 
,nescapa e J e p01n at 1ssue however is simpl h 
d t h 1 t 1 " ,y, were oes, ,e cu ura cr1~lc - of whatever denomination or 
conv1ct1on - ,sta~d, ~h1le formulating her criticism, and 
what are the 1mpl1ca~10ns of this situatedness? Can there 
be a ~lack p~rspect1v~ th~t ~s completely independent of 
t~e wh1te soc~al,and llngu1st1c matrix that it critiques? 
W1thout quest1on1ng the need for, or the existence of 
something called a 'black perspective', deconstructio~ 
interrogates the assumptions on which such a perspective 
is based. How can such a perspective be articulated and 
what are its relations to the broader white worldview? 
I have at various points looked to debates within feminist 
criticism and drawn limited parallels between the concerns 
of feminism and anti-racism; and here again, feminism 
offers some interesting insights, drawn from consideration 
of women as readers and writers, as producers and 
consumers of 'knowledge' in a system that is deeply 
androcentric. 5 Deconstruction urges an acknowledgement of 
the extent to which even critical thinking is beholden to 
the very conceptual apparatus it seeks to destroy. The 
point has been made over and again - there is no place 
outside language from which to apply one's critical lever. 
We speak and write from within a dominant tradition, 
however flawed we would claim it to be: in the end, "there 
is simply nowhere else to go" (Moi, 1985:81). 
And recognition of this unavoidable location in a 
particular linguistic network can be used to assess the 
validity of efforts to remove racism from our language, 
characterised in the phenomenon of 'political 
correctness'. I have suggested that 1 anguage i s never 
static, but is always in a state of dissemination. 
Therefore attempts to somehow 'freeze' a particular set of 
expressions as either 'correct' or 'incorrect' are at best 
misconceived, and at worst run the risk of becoming 
seriously repressive. This is not to say that we should 
use language thoughtlessly, and accept the impossibility 
of ever finally 'purifying' it as an excuse for gratuitous 
offensiveness. Social work is a field where language 
clearly does matter, and the process of establishi~g 
certain words or expressions as 'acceptable' and of rul1ng 
others out of order cannot be dismissed as mere wordplay. 
It 1S significant, for example, if we call people 
receiving state welfare payments "claimants" rather than 
"scroungers", or if we recognise only "immigrants" rather 
than "black British". Language use is not a trivial 
matter" as I have argued throughout. Recogni ~i ng the fact 
that language has the capacity to constra,n as ~ell as 
enable invites us to treat it with respect. But ,t does 
not give us the ability to expunge particular ideas from 
our thinking simply by removing certain words from our 
vocabulary. 
c.vc.. 
political correctness lS predicated on a misapprehension 
of what, ln this case, racism (and hence, also 
ant~-~a~ism) is. This statement does not imply a new 
def~~l~lO~ ~fllw~at '~acism' essentially is, because this 
v,'0u 7 0 a .. ack lnto precisely that logocentric trap 
lnto WhlCh polltlcal correctness has fallen. Rather, it is 
to suggest that language is altogether more comlex and 
subtle. and cannot b7 'cleansed' of racism by creating what wo~ld ln effect be ]us~ another (new) logocentric space in 
WhlCh the play of meanlng had temporarily been arrested. 
Attempts to 'purge' language in this way seem to me both 
regresslve and repressive, proceeding in a spirit of 
intolerance that is far removed from the open and 
questioning stance of much of the post-structuralist 
thinking from which it draws. It becomes a way of stopping 
discussion, rather that opening up a discursive field for 
further exploration. In Derridean terms, it sets up a new 
opposition, creating a new centre of the linguistically 
'pure', and banishing to the margins everyone else whose 
language use does not - for whatever reason - conform. 
For Derrida, then, the practice of deconstruction lS 
heavily, and necessarily, implicated in the system it 
interrogates, and depends on the terms and concepts ~f 
that system even while working to undermine them. The 
process of reversing particular hierarchical oppositifr-ns 
very clearly remains within the 'old' economy of 
differences, but deconstruction does not remain there: 
" to remaln in this phase is still to operate on the 
terrain of and from within the deconstructed system. By 
means of this double, and precisely stratified, dislodged 
and dislodging, writing, we must also mark the interval 
between inversion, which brings low what was high, and the 
irruptive emergence of a new "concept", a concept that can 
no longer be, and never could be, included in the previous 
regi me" (Derri da, 1987: 42) . 
As these remarks by Derrida indicate, deconstruction has 
the potential to surprise, to take us beyond the expected 
- even beyond the 'rational'. Indeed many of Derrida's own 
analyses have precisely that result, coming to conclusions 
that seem counter-intuitive or downright irrational, when 
measured against the current standards of 'rationality'. 
But these, Derrida would argue, are not transcendental 
standards; they are generated from within a partic~lar 
metaphysical system, one that is governed by logocentrlsm, 
and within which his own analyses are placed. Derrida's 
position is not 'irrational' in the usual sense, in that 
his approach to textual analysis. is 't~orough', 
'rigorous', and indeed 'scholarly' - agaln when Judged by 
the prevailing standards associated with those terms. 
However, the inexorable logic of his line of argument 
203 
leads to conclusions that are at variance with everyday 
thinking. :hus, decons~ruction unsettles old habits of 
thought, w1thout offer1ng any new certainties to replace 
them. It allo~s for the emergence of ideas that were 
literally unth1n~able before, with the 'old' conceptual 
apparatus, but Wh1Ch nonetheless have been drawn out of an 
analysis of precisely that system of thought. 
So, deconstruction involves a further turn or moment - the 
~ttemp~ ,to 'reinscribe' the opposition under 
1nvest1gat1on, so that the bases on which that hierarchy 
was founded are themselves called into question. Derrida's 
treatment of th~ pairings presence/absence, speech/writing 
or centre/marg1n, for example, show this process at work. 
The :eit~er/or' logic that such binary distinctions depend 
on 1S d1ssolved, and the attributes of each 'side' of the 
divide can be re-thought in a new logic of 'both/and'. 
Derrida's approach makes room for the element of 
undecidability that logocentrism seeks to exclude. 
Acknowledging the inevitable involvement in a particular 
language/practice network does not invalidate the 
enterprise of criticism, or necessarily reduce the force 
of challenges to the particular tradition from elements at 
the social or intellectual 'margins' indeed, 
deconstructive criticism typically starts at the social or 
textual margins. Rather, it directs us away from the 
search for a 'pure' language as a solution to the problem 
of racism and towards an understanding of the process of 
change which can be put in train when a range of 
unexamined assumptions and conceptual 'givens' are 
critically investigated. This process has a few sign 
posts, and no certain destination, but has the potential 
to lead to the emergence of 'new' and unexpected ways of 
thinking. I leave the 'final' comment here with Derrida 
(quoted by Culler, 1983:179): "we are still at the stage 
of suspecting that something is going to have to change in 
our old ways of speaking, but not yet knowing what". So 
how, in the meantime, to proceed? 
The textual nature of social work is demonstrated at every 
turn: the essays, process recordings, placement reports, 
the case records, applications, letters, case conferences, 
court reports: from the process of applying to go on a 
training course, through the training programme itself, to 
the daily practice of 'profe~sional' ,workers -:- ~ocial 
work is inescapably involved w1th read1ng and wr1t1ng. I 
have suggested therefore that within a critical practice 
there could be a place for a form of textual analysis. I 
am certainly not alone in making a connection between 
social work and literature, as England's text (1986) makes 
explicit. England's proposal for, the estab~ishment of 
libraries of practice accounts wr1tten by soc1al workers 
1S innovative and offers an imaginative way of moving 
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social work practice into 
self-critical mode. However, 
proposals go far enough, and 
emphasis based on a different 
sources. 
a more reflective and 
I do not feel that his 
I would suggest a different 
choice of literary critical 
Social workers should indeed be encouraged to write 
accounts of their practice and to think and write 
critically about the existing theoretical literature _ 
tho~g~ real~stically, in the current economic and 
pol1t1cal .cl1mate, the scope for the average practitioner 
to engage 1n these activities will be limited, leaving the 
bulk of such work to be done by 'academics'. The texts 
prod~ced will provide examples of the operation of a 
part1cular language-practice network which can then be 
critically examined in their turn. Deconstruction suggests 
a way of opening up issues of concern within social work 
by engaging with text, confronting 'slips' of language, 
language that is not politically correct, examining the 
rhetorical strategies employed in different pieces of 
writing, and their effects or implications. 
And this approach can be generalised to the analysis of 
patterns of activity as well as written language: both 
are, within Derrida's terms, part of the "general text". 
Although deconstruction is a text-based approach, the 
dismantling of the binary pairings of logocentrism is not 
without concrete effect. A practical implication of the 
reversal of hierarchical oppositions can be seen in 
Dominelli 's proposal for an apprenticeship model of social 
work (1988) where part of a student social worker's 
practical training would include a period of supervision 
by a black supervisor. Deconstruction, then, need be 
neither esoteric nor abstract in effect, but can form part 
of a strategy for engaging with the practical and 
theoretical dimensions of the social work and race 
debate. 
My own approach, to put it at its most blunt, has been to 
argue that Gadamer's hermeneutics offers a useful 
regulative yardstick for practice, but that something else 
is needed to supplement it. 6 The choice of supplement 
explored here, based on the understanding of racism as a 
linguistic resource, has been an approach that is itself 
directly concerned with the operation of language: I am 
suggesting that deconstruction can illuminate precisely 
those points of strain that Gadamer tries to accommodate. 
The discourse of social work, of race and anti-racism, can 
be investigated through the deconstructive reading of 
chosen texts. 
Such reading and analysis is not designed to provide a 
racism-free version of social work, nor .even a n~w 
understanding of what social work 'really' 1S. Rather 1t 
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is an attempt to interrogate the 'everyday' or 
'commonsense' understanding we have of both the phenomenon 
of 'race' and the activity designated as 'anti-racism', as 
this operationalised in the practice known as 'social 
work'. Within a deconstructive reading, all these terms -
which I have here put in inverted commas - would be placed 
"under erasure" (sous rature) , to i ndi cate thei r 
provisional nature. It is only by accepting the way in 
which our understanding of such terms is continually open 
to revision that we can begin to ensure that the process 
of developing anti-racist social work practice is 
accessible to a true plurality of voices and traditions. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
NOTES 
1. Having started with a number of disclaimers, I would 
aga1n want to emphasise that 'strategy', in the sense in 
which it is used here, does not imply passage towards a 
known end-point; that is, we are not in the realms of the 
technical-rational solution or 'fix'. 
2 . See Domi nell i ( 1988), Ahmad (1991) J CCETSW (1991), and 
NCDP (1 991 ) . 
3. Though metaphors of this kind have a knack of 
backfiring see Derrida's discussion of the use of the 
word IIpharmakos" in Plato (Derrida, 1972). 
4. Harding (1986), as I 
highlights the limitations 
position. 
indicated in chapter two, 
of the "equal opportunities" 
5. See Harding (1986), Culler's dicu$sion of Hreading as a 
woman lJ (1983:43-64), and Moi (1985: particularly chapter 
four) . 
6. I use the term "supplement" here with the double sense 
explored by Derrida (1976). 
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